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Bereavement, Storytelling, and Reconciliation: 
Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians* 
Frida Kerner Furman 
 
Abstract 
Despite the ongoing conflict and the general neglect by the media, power brokers, and the 
public, grassroots organizations in the Middle East persist in their dedication to “people to 
people” diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians. The Parents Circle-Families Forum is a 
bi-national NGO committed to peacebuilding and reconciliation between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Its most distinctive features are its 
membership, composed of 300 families from each side who have lost a close relative to the 
conflict, and its use of storytelling to connect the two sides. Bereaved individuals develop the 
capacity for empathy and moral responsibility beyond their own people by encountering “the 
other” via personal stories of loss and suffering. In pairs, Palestinian and Israeli members 
then share these stories with students in each society, modeling compassion and human 
solidarity, in an effort to bring about social transformation. This paper, based on ethnographic 
research recently conducted in Israel and the West Bank, considers the moral dynamics of 
these encounters and presentations, and their potential contribution to reconciliation and 
conflict transformation.  
 
*I would like to thank my colleagues Elizabeth A. Kelly, Charles Strain, and David Wellman 
for reading earlier versions of this article and providing valuable feedback.  The research for 
this paper was partially supported by a Competitive Research Grant of the University 
Research Council and by Academic Affairs' funding for Vincent de Paul Professors, DePaul 
University. 
Introduction 
In the last week of June, 2012, a surprising image graced newspapers throughout the 
world. The photograph, taken in Belfast, showed a smiling Queen Elizabeth II shaking hands 
with an equally cheerful Martin McGuinness, once the commander of the Irish Republican 
Army and currently Northern Ireland's deputy first minister. This gesture of reconciliation 
between formerly bitter enemies symbolically put to rest the decades-long bloody conflict 
between the Protestant Unionists and the Catholic Republicans (Cowell, 2012).   Does this 
image offer hope for the resolution of other seemingly intractable conflicts, such as the one 
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between Israelis and Palestinians? The situation in the Middle East looks so discouraging at 
the present time that it is difficult to imagine anyone there feeling hopeful about peace. Yet 
despite the bleak outlook, there are grassroots organizations that continue to persevere in their 
commitment to peace.  
The Parents Circle-Families Forum (PCFF) is just such an organization: a bi-national 
NGO committed to peacebuilding and reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Palestinians 
from East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Its most distinctive features are its membership, 
which consists of 300 families from each side who have lost a close relative to the conflict, 
and its use of storytelling to connect people across the divide.  
In recent years, storytelling has received attention as an important method used by 
adversaries in reconciliation work across the globe, usually in situations following violent 
conflict. Less is known about groups' use of this approach in the context of ongoing conflict 
and asymmetrical power dynamics, as is the case in Israel-Palestine (Maoz, 2011); this is 
precisely the focus of this paper.  
An American social ethicist, I recently spent two months in Jerusalem doing 
qualitative field research with the PCFF.  I attended several presentations in English given to 
visitors from abroad by one Palestinian and one Israeli PCFF member and conducted in-
depth, open-ended interviews (typically lasting between one and two hours) with twelve 
members in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Beit Jala, including the then Israeli and Palestinian co-
directors of the organization.  Interviewees were selected by the PCFF staff based on 
members' availability and English competency and were evenly divided between Israelis and 
Palestinians.  Working with a schematic interview protocol and probing for deeper responses, 
I asked study participants about their views of and involvement with the PCFF: what drew 
them to the organization; in what ways they felt connected to its mission, values, and 
methods; their views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of the "other"; the role the 
organization has had—if any—in effecting a change in their perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviors toward the other; their involvement in the organization's activities; and their view 
on the role that transformation at the personal level, an important goal of the PCFF and of 
person-to-person diplomacy, can have on the social level.  I gleaned further data about the 
PCFF and its members from the organization's extensive website (Parents Circle Families 
Forum) and videos it has produced (Parents Circle-Families Forum, It Won’t Stop until We 
Talk). 
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In this paper, I explore the unique contribution to reconciliation and peacebuilding 
made by the PCFF built around bonding through storytelling about loss and bereavement.  
While the PCFF sees itself as an educational organization as opposed to a political one, I 
argue that its methods are profoundly political, as they challenge and help transform each 
side's received cultural knowledge about itself and about the other.  
Encountering the “Other” 
After his brother Yusuf was killed by an Israeli soldier at the entrance to his village in 
the West Bank, Jewish coworkers called Khaled to offer condolences, and to apologize.  But 
he refused to talk with them.  From the start, his anger flared up, feeding his hatred even for 
those Israelis he had known before, because “everyone on the other side is guilty of what has 
happened to your brother.”  Having lost his direction in life, he stopped working and spent 
most of his time sitting at home, thinking.  This took place in 2000, the year the Second 
Intifada broke out.   
Two years later, Khaled's little brother Sayed, fourteen years old, was shot dead as 
well.  Sighing wearily, Khaled says to me now, head in his hands, “It's like that, again and 
again, the same drama.”  This time, members of the Parents Circle-Families Forum (PCFF), 
at the time an exclusively Jewish Israeli organization, hoped to meet with Khaled and his 
family and provide them with some comfort.  Once again, his first reaction was refusal, 
because they were “the enemy, from those who killed my brother.”  But “those people are 
talking about peace,” argued his mother.  “Everyone wants peace,” retorted Khaled, skeptical.  
“All the people are talking about peace.  They are lying to us.  They are killing our children.”  
Yet she insisted, arguing that these were bereaved families, “like us.”   
Eventually, Khaled relented, largely because he was driven by curiosity: “I had a 
question, ‘Are [PCFF members] crazy people?  Have they lost their minds?’”  He could not 
fathom a rational connection between the reality of losing a loved one and the desire to meet 
the other.  “They killed your brother, and they're interested in meeting the other side, the 
perpetrator?”  So he opened up his home, and they came and told stories of their own 
relatives’ deaths.  Khaled listened attentively to each story, remaining silent himself, and “in 
the story of every one of them, I found my story.”  He could feel in these speakers the same 
kind of pain now familiar within himself.  And then, not knowing exactly how this happened, 
he said, “‘I also have a story like every one of you.’  And I started talking about Yusuf and 
Sayed, for the first time.” And when he finished his story, Khaled announced, ‘I think I 
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belong to this group, I want to be in this group.  I think we should bring peace, we should 
have peace here.’”   
At the time of my interview with Khaled Abu Awwad in 2010, he was the Palestinian 
co-director of the Parents Circle-Families Forum, whose Palestinian office is located in the 
town of Beit Jala in the West Bank, some six miles south of Jerusalem.  (Actual names are 
used for PCFF's staff members, while names given to other study participants are fictitious.)  
How do we explain Khaled's seemingly sudden determination to engage with members of the 
PCFF, given his previous resistance to meet with Israeli Jews?  What motivates bereaved 
families to embrace the other and to join together in shared peacebuilding?  Why does the 
work of the PCFF work?  And what can the PCFF teach us about storytelling, reconciliation, 
and peacebuilding efforts in such a fraught environment?  These are central questions I 
address in this paper. 
Peacebuilding and Challenges to Identity   
It is a well-known fact that identity issues are often located at the core of conflicts 
such as this one (Lederach, 2003; Volkan, 1997).  While the PCFF tries to create a safe space 
for meeting the other, it takes a good deal of courage to enter that space since one's identity is 
likely to be challenged on a variety of fronts.  First, the trauma of the loved one's death 
engages difficult emotional and psychological responses that may vary from one person to 
the next, since each has a distinctive way of handling loss.  Undoubtedly, all come to the 
table with a major sense of vulnerability about revealing their personal pain, as mourning in 
general, but especially given traumatic circumstances, can be a lonely, private, and isolating 
process.  Several study participants told me how painful telling the story of their loss was for 
them, particularly at the beginning of their PCFF involvement.  For Tzvi, for example, “It 
was very, very difficult ...  to speak about my father, to call myself a bereaved son.... The 
Parents Circle gave me the ability to personally deal better with what happened in my 
family.”  This is in no way surprising, for, as anthropologist Michael Jackson (2002) argues, 
“Every place of violence and social suffering becomes, for a time, a place of silence…. At 
such times, traumatic experiences tend to be salted away in subjectivity, too painful and 
personal to be told” (p. 132).  Some experience the telling of their stories of bereavement as 
leading to profound healing from a seeming abyss, as a bereaved Israeli father in a PCFF 
produced video poignantly puts it: “Meeting bereaved parents gave my life meaning.  
Meeting with them gives me a reason to get up in the morning” (Parents Circle-Families 
Forum, It Won't Stop Until We Talk).  Yet others say it took them years before they were 
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willing or able to join and to engage in this kind of deeply painful revelation.  These 
individuals may have been wisely self-protective, for in telling traumatic stories, there is 
always the risk of becoming traumatized once again (Bar-On, 2006, p. 41).     
Existential concerns also accompany traumatic events such as the death of loved ones 
in the context of violent conflict.  After all, to use the language of religious studies, death is a 
fundamental limit situation, one that challenges our sense of self, questions the predictability 
of our world, and brings home the reality of our own mortality.  In addition, in the context of 
the Middle East conflict, ongoing fear acts as a profound threat to self, family, and nation in 
the experience of both Israelis and Palestinians.   
Finally, social identity is dramatically challenged when adversaries choose to meet the 
purported enemy with peace and reconciliation as central goals.  Group-based identities tend 
to be essentialized, built on the constructed binary of “us/good” versus “them/bad” 
(Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008, p. 127); these constructions populate collective narratives, 
markedly so in contexts characterized by long-term conflict.  Therefore, to enter a space 
where PCFF members encounter the other side involves a challenge to that secure national 
narrative that informs personal identity and aligns it with that of one's fellow countrymen.  
Openness to the other's suffering becomes a subversive activity of sorts: the assumptions of 
the witness to such suffering—or to the storytelling about it—are thereby challenged when 
encountering what some scholars call “dangerous memories” (Metz, 1972; Ostovich, 2002; 
Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008).  The term, originally coined by Walter Benjamin, may be 
used to interpret the PCFF's work of exposing members and other audiences to the 
experiences and suffering of the other, which are mostly kept hidden from the populace by 
master narratives, that is, those internalized dominant cultural storylines that form the 
blueprint of national consciousness (Andrews, 2004, p. 1) and shape social identity.  
Khaled recalls a situation that, in addition to his own experience, represents an 
illustration of dangerous memories and their impact.  When the PCFF first became binational, 
it organized a meeting in the village of Deir al-Hatab, near Nablus, to invite bereaved 
Palestinian families to join the organization.  A couple of Israeli parents talked about the loss 
of their sons, after which one of the Palestinian men said in response, 
You know, before we met you, we were very happy whenever we heard that 
an Israeli soldier had been killed; but now, after meeting with you—the 
parents—it will be harder for us to have this kind of happiness when we hear 
something like this, because we know that they are your sons, just like we 
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have sons.  We know now that you are suffering, and that the pain that you 
have is the reason for your loss of soul.  It will not be easy any more for us to 
hear, or to be happy with, such news. 
Khaled offers me the following commentary on that father's declaration: “For me, I 
think this is the point of our work.  And this is what we try to bring to the people.”  This 
perspective goes hand in hand with the characterization of PCFF members as “messengers of 
reconciliation” offered by Nir Oren, the then Israeli co-director of the PCFF, whom I met in 
the Israeli office  of the PCFF, located in a suburb of Tel Aviv.  In effect, the Palestinian 
father's realization that Israeli parents suffer when their soldier children are killed provides an 
example of an exposure to a dangerous—or disruptive— memory; in this case, the Israelis' 
telling of their painful losses intrudes into the Palestinian's worldview.  Such exposure to 
dangerous memories leads to the recognition of the existence and legitimacy of alternative 
narratives and has an important influence in reshaping one's view of the other, especially in 
contexts where strategies that elicit empathy are put in play.  
Not surprisingly, participants in PCFF dialogues run the risk of social marginalization 
from their own communities through accusations of being “traitors” in the case of Israelis, or 
possible collaborators engaged in “normalization” in the case of Palestinians, that is, 
participating in activities with Israelis despite the continuing occupation; after all, these are 
perceived as culturally and politically dangerous activities.  While this possibility does not 
materialize across the board—most participants in fact told me they receive support from 
their families for their PCFF work—everyone is aware of such risks.  
Not all participants are initially sure that the non-violent commitment of the PCFF is 
congruent with their views, as some, at any rate, experienced impulses toward revenge soon 
after the death of a relative.  Others are not certain when they first attend a meeting that it is 
peace they are fundamentally after, or that it is possible to make peace with the other side.  
For example, Robi Damelin, an Israeli bereaved mother and long time PCFF staff member, is 
featured in a PCFF video approaching a Palestinian woman who attends her first PCFF 
gathering (Parents Circle-Families Forum, It Won't Stop Until We Talk).  The woman looks 
anxious and suspicious and soon expresses anger about the Israeli policies that cause her 
people suffering.  Robi looks into her eyes and gently tells her, “I see your pain. I know what 
it is.”  The camera cuts to another scene as the women embrace.  Robi's recognition and 
acknowledgement of the woman's suffering allows the latter, at least temporarily, to suspend 
her political stance, set her anger aside, and accept the empathy extended to her.   
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Empathy and Moral Inclusion 
Palestinians have ample cause to hate Israeli soldiers, given the latter’s role and 
actions as safe-keepers of the Israeli occupation, akin to Israelis’ hatred for suicide bombers 
and for those Gazan organizations that regularly send rockets into the Israeli city of Sderot, 
targeting civilians.  Yet in the course of an hour or two, we have seen what might be called 
“conversion” experiences taking place on the part of bereaved Palestinians.  What do we 
learn from such poignant responses to the suffering of the enemy communicated through 
storytelling?  Empathy is clearly at work here, insofar as seeing the suffering of the other 
opens up the possibility of identification with and compassion toward the other’s pain, a 
dynamic that has received a great deal of scholarly attention in what some call, referring to 
the present time, the “age of empathy” (de Wall, 2009; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003).  This 
dynamic seems to be operative in this context in rather extraordinary circumstances in at least 
three ways.  First, empathy is extended across enemy lines in the course of continuing 
conflict, in contrast to the more common post-conflict efforts at reconciliation following 
ethnic or nationalist discord.  Second, empathy develops across a highly asymmetrical 
political reality, given the Israeli occupation of the Occupied Territories and its consequences 
for the Palestinian population.  And third, empathy emerges between parties who have been 
traumatized through the loss of their children, parents, or siblings, suffering not due to illness, 
old age, or natural disaster, but perceived by each side to be the result of morally indefensible 
acts of violence.   
 Empathy is thus a critical emotional response operative in PDFF dialogue encounters, 
encouraging bonding across the divides.  We may view the content of the exchanges—the 
sharing of dangerous memories—that take place within the auspices of the PCFF as the raw 
material for empathy to do its work, with empathy as the  internal affective change allowing 
for a significant shift in perspective about the other, including elements of personal 
experience and collective realities.  
Participants’ courage and willingness to engage in dialogue set the stage for the 
possibility of personal and social change.  Finding commonality in suffering becomes a 
transformative moment in these encounters.  As Pam Kleinot (2011) suggests, each side is 
able to withdraw its hatred by witnessing each other's suffering, which mirrors one’s own (p. 
106); she adds that “[a]cknowledging each other’s pain replaces blame” (p. 108).  Perhaps 
this is the beginning, as well, of a shift away from righteous victimhood, a theme we will 
return to.  When the Palestinian father asserts that he will no longer rejoice when an Israeli 
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soldier is killed, he is in fact engaged in a form of moral conversion of the sort Kleinot 
addresses.  In addition, through shared storytelling about their experiences of loss and pain, 
he has found commonality and bonded with members of the other side, and in so doing he has 
expanded his circle of moral responsibility from a position of exclusion of Israelis to one of 
inclusion, initially of those of his acquaintance.  Randa also reveals a commitment to greater 
moral inclusivity when she tells me that through her participation in the PCFF she feels 
strongly that “I can’t let one of my people hurt one of them,” referring to the Israeli friends 
and colleagues she has made through the PCFF: “They are now part of my reality.”  A new 
kind of “we” (Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008, p. 148) has emerged for Randa and for other 
members as their taken-for-granted assumptions have been contested via their exposure to 
their former enemies.   
The broadening of moral responsibility we see here may well have a necessary 
antecedent, as Michalinos Zembylas (2006) suggests: “Witnessing is above all a practice of 
reconceiving the Other as a subject” (p. 316).  For as is well known antagonism and conflict 
are triggered and sustained through the stereotyping and vilification of the perceived enemy.  
Before attitudes can change, the other must be perceived as a human being “just like us,” that 
is, with a distinct personality, a history, and a life.  Face to face encounters that reveal the 
suffering of the parties involved decidedly facilitate this kind of recognition.  Witnessing of 
this sort involves more than being a spectator to the other's experience; it involves learning to 
“see differently when one confronts others’ suffering,” resulting in the widening of one's 
memory “to include the Other's memory” (Zembylas & Bekerman 2008, p. 145).  Such 
process has the capacity to develop trust in and solidarity with the other.  
This shift in moral attitude takes place among Israelis as well as Palestinians, as 
demonstrated by Nir when, some years ago, he attended a parents’ meeting following his 
son’s participation in the PCFF's summer camp for bereaved families, which served as Nir’s 
introduction to the organization.  Largely unacquainted with Palestinians at the time—not 
unusual for many Israelis—Nir, a social worker by training, felt ashamed when he met 
bereaved Palestinian parents who were his professional counterparts—doctors, government 
officials, corporate managers—realizing they did not fit his image of the Palestinian peasant 
working on his field.  Hence began his openness to meeting the other and expanding the 
range of his moral imagination; soon thereafter he attended a PCFF weekend retreat, which 
he found to be a “euphoric” experience, as he was able to tell of his mother’s death several 
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years earlier during a suicide bombing with the feeling that the other side was “containing my 
story,” that is, listening attentively, without judgment or angry retort.  
Empathic Listening 
Nir raises here the important role that listening must play if storytelling is to be a 
productive tool of reconciliation.  This approach only works when the storyteller can count 
on an audience that listens with respect and an absence of contestation, at least in the short 
term. Empathic listening is taught to PCFF members so they can hear the other’s narrative, 
even if they disagree with the perspective of the speaker, a difficult but essential exercise if 
trust is to be developed. (See Furman, 2009-2010, for an analysis of compassionate listening 
in the service of reconciliation.)  Yehudit, an Israeli bereaved mother, tells me of the time 
when a mixed group of PCFF members went to Yad Vashem, the Holocaust museum located 
in Jerusalem.  Seeing photos of Nazis with dogs in one of the exhibits, a Palestinian bereaved 
mother declared, “‘This is exactly like Israeli soldiers with dogs in Nablus.’”  This 
association was difficult for Yehudit to hear, since for her the Israeli army uses dogs to find 
explosives and is, therefore, not comparable to the Nazis’ genocidal motivations.  “But that’s 
the way she sees it; that was her impression.”  So provisionally Yehudit let the woman’s 
interpretation stand as an expression of her experience.  “It is important to listen to it from 
their point of view, and then it brings empathy.”  For the sake of the other, Yehudit did not 
argue, as “one has to be open to recognizing the other’s right to have a different narrative.”  
This view is consistent with the practice of compassionate listening (Furman, 2009-2010).  In 
the long run, Yehudit and others believe that “If you are part of the Forum, you have to be 
encouraged enough to tell yourself to say the way you see things, and to listen to the way they 
see things. I think otherwise you cannot be together.”  
Unlike some groups committed to coexistence whose work focuses exclusively on 
finding commonality across the board (Maoz, 2011), the PCFF does not shy away from 
addressing disagreement, both at the leadership and membership levels.  The organization is 
said to have become binational, in part, because the Palestinians “gave the Israelis an 
ultimatum in 2003, noting that either the organization became a joint organization and they 
started to share the work more evenhandedly or they would leave the organization” (Gawerc, 
2012, p. 207). Since that time, the PCFF has had to address challenging issues calling for 
greater symmetry and equality within the organization, including the equitable distribution of 
staff, salaries, and authority for the Palestinian and Israeli administrators and their respective 
offices.  In addition, there is a recognition that each side is fundamentally concerned about 
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different things—Palestinians with seeking justice and freedom from the occupation, Israelis 
with pursuing security—with the PCFF representing a sort of microcosm of the conflict as a 
whole (Gawerc, 2012).  But, as Michelle Gawerc (2012) argues in regards to the PCFF and 
other  Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding organizations, “These groups may have been 
reflections of the macrocosm, but unlike the macrocosm, they were still talking when others 
were not, trying to build trust, and trying to deal constructively with the discord” (p. 152).  As 
a result, according to both Khaled and Nir, trust has been largely achieved within their 
organization. 
At their organization-wide meetings, members characterize their exchanges in images 
suggesting lively and emotional debate.  “Very clashing,” Nava tells me. Full of “loud 
arguments,” recounts Marwaan.  More expansively, Lev says, “We see things from different 
angles…. We don’t agree immediately on things, and sometimes the shouting goes up, right 
up to the ceiling.”  Yet he concludes by saying that “after a very heated discussion … we 
come out even more convinced that we need to work together to put an end to the 
bloodshed.”  Nir informs me that in a large member seminar in 2006, members of both sides 
were told to “ask the difficult questions” of one another. Some people became alarmed, afraid 
that this approach would “ruin us.”  But questions, sometimes provocative ones, were asked, 
such as, “How come you don’t reject the suicide bombers?”  “How come you send your son 
to the army?”  Early in the seminar, an argument arose as to whether or not “to continue in 
this vein or continue [exclusively] trying to find mutuality.”  Members concluded that “the 
Parents Circle was strong enough to start fighting….  We believe we don’t just want to have 
hummus and hibukim [hugs],” shorthand for superficially good relations that avoid deeper 
disagreements.  What this account suggests is that while the PCFF begins with the painful 
task of bonding individuals through their stories of personal and familial suffering, the 
method does not stop there.  As Maoz (2011) opines, the story-telling model “combines 
interpersonal interaction with interaction through group identities, subsequently combining 
the formation of personal ties with discussion of the conflict and of power relations” (p. 120).  
There is a move that takes place, therefore, from exposure to the other to the challenging 
engagement with political realities affecting—typically differentially—those on each side of 
the divide.  
Recognition 
Much has been made in the scholarly literature of recent years of the significance of 
recognition as a moral value.  Beyond the more generalized philosophical and existential 
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meanings that recognition may embed, there are important local meanings that deserve 
attention in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Both populations, as is the case in 
other ethnic or nationalist conflicts, suffer from dehumanizing, denigrating characterizations 
by the other side.  Palestinians feel that the condemnation leveled at suicide bombers is 
unjustly extended to them as a matter of course by the Israeli populace in general, shaped by 
the mainstream Israeli media and, especially in recent times, by right wing government 
officials.  As a result, there is a palpable and urgent desire among the Palestinians I 
interviewed for the recognition of their humanity.  Randa, a mother of five whose two 
brothers were killed by the Israeli Army, reveals this sentiment whenever she tells her story.  
Constructing an imaginary message to the soldier who killed her favorite brother, she says:  
If I face you, I will never cut you to pieces, I will never be a monster like you. 
I will invite you to live with my family for two days, where you will find that 
we are human, that we deserve to live exactly as you do…. If you give me a 
chance to show you that I’m here, that I’m not an animal, that I’m not with 
horns, then I think I will succeed [in showing you my humanity.]  
The Israelis that I talk with have been deeply informed by egalitarian commitments, 
even before joining the PCFF, but their sensitivity to Palestinian suffering has been 
significantly expanded through their joint dialogues and activities.  Israelis, in my view, seek 
a parallel kind of recognition from their Palestinian counterparts in the PCFF.  They wish to 
be reinstated as moral human beings, to be rehabilitated, if you will, from the Palestinian 
characterization of all Israelis modeled after soldiers assigned to the West Bank, whose 
actions are perceived as vicious and humiliating toward Palestinians.  They too want to be 
seen as individuals worthy of respect, as those who disagree with the occupation and who 
affirm respect for human life and dignity, Israeli and Palestinian alike.  So the dialogue 
functions as a context for the mutual recognition of both suffering and moral character for 
both sides of the divide, facilitating the understanding of one another as embodied persons, 
not simply as the grand abstraction that the other typically connotes (O'Connor, 1998, p. 
211).  
Equivalence of Suffering? 
Openness to the other at PCFF gatherings is shaped for many members by perceptions 
of equivalence when it comes to their losses, despite the asymmetry of political locations 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  A central shared value seems to be the sacredness of 
human life, which likely derives from humanistic, liberal values, but also from each of the 
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three Abrahamic religions represented in the conflict.  Yehudit, an Israeli woman who lost 
her son in 1997, for example, explains the bonding among PCFF members as “being part of 
the same sorrow and the same grief and the same feeling.”  Jamal, a Palestinian who lost his 
son to the conflict, argues, in turn, for the moral leveling of suffering when he tells his West 
Bank village that bereaved Israelis “are suffering, not from the checkpoints and not from the 
occupation; but they suffer from the terrorists, whose acts don’t differentiate between whites 
or blacks, Arabic or Jewish, American or Swedish.”   
Not all study participants express this attitude, however.  For example, Layla, a 
Palestinian woman whose brother died while in an Israeli prison, recalls a time when she 
addressed Israeli members of a PCFF’s women’s group, who of course are also bereaved:  
“I admit that you are hurt.  I admit that you are in pain.  But your pain is not 
equal.  It can never be equal to my pain.  I want you to imagine that you are 
sleeping in my house [in a West Bank refugee camp], and to see how the 
[Israeli] army used to break our doors and come into our houses and take us 
all.  Or to be at the check points and to see what they do to us—the way they 
humiliate us, the way they call us names.”  
Similarly, Hadassah, an Israeli Jew who lost her son while he served in the army, expresses 
great frustration about the “conventionality” of some Israeli PCFF members.  Reporting on a 
joint meeting of the organization, she remembers how a Palestinian woman had told what 
happened when her son was killed, and about all the terrible things she had endured.  “And 
one of the Israeli girls says, ‘I tried to understand you, but you are not trying to understand 
us,’ and I almost died when she said that.”  Pointedly addressing the asymmetry of the 
conflict, reflected as well in the PCFF membership, Hadassah asks rhetorically, “What do 
they have to understand, with all the luxury, with all the democracy [available in Israel]?  
When your son dies here, you are recognized for your whole life as a bereaved family and 
financially supported.” 
Transcending Victimization 
Intractable ethnic and nationalist conflicts typically lead to feelings of victimization 
on both sides, sometimes manifested in competitive ways, as in claiming that “We are more 
victimized than you are.” In fact, Vamik Volkan (1985) uses the term “egoism of 
victimization” to characterize situations in which “there is no real empathy for suffering 
experienced by a group's traditional enemies, although it may be as severe as that of the 
group itself—or even worse” (p. 222).  In this particular Middle Eastern locale, both the 
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Holocaust and the Nakba (the “catastrophe” of 1948 for Palestinians) act as the historical 
antecedents for more recent losses, thereby justifying for each side claims of greater victim 
status, typically based on ignorance about the adversaries' pain.  In the absence of 
communication across the divide, people often remain immobilized by their grief, by their 
anger, and by this self-definition as victims.  
According to both Palestinian and Israeli members, encountering the other results in a 
shift of self-perception and relief from the experience of being victims.  For example, during 
a public lecture, Saleh declares assertively, “I cannot live in the [refugee] camp and be a 
victim all the time,” hence rejecting that label.  Nir captures this sentiment as well, and 
expands on it, when he tells me that during his first three-day seminar with the PCFF, “I 
could hear their [Palestinian] story without fighting about who is the greater victim.”  He 
came to realize that “I don’t want to be a victim anymore.  Although I am a ‘registe red 
victim,’ I don’t want to act upon it as if I am a victim.  I can define what I’m doing, not 
according to the situation, but according to what I want to achieve.”  In short, participation in 
the PCFF moves members like Nir and Saleh from the experience of victimhood to one of 
empowerment and agency as they commit to a mutual cause, namely, working for peace. 
Seeking Reconciliation: Turning Personal Pain into Social Ends 
The Parents Circle-Families Forum believes that a process of reconciliation between 
Palestinians and Israelis needs to be developed if peace is to be realized between the two 
peoples.  This position is shared by other grassroots organizations whose approach fits under 
the category of “people to people” diplomacy; their view is that peace agreements are only 
pieces of paper unless supported by an infrastructure of trust by people on both sides of a 
conflict. Therefore, a key to the PCFF's mission, according to the organization's website, is to 
“influence the public and the political decision makers to choose dialogue and the path of 
peace over violence and war in order to achieve a just settlement based on empathy and 
understanding” (Parents Circle-Families Forum, Our Mission Statement).  Furthermore, 
members believe that if people who have lost so much can talk to the other side, so can 
everyone else. It is not surprising, therefore, that a favorite PCFF slogan is “We won't stop 
until we talk.” 
Over the years since its original founding in Israel in 1995, the PCFF has engaged in a 
variety of activities designed to achieve this goal.  Its chief public activity has consisted of 
presentations given by members in various venues, including schools, community groups, 
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and visiting foreign delegations.  This section of the paper will be dedicated principally to a 
discussion of this activity, particularly as it is carried out in Israel.   
Early on, the PCFF began conducting “lectures” in Israeli high school classes, with 
the permission of the schools' principals.  These are storytelling presentations of loss and 
bereavement collaboratively conducted by a Palestinian paired with an Israeli member: “Our 
most important ongoing work on the ground is conducting dialogue meetings in schools.  
They allow us to reach more than 25,000 students every year.  We speak to 16- and 17-year-
old Palestinians and Israeli students who, for the most part, have not met anyone from ‘the 
other side.’  Coming into a classroom of Jewish-Israeli students with a Palestinian partner 
who tells his or her personal story and journey to reconciliation opens their eyes to the 
humanity and narrative of the other side” (Damelin, 2011).   
Fundamentally, the PCFF sees itself as educational in nature and the lectures, by 
extension, as having an educational purpose.  As Tzvi puts it, it is critical “to convince 
Israelis of the basics that Palestinians and Israelis are not monsters.”  So the method used in 
dialogues between Israeli and Palestinian PCFF members is extended to the classroom, where 
storytelling exposes the suffering of the bereaved individual and becomes a tool of 
humanization.  For this process to be effective, it is critical, at least initially, to see the 
individual qua individual, that is, beyond usual stereotypes and perceptions defined strictly 
via national categories.  As Nir puts it, the goal is to see the person as both an individual and 
a member of a group: 
When I see this Palestinian in front of me and I talk with him, he is a 
Palestinian, but he is also a person.... Now you are standing in front of an 
individual, and now he is human. You find humanity. 
Considering that each side has been socialized to perceive the other in a negative light, this 
strategy of humanization, if successful, is no small feat.  
Reconciliation as a Moral Imperative  
All PCFF members that I met identify reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians 
as the main goal for their involvement in the schools project, thereby taking a teleological 
moral position.  For example, Jamal offers a beautiful set of metaphors to communicate the 
PCFF's work in the schools, which for him is key to changing deeply entrenched antagonism 
between the two peoples:   
Our purpose is to open the minds of young people of the next generation.  We 
build the columns, we prepare the lands for them, we plant small trees for 
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them.  We start all of this from our tears after losing our relatives.... If we 
continue in this way, they will benefit from the food, and they will taste it.  
I also noticed some Israeli members' unmistakable use of deontological, or duty-
based, language to characterize their ongoing commitments, language that reveals their moral 
sensitivity to the injustice of the occupation and to the power differentials between the two 
sides.  For example, as an Israeli, Gad feels responsible for the unjust actions of the Israe li 
government in the Occupied Territories.  “I prefer being responsible than ashamed.  I feel 
obligated” to do something, he claims, even if it does not change the situation.  In addition, 
through the lectures in the schools, Gad believes he is setting right what his deceased father 
did wrong: As an architect working for the government, he designed settlements in the West 
Bank at a time when neither he nor the society as a whole thought about their long-term 
implications.  Lev's involvement devolves from his desire to represent his dead son who at a 
young age “felt obligated, committed, responsible.”  Several Israelis are impelled by their 
perceptions that the Israeli government's actions toward the Palestinians are “anti-Jewish.”  In 
regards to the “siege” of Gaza, for example, Yoni says, “It is not human; it is not Jewish.  We 
have an obligation as Jews” to be just.  For Nava, the settlements are the central ethical issue 
in the conflict.  “Jewish ethics,” she declares, teach us to “be good to others as you are to 
yourself.  But the current government does not do it; they do the opposite, and that kills me.”  
Finally, Lev quotes the prophet Amos in his lectures when his Jewish “consciousness” is 
questioned by some Israeli students: “‘Let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a 
mighty stream.’  That is my outlook.  That is Judaism.’”  Then, quoting Hillel’s famous 
dictum, he adds, “‘This is the Torah: What is hateful to you, don't do unto others.  All the rest 
is commentary.’”  
The ultimate goal for all of these PCFF members is to reach a just and peaceful 
resolution to the conflict so that others will be spared the grief they have known through the 
untimely death of their children, parents, and siblings.  Individuals from both sides also tell 
me in anxious tones how important it is for them to protect their own children and 
grandchildren from future harm.  By sharing the stories of their losses, they hope to use their 
pain for the sake of social transformation.   
Awakening the Public 
PCFF members are of course aware of the general ignorance and distrust that 
characterizes Israelis’ and Palestinians’ attitudes toward one another.  Hadassah believes that 
“the Israeli public is completely numb . . . living with a closed mind.”  The PCFF's job, 
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therefore, is to “awaken the public” to the Palestinians’ experience under the occupation.  
Khaled finds it most rewarding to see the impact of the lectures at Israeli schools, as “they 
give students a new picture of the Palestinian people.”  Following these lecture s, “we see 
students coming to us and hugging us and telling us that we've opened their minds, that we've 
opened their eyes, that we are bringing them hope.  This is not the Palestinians that they 
know.”  Nava's view is that before the lectures, “Israeli students think that Palestinians have 
horns and tails, and I don't know what else.  From my point of view, it is very important that 
they see that the Palestinian speaker is a real man, not a terrorist, and that he wants peace, 
like me.”  Students' exposure to flesh and blood Palestinians and their suffering removes 
social blinders and expands their moral imagination, as Lev reports about some student 
responses: “They will say after a lecture, ‘We've never heard it put that way.  We never 
thought that Palestinian families also weep for their children.’”  So it is precisely the 
storytelling nature of these events—as opposed to presentations of facts and statistics—that 
enhances the possibility of transformation, for “it is in narrative description that we gain a 
sense of the moral impact” that the conflict has had on people, argues social ethicist June 
O'Connor (1998): “It is in the detail that our moral imaginations are stretched and our 
constructive moral thinking challenged” (p. 212).  In other words, because the 
communication transmitted during these lectures involves principally emotional experience 
as opposed to didactic or intellectual information and interpretation, audiences are more 
likely to open up to the other.  As anthropologist Marc Howard Ross (2007) suggests, 
“Reconciliation ... is about changing the relationship between parties in conflict both 
instrumentally and emotionally in a more positive direction so that each can more easily 
envision a joint future” (p. 84). Not infrequently, in response to the lectures, I am told, some 
students will write, “What can I do to help?  I think that I have to become active.” 
In presenting the central purpose of the PCFF's work, Lev quotes the writer Amos 
Oz's recommendation, “‘Try to take out stones from the wall of hatred between the two 
peoples,’” and concludes, “and that's what we are trying to do.”  The paired nature of the 
school presentations undoubtedly functions to model for students empathy and the possibility 
of reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis.  Gad is well aware that most bereaved 
Israeli families are not part of the PCFF; instead, they tend to be nationalistic and right wing.  
Through lectures, he says, “I have to show another possibility ... an alternative reaction to the 
loss.”  Presenters make no secret of their trust in and fondness for one another.  When paired 
with Yoni, for example, Khaled tells classes that he has lost two brothers to the conflict, but 
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that in Yoni, “I have gained a brother” (Parents Circle-Families Forum, It Won't Stop Until 
We Talk  ). Noor says that she often hosts visitors from abroad, but that she is not able to have 
Lev, who is her “neighbor,” visit her at home—given travel restrictions across the border—
and that this pains her.  Speaking in a lecture context, she says that it was only through PCFF 
dialogues that she came to understand that:  
There is a human side to Israelis, because what I knew about them before was 
through the soldiers only.... I didn't know that there is a very big human heart 
in those people.  Now I have a lot of Israeli friends.  I'm not talking because I 
want to make it like a movie.  No.  I'm talking from my heart.  Really, I love 
them; they are my friends.  
Conquering Fear, Modeling Agency 
Not surprisingly, students’ fears regarding the “situation” surfaces during these 
events.  Randa believes that understanding the other “conquers fear,” hence the urgent need 
for the PCFF's reconciliation work:  
Fear is the true enemy. I will bring peace if I believe that my enemy is not a 
soldier, but that my enemy is his fear.  How can I make an agreement with 
someone who feels afraid of me, or I feel afraid of him?  Before anything, we 
should destroy this monster between us.  [My enemy] should understand me, 
should know me, so that knowledge and understanding lead us to make this 
big difference.   
Lev reports that Jewish students often express profound fear, challenging him in this way:  
“How can you contemplate sitting down with those people who send their kids 
to blow themselves up in shopping malls and bus stations?  How can you think 
of sitting down with them?  We’ve had our Holocaust.  And we’re entitled to 
do everything not to repeat that experience.  We are afraid.  And we have to 
look after ourselves.” 
A Holocaust survivor himself, Lev responds, “‘You are afraid?  Not more than me—not so 
much for myself, but for my family and for my grandchildren.  You speak of the Holocaust, 
but where will fear lead us?  What will we do?’”  Palestinian students also respond by listing 
their fears and grievances about the way they have to live under Israeli occupation, and Lev 
counsels them thusly:  
“Look, I know what it is to feel without being able to control your future.  I’ve 
been a little refugee boy without the ability to know what to do, how to get on.  
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I know what it is to feel like that.  But I ask you, will another bomb or another 
stone bring you your homeland—your suffering homeland—any nearer?  
That’s not the way.  We have to dry up that spot of despair, and think of 
another way.” And then they say, “OK, tell us.  What’s the other way?’  So I 
say, “I just want you to know that the way of thinking involves the idea of 
compromise.” 
Both sets of students express a sense of powerlessness about what they can possibly 
do to change the situation. They ask Lev, “‘So what do you want from us?’ ‘We are 
youngsters. Even our parents have no real say in these things. These things are decided way 
up – presidents, prime ministers. There’s nothing we can really do.’”  Lev responds to them 
by saying, 
“No, no. Important things require a two-way movement. Obviously, there has 
to be movement from above, but there has to be movement from the 
grassroots. That’s how it was in South Africa, that’s how it was when the 
United States was involved in Vietnam. There has to be a grassroots 
movement.” 
 “And I tell them, ‘I believe that you have sense to know, to choose an aim, a worthy aim like 
peace, and you have the power to work for it, to get it. And you have to be active.’” He adds,  
“In a few years you’ll be starting your own families. So will you be prepared 
to lean back and wait for somebody to bring peace down for you? You have to 
be active. Talk to your friends, your family, your parents, your neighbors. You 
have to go out and be active.”   
It is clear that in this account of a classroom encounter, Lev uses the pain of his own 
experience—as a bereaved father, as a Holocaust survivor—to empathize with the students' 
fears, grievances, and sense of powerlessness.  But he does not stop there.  He also models 
for students a way to work for peace in the midst of the conflict by providing them with a 
kind of embodied way to make a difference— talking to people, addressing the conflict head 
on, being active in the pursuit of peace.  
Like every other PCFF member I encounter, Lev rejects revenge as an appropriate 
course of action, as “revenge leads to revenge, a vicious cycle of blood that goes on and on.  
There must be something else.”  Some members concede that they felt driven to revenge 
when their loved one was first killed but rejected this option on rational grounds, much as 
Lev does.  Others may well have chosen to strive for reconciliation, instead, via a 
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“substitution of values,” to use Michael Jackson's term (2002, pp. 165-166), by giving up 
vengeance in exchange for the support, recognition of their suffering, empathy, and healing 
they have received as PCFF participants.  Yet others were never inclined toward revenge.  
For example, Nava says that she and her husband joined the PCFF after their son's death 
precisely to stop the ongoing conflict, which is often fueled by acts of revenge and 
retribution.  These attitudes against revenge are shared with student audiences on a routine 
basis. 
Storytelling and the Truth of Lived Experience 
Since the PCFF relies on storytelling as a major method of reconciliation, there are 
two questions that require some attention at this point.  The first pertains to how the story is 
delivered so as to avoid communicating the moral superiority each group typically assumes 
about itself.  A major strength of the PCFF's approach is its engagement in personal 
storytelling regarding each speaker's family experience rather than locating the experience of 
loss within a specific ideological interpretation.  Suggesting that not all stories will do, Bar-
On (2006) argued for the importance of the “good enough” story, which may well be “a story 
that members from both sides [can] emotionally identify with” (p. 138). It needs to be 
presented “in a way that both groups [can] contain, emotionally and cognit ively, despite the 
continuing struggle between them” (p. 202).  
The second question pertains to factual accuracy in storytelling.  Are bereaved 
individuals’ accounts of the loss of loved ones empirically accurate?  Is their storytelling 
credible?  It is generally known that memoir and other autobiographical expressions interpret 
historical events through specific and selective lenses, since memory is not reliable when it 
comes to the recollection of facts.  Perhaps if one focuses on the question of the truth of lived 
experience as such, this question ceases to play a central role (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003, pp. 
86-87).  In listening to a PCFF member speak, what becomes evident to an audience is the 
authenticity of bereaved people's loss and grief.  As an example: I talk to a Palestinian 
woman I call Fahima.  She tells me that her son was shot by an Israeli soldier six years earlier 
while serving as a pallbearer at a funeral for a friend killed by the army.  She immediately 
turns to her large purse, prodding and pushing its contents around, until she finally retrieves 
her iPhone and proceeds to look at the screen with great concentration.  She passes the 
iPhone to me, pointing to a video image of a funeral procession, of a group of men carrying a 
coffin through a crowded street.  The scene soon becomes turbulent; I first see some jostling, 
then, very quickly, jostling turning to chaos.  The factual details of this event are hardly clear.  
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But the next scene reveals a young man on a hospital gurney, naked from the waist up, 
diaphragm moving rapidly up and down.  That was her son as he lay dying, Fahima informs 
me.  And that observation seems credible to me, especially given the continuing grief evident 
in her face, in her voice, in the way she labors to swallow at times, in the clenching of teeth, 
in the occasional avoidance of eye contact as her gaze moves to some indeterminate point on 
the horizon.  Fahima is attesting to her son's death, and we, the listeners, become witnesses to 
her truth, which we experience emotionally, in our hearts, so to speak.  And what she is 
sharing, of course—as so many PCFF's stories do—are dangerous memories, capable of 
communicating to an Israeli audience aspects of their army's behavior typically unavailable 
for public viewing.   
 When students or others witness Fahima’s and other PCFF members’ stories, the 
palpable, authentic suffering communicated by these storytellers may well evince empathy, 
encourage in listeners an openness to multiple narratives and moral inclusion, and create 
“new solidarities without forgetting past traumas” (Zembylas & Bekerman 2008, p. 128).  
Hence, for Jewish students, the collective trauma of the Holocaust is not erased by witnessing 
a Palestinian's pain; neither does the Nakba or the occupation disappear for the Palestinian 
audience of a Jewish bereaved storyteller.  So it is not that “the unjust past and the suffering . 
. . are being forgotten” in this scenario. Rather, “it is the anger and the hatred that are being 
forgotten, so as to enable space for reconciliation” (p. 139).  In some cases, “memory 
interrupts fixed historical narratives by acknowledging the powerfulness of human suffering.  
All human beings as subjects are located in suffering; thus, through the memories of 
suffering—that is, dangerous memories—the taken-for-granted narratives are interrupted” (p. 
130).  These interruptions may lead us to “remember events in the past [in ways that] 
question our consciences and assumed horizons” (p. 131).  In drawing her listeners into her 
experience of loss and suffering, Fahima's story intrudes into—interrupts—the way Israelis 
might usually interpret their identity and social location.  Thus memories like hers propel 
“individual consciousness into a new process of narrativization.  Re-claiming forgotten 
connections with others involves acts of compassion, self-criticality and resistance to the 
status quo” (p. 131).  
Perhaps, then, the PCFF's program in the schools may be understood in part as a 
“pedagogy of dangerous memories” or of counter-narratives that function precisely to 
question the received historical narratives of each people, challenging listeners to deconstruct 
received assumptions and reconstruct more complex, multiple, and inclusive narratives.  Such 
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pedagogy was also at work when a large group of PCFF families—70 from each side— 
participated in a visit to Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948 where some members were 
raised as children.  Yehudit recounts how moving it was “to see them coming to the place, 
touching the ground, taking the soil and touching it,” her voice fading as she concludes, “And 
they could describe every place: here was the mosque, here was that....”  Seeing the 
Palestinians’ emotional response, Yehudit felt she could hear and validate their story.  For 
Lev this visit pressed him and his fellow Jews to “try and see and feel what our friends went 
through.”  The experience was similar in important ways for Palestinians who accompanied 
Jewish members to Yad Vashem.   
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the PCFF's reputation and credibility (the 
organization is the recipient of numerous international peace awards) among its various 
audiences is the cultural capital garnered by its members because they have suffered 
disproportionally for the sake of their respective peoples.  Ironically, for individuals who now 
reject war and exclusivist nationalist strivings because they have lost so much and wish to 
spare others their unspeakable pain, they are honored by their countrymen because of the 
perceived sacrifice their dead relatives have made to each side's cause.  Hence, because 
bereaved families are beyond suspicion, PCFF members are situated in a particularly good 
location to influence public opinion, one lecture at a time.  
Educational vs. Political Goals? 
As mentioned earlier, the PCFF sees itself as an educational institution, and therefore 
as non-political in orientation.  The non-political characterization may well be strategically 
based, grounded on a rather narrow definition of the meaning of politics. (See Furman, 2011, 
for a discussion of the strategic use of “non-political” by another Israeli peacebuilding 
organization.)  I believe that the “educational” designation is seen as a more acceptable, less 
controversial term, and hence likely to draw more members, especially on the Israeli side.  
Also, the educational label allows access into Israeli high schools, now with the blessings of 
the Ministry of Education.  When members tell me that the PCFF is non-political, they mean 
that it does not take public positions regarding the way in which the conflict should be 
resolved, nor are members involved as members in what is more typically considered 
political work, that is, publicly advocating a particular party or policy, or demonstrating for a 
particular cause.  While the PCFF's website supports this perspective, it also concedes that 
some political values are shared by its members:  
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Although the PCFF has no stated position on the political solution of the 
conflict, most of its members agree that the solution must be based on free 
negotiations between the leadership of both sides to ensure basic human rights, 
the establishment of two states for two peoples, and the signing of a peace 
treaty.  (Parents Circle-Families Forum, Introduction) 
My definition of political action is broader, as it includes any challenges to reigning 
power dynamics, which of course involve cultural as well as social and more traditional 
“political” relationships.  From this point of view, as I have argued, a good deal of the PCFF's 
work is decidedly political, as members are willing to expose themselves to “dangerous 
memories” in their dialogue with those from “the other side” and to engage in a pedagogy of 
dangerous memories with students and others in their presentations.  In keeping with 
Zembylas and Bekerman's (2008) argument, such exposure interrogates accepted master 
narratives, expands the boundaries of received identities, and leads to solidarity with the 
other. 
In contrast to Israelis, Palestinian members engage in traditional political discourse as 
a matter of course when addressing Palestinian audiences in the West Bank.  As Khaled 
explains to me, the approach is different from the one used in Israel, given the different 
situations involved, alluding to the power differential involved in the Israeli occupation of the 
Occupied Territories.  As in Israel, lectures are given to young people, but in universities and 
youth clubs, not in high schools.  Depending on the zone, security issues, and the general 
climate, sometimes Israeli members are able to join their Palestinians counterparts.  Instead 
of telling stories of suffering and loss, as is typical in Israeli lectures, in the West Bank 
Palestinians must project a strong persona “in order to make the people trust you and be ready 
to listen to you.”  Essentially that means providing bona fides regarding the speaker's 
standing as a Palestinian:  
I am only Khaled the Palestinian.  I am Khaled who lost two brothers.  I am 
Khaled who spent one and a half years in jail.  I am Khaled whose son has 
been injured by the Israelis.  I am Khaled whose son is in an Israeli prison 
until now.  I am Khaled whose brother was shot down by a soldier.  I am 
Khaled whose brother spent seven years in an Israeli prison, and his other 
brother also seven years, and his mother six and a half years. 
These realities situate Khaled squarely in the Palestinian narrative as a point of departure and 
furnish him with the legitimacy needed to “open doors,” to convince his audience that the 
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PCFF is a trustworthy organization.  Judging by the success of Palestinian families' joining 
the PCFF—300 to date—this strategy has worked. 
A number of Israeli members would like to see the organization engage in more 
conventional political work, such as public action and resistance, including demonstrations, 
joining with other organizations in protecting Palestinian land from Israeli expansionism, 
shielding Palestinians from settler violence, and assisting Palestinian farmers harvest their 
olive trees.  The differing social locations of Israelis and Palestinians give rise, at times, to 
tensions about how to proceed in light of the PCFF's non-political self-definition.  A case in 
point is the time of the Gaza War of winter, 2008-2009, when Palestinians members’ impulse 
was to withdraw from the organization as a way of registering their response to the power 
asymmetry between the two sides, manifested particularly by the massive use of force used 
by the Israeli army in Gaza, sometimes against civilian targets.  It was hard for people to 
meet during that time, both because of different views on the war and because it was difficult 
to find a location where Palestinians and Israelis could safely gather; they finally settled on a 
gasoline station where both sides could get to, on the way from Jerusalem to Jericho, near the 
Dead Sea. 
During that war, some Israeli members participated in a protest watch in Be'er Sheva 
against the war on behalf of the children of both sides.  More recently, another gesture of 
public solidarity with Palestinians and resistance to Israeli government actions was made by 
the PCFF by honoring a member who took part with Israelis and Palestinians in boarding a 
boat headed for Gaza in opposition to the Israeli blockade.  A couple of Israeli interview 
participants take exception to the political nature of such actions in the name of the PCFF, 
arguing that this kind of activity violates the agreed upon non-political status of the 
organization.  These members, unsurprisingly, also feel that the PCFF sometimes bends over 
backwards to address Palestinians’ identity needs, while neglecting the Israelis’.  One of 
these members believes, for example, that “at the Forum, there seems to be a general black 
and white perspective, where the Israelis are ‘black’ and the Palestinians are ‘white.’”  As a 
facilitator in a women's group following the Gaza War, she made sure to give the Israeli 
women the opportunity “to express what they feel, so the Palestinians would see also the 
other side.  It is much more obvious for the Israelis to see the other side than the other way 
around.”  Another member tells me that were the PCFF to become more politically active, 
she would participate less but still remain a member.  These views suggest that the PCFF 
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enjoys a strong commitment from its members, even when they have substantial 
disagreements with the organization.   
Reconciliation, Not Forgiveness 
On one thing there seems to be widespread agreement, however, and that is the role of 
forgiveness in the reconciliation process between Palestinians and Israelis.  No doubt because 
of the powerfully influential model offered by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), reconciliation and forgiveness are often joined at the hip in conflict 
resolution discourses.  As is well known, the TRC was headed by Desmond Tutu, the 
charismatic Anglican archbishop whose vision of reconciliation was, naturally enough, 
deeply shaped by his Christian understanding of forgiveness as a major key in the healing of 
conflict.  Any number of PCFF members told me that forgiveness is not necessary for 
reconciliation, that they are not willing to forgive, or that they had no right to forgive, as they 
themselves had not been the direct targets of violent action, a position consistent, certainly, 
with a Jewish perspective on forgiveness, though this view was not limited to the Jews I 
interviewed. 
An interesting dynamic arose following a PCFF presentation to a visiting group of 
American Evangelical Lutherans that illustrates this point of view.  The visitors’ leader self-
assuredly declared that people of faith take forgiveness very seriously, at which point Yoni, 
the Israeli speaker, interjected that the PCFF is not a religious organization, and that it is not 
interested in questions of forgiveness.  “One cannot forgive the killing of innocent people,” 
Yoni asserted, “but one can try to understand what happened: the origin of the violence.”  
Saleh, the Palestinian presenter, agreed with Yoni, saying, “I don't have the right to forgive 
the killing of my father.”  He concluded by extending to the group a request frequently heard 
from PCFF members: “Don't be pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian.  Try to bring rights, justice, and 
peace to us all.”  Likewise, Nir supports that point of view when he declares that the PCFF's 
approach is to be “pro-dialogue, pro-reconciliation, pro-solution,” so he routinely asks his 
Jewish audiences, “Please don’t be pro-Israeli.”  To me, all of this points to the importance of 
understanding the local context and its concomitant meanings and assumptions when 
interpreting approaches to reconciliation and peacebuilding, a view widely supported by 
scholars of conflict transformation (Lederach, 1999).  
Conclusion 
I was first introduced to the Parents Circle-Families Forum through the film 
Encounter Point (Avni, Bacha, Rous, & Rukab, 2006).  I was immensely impressed by the 
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courageous and generous work of this organization, for it demands that its members deploy 
their most personal, wounded experience of loss and grief in the interest of peace and 
reconciliation.  This kind of work remains largely hidden from public view because the 
contemporary media across the globe typically choose to focus on stories of conflict and 
destruction, of hatred and vindictiveness, and not on accounts that provide us with models of 
the best that human beings are capable of.  Exposure to members of the PCFF is thus an 
ennobling and inspiring experience.  I am most grateful to have had the opportunity to speak 
face to face with its members and co-directors, to have been gifted with their time and 
personal stories of suffering and hope.  
In this paper, we have seen that the PCFF is invested in the development of trust, 
empathy, and bonding between Palestinians and Israelis, even in the midst of the continuing 
conflict, lest more people on each side continue to suffer the immeasurable loss of loved 
ones, as they have.  While I have focused here principally on PCFF's peacebuilding work in 
the schools, it is important to note that in more recent times the organization has also 
designed successful projects intended to connect Israelis and Palestinians in a variety of ways 
in order to facilitate their contact, communication, and mutual understanding.  For example, 
“A Crack in the Wall” is a virtual project using social media whose goal is to break the wall 
separating the two peoples, encourage sharing and understanding across the divide, and 
contest the status quo.  In “History through the Human Eye,” the PCFF has brought together 
hundreds of people to share personal and national narratives of Israeli and Palestinian 
university students, young political leaders, grandmothers, and other groups.  Perhaps some 
of these initiatives will address a continuing challenge for the PCFF, namely, how to grow 
the organization by appealing to a broader swath of the bereaved population on both sides.  
The most ambitious project to date consists in the recent development of a reconciliation 
center, which now includes the above mentioned narrative project, a resource center, and 
activities intended to engage politicians in processes of reconciliation leading to peace 
(Parents Circle-Families Forum, Reconciliation Center).  
The last initiative is a recognition that the PCFF's efforts—and those of other 
grassroots organizations in the region—on behalf of reconciliation and peacebuilding, as 
successful as they are, are not sufficient to end the conflict, as a major partner is missing, 
namely, each side’s policy makers; these, after all, are the social agents with the power to p ut 
in place major structural processes aimed at conflict transformation (Lederach, 2003).  The 
late Israeli psychologist and peace educator, Dan Bar-On (2006), argued that it is very 
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difficult for a society to adopt psychosocial perspectives—such as those that PCFF members 
develop through their dialogues and lectures—in the absence of “parallel, top-down political 
change into which [their] activities and understanding can fit....  An important component of 
a successful peace process,” he believed, “is positive mutual acknowledgement and 
synchronization of top-down agreements and bottom-up peace-building activities” (pp. 206, 
219).  
What is needed now is political will on both sides, so that one day newspapers 
throughout the world will surprise their morning readers with photos of Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders smiling broadly as they shake hands, marking, finally, the beginnings of 
sustainable peace and reconciliation between their two peoples.   
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A Sequence Analysis of International Peace Operations: 
Japan’s Contributions to Human Security of East Timor 
Daisuke Akimoto 
 
Abstract 
Japan’s commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest 
contribution the country has made in the history of its international peace operations. 
Notably, Japan’s participation in the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on 
“human security” as one of the pillars of its diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan’s 
participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone issue for its human 
security policy. Yet, one simple but important question arises. How consistent were Japan’s 
commitments to the peace operations? In an attempt to answer to this question, this paper 
systematically examines Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations for East 
Timor. In order to investigate long-term and complicated activities in the peace operations, 
this paper employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method which combines and 
simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of 
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s contributions to the peace 
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement 
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). The 
findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan’s commitments to the peace operations 
were consistent and for human security of East Timor. 
Introduction 
During the Cold War period, Japan was unable to participate in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) because of its post-war anti-militarist pacifism, based on 
its Peace Constitution. However, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace 
Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in order to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. Japan’s participation 
in UNTAC was a turning-point for Japan’s peacekeeping operations (PKO) policy. In order 
to participate in UNPKOs, Japan’s pacifism shifted from one-nation pacifism constrained by 
Article 9 of its Constitution to international pacifism based on the Preamble of the 
Constitution (Akimoto, 2012; Ishizuka, 2005). During the 1990s, Japanese peacekeepers were 
dispatched to the following UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian operations: 
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Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), the Congo (1994), the Golan Heights (1995, 1996), 
Bosnia (1998), and Kosovo (1999) (Cabinet Office Japan, 2012). 
In this context, the Japanese government attempted to make a greater contribution to 
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor based on the concept of “human security” as 
one of the pillars of its foreign policy (Nasukawa, 2010), which  “emerged as a tool for 
coordinating various activities of international aid and peace operations” (Shinoda, 2004, p. 
1). Notably, as Gen Kikkawa (2007, p.  248) observed, Japan’s participation in the peace 
operations in East Timor was “the first test case of Japan’s human security policy”. 
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that military and constitutional limitations of Japan’s 
peace operations are obvious because “Japan avoids genuine risks for peace by not 
dispatching adequate manpower” (Lam, 2012, p. 193). Here, one simple but significant 
research question immediately arises. To what extent were Japan’s peace operations in East 
Timor consistent despite its military and constitutional constraints? 
The purpose of this paper is to answer to this research question by systematically 
examining Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations in East Timor. To this 
end, this study employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method, which combines 
and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of 
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s commitments to the peace 
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement 
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). Finally, 
examined research data will be provided after the analysis of the four periods in order to 
visualise and evaluate the sequence of Japan’s peace operations for human security of East 
Timor. 
Methodology 
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive, and can be 
divided into four major stages, as observed by Juichi Inada (2004, p. 229). This research 
utilizes this classification to conduct “sequence analysis” of the four periods. First, the United 
Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), led-by Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Ian Martin, was established on 11 June 1999 in order to observe the national 
referendum. Second, the Australian- led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 
under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove, was initiated on 15 September 1999 as 
a peace-enforcement operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Third, as a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
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Timor (UNTAET) led by SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set up on 25 October 1999. 
Fourth, as a post- independence peacebuilding operation, the United Nations Mission of 
Support to East Timor (UNMISET), under the leadership of Japanese SRSG Sukehiko 
Hasegawa, was organized on 20 May 2002. 
Simply put, the peace operations in East Timor consists of four phases as follows: 1) 
preventive diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), 2) peacemaking (INTERFET 
as peace-enforcement), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) post-conflict peacebuilding 
(UNMISET), as advocated by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros B. Ghali 
(1992) in his essay, An Agenda For Peace. 
Strictly speaking, however, Ghali (1992) proposed “preventive diplomacy” as a 
peaceful action before conflict arises. Still, UNAMET can be categorized as preventive 
diplomacy in that it was a “preventive deployment”, aiming to prevent conflict from 
spreading during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force or UN-led peace enforcement 
unit, but rather a multinational force authorized by a UN resolution. Nonetheless, it can be 
categorized as UN-authorized “peace-enforcement” part of the “peacemaking” process. 
UNTAET was established based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, but in 
reality, this peace operation was a UNTAC-type “peacekeeping” operation. UNMISET and 
the peace operations which followed can be categorized as post-conflict “peacebuilding”. 
During the four periods, Japan made substantial contributions to the peace operations in East 
Timor by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET in 1999, donating US$100 million to 
INTERFET, sending civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET in 2001, and deploying 
peacekeepers to UNTAET and UNMISET in 2002 (Cabinet Office Japan 2002-2004). 
Needless to say, previous research has developed and employed sophisticated timeline 
conflict analysis methods, such as “conflict escalation and de-escalation” to clarify nine 
stages of conflict (Glasl, 1982), “progression of conflict” (Lederach, 1995), “conflict life-
cycles” to analyse the birth/genesis, maturation/dynamics, death/solution of conflict (Galtung, 
1996), the “life history of conflict” illustrated as a bell shaped curve (Lund, 1996), and the 
“hourglass model” to investigate conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict 
transformation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). In the examination of 
international peace operations, some researchers have focused on peacekeeping operations 
and other analysts have emphasized the significance of peacebuilding activities (Paris & Sisk, 
2009; Francis, 2010). The earlier works provided applicable conflict analysis models and in-
depth investigations, but they are methodologically different from analyst to ana lyst. 
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In contrast, this study integrates the analytical frameworks employed by the earlier 
studies and simplifies them as a “sequence analysis method”. Normally, the term “sequence 
analysis” is employed in the field of natural science, especially in genetics for the analysis of 
a DNA sequence (Margulies & Birney, 2008). However, a timeline-based sequence analysis 
can be applicable to political science (Fenno, 1986; Pierson, 2004), social science (Abbott, 
1995), economics (Kanai, 2002), conflict analysis (Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977), 
and peacekeeping operations (Akimoto, 2012). The previous works in various academic 
fields employed the sequential analysis in different ways, but they indicate that it is possible 
to introduce the sequence analysis method into the field of peace and conflict studies. The 
sequence analysis method in this paper examines the “four stages” of peace operations (1. 
preventive deployment, 2. peace-enforcement, 3. peacekeeping, and 4. peacebuilding), 
followed by analysed and visualised research data. The simple sequence of peace operations 
in East Timor can be shown in Table 1 below.  
Table1: Sequence of Four Stages of Peace Operations in East Timor 
Year Month Stage of Peace Operations Name of  Peace Operations 
1999 June 1. Preventive diplomacy UNAMET set up (preventive deployment)  
1999 August 1. Preventive diplomacy Ballot conducted (cause of violent conflict) 
1999 September 2. Peacemaking INTERFET operated (peace-enforcement) 
1999 October 3. Peacekeeping UNTAET established (pre-independence) 
2002 May 4. Peacebuilding UNMISET, etc. (post-independence) 
Note: For a detailed sequence analysis of the peace operations, see Table 2. 
 
In order to apply the sequence analysis method, this paper investigates the data from 
the Cabinet Office Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and the United 
Nations as primary sources. The in-depth sequence analysis of the primary sources will assist 
in filling a gap in the earlier research regarding Japan’s contributions to international peace 
missions in East Timor (e.g. Gorjao, 2002; Inada, Yoshida, & Isezaki, 2003; Inada, 2004; 
Walton, 2004; Kikkawa, 2007; Llewelyn, Walton, & Kikkawa, 2009; Lam, 2012) and 
answering to the core research question: to what extent Japan’s peace operations were 
consistent and comprehensive for human security of East Timor.  
Findings  
Stage 1: Preventive Deployment: Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET 
As an analysis of the first stage of the peace operations, Japan’s contribution to 
“preventive diplomacy” for East Timor, will be overviewed in this section. From the 
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perspective of a sequence analysis of international peace operations, UNAMET can be 
categorized as a “preventive deployment” for independence. Normally, preventive diplomacy 
is considered the prevention of conflict, and conflict already existed between East Timor and 
Indonesia. Still, UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the 
referendum period. In spite of the operation’s peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch the SDF 
and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal 
signed an agreement to resolve conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a 
“direct, secret, and universal ballot” to determine the future of East Timor and to set up an 
appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process. On 11 June 1999, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET (United Nations, 2001a). 
In response to requests from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to 
dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers from July 1999. In 
addition, Japan contributed US$10.11 million to the UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000 
radios (MOFA, 1999a). As for the significance of Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET, 
Ian Martin noted that “Asia’s economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune: stocks of 
vehicles were available to be flown to East Timor from Tokyo” (Martin, 2001, p. 39). Due to 
the death of police officer Haruyuki Takada during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, a 
cautious debate took place in Tokyo when three civilian police officers were dispatched to 
East Timor (National Diet Library, 1999). In spite of the small number of participants, Japan 
was recognized as a “major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET” (Martin & 
Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 130). 
Ironically, the ballot in East Timor turned out to be a cause of conflict despite the 
peace operation as a preventive measure. According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East 
Timorese people registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on 
30 August 1999 and 98.6% of registered voters participated in the process. The result of the 
vote was that 78.5% of voters rejected the proposed plan for special autonomy and 21.5% 
voted in favour of being governed by the special authority of the Indonesian government 
(United Nations, 2001b, 2001c; Martin, 2001, pp. 60, 90, 94). Immediately after the result of 
the ballot was announced, however, anti- independence (pro- integration) groups burned down 
houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst pointed out that UNAMET 
was “defenceless” because “UNAMET had always been an unarmed mission and that 
security had always been the province of the Indonesian authorities” (United Nations, 1999b). 
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By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one-quarter of the entire population, had 
become refugees due to the violence and destruction. At this stage, 1,200 members of the 
Australian Defense Forces began implementing military drills near Darwin in anticipation of 
the UNSC adopting a resolution to authorize the armed intervention of multinational forces 
(Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 121-122). Gross human rights violations, including the indiscriminate 
killing of women and children, were conducted across East Timor in September. In addition, 
as many as 70% of the buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 270,000 
people, one-third of the entire population, became refugees (Takahashi, Masuoka, & Monju, 
2000, pp. 7-10, 13-20). UNAMET was able to hold the ballot but it could not prevent “crimes 
against humanity”, and major cities in East Timor became “killing fields” (Dunn, 2001). 
These mass killings and “human insecurity” (Umegaki, Thiesmeyer, & Watanbe, 2009) in 
East Timor were beyond the mandate of UNAMET and necessitated military intervention by 
INTERFET. 
Stage 2: Peace-enforcement: Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET 
In the second stage of the peace operation (peacemaking/peace-enforcement), it is 
clarified that Japan made a financial contribution to INTERFET as a peace-enforcement 
operation in East Timor. On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising 
the security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The resolution 
authorized the establishment of a multinational force (United Nations, 1999a). INTERFET 
was established to “restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET 
in carrying out its task (and within force capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
operations” (Cobb, 1999). It is noteworthy that Resolution 1264 legitimatized the use of 
force, stipulating “all necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate” (Ibid). 
The approximate number of the “coalitions of the willing” soldiers was 13,000, 
comprising troops from Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the 
United States, and Australia (Dee, 2001, p. 1). The mission of INTERFET troops was to 
crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been created by the 
Indonesian army (Isezaki, 2004, pp. 64-65). In this sense, the INTERFET mission was more 
difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations.  
Predictably, Sadaaki Numata, the MOFA Press Secretary, was vague on the issue of 
dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, stating that “I think it is a bit premature for me to go 
further into the details of what sort of possible participation there might be in the United 
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Nations Peacekeeping Forces” (MOFA, 1999b). It is plausible that Numata avoided 
mentioning a SDF dispatch to INTERFET because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The 
dispatch of the SDF to multinational military operations was technically impossible, and 
therefore, the Japanese government decided to support the launch of INTERFET by 
financially providing a fund of US$100 million. Notably, the entire contribution to the 
INTERFET Trust Fund was US$107 million (Dee, 2001, p. 10; McDermott, 1999). 
In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the Japanese 
government decided to contribute an additional US$2 million as an emergency assistance 
fund. One million dollars was donated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and another million was contributed to the World Food Programme (WFP) 
(MOFA, 1999c). This immediate response from Japan indicates that the Japanese government 
believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to join a multinational 
force. At a press conference, the MOFA Press Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch 
of the SDF to INTERFET on the grounds of a lack of legal framework (MOFA, 1999d). 
To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the Japanese 
government started to reconsider its conventional PKO policy. These decisions by the 
Japanese government regarding a non-military contribution to the security crisis of post-
ballot East Timor were made based on the PKO Law. While making decisions on 
humanitarian aid, the Japanese government attempted to lift the freeze on peacekeeping 
forces (PKF) operations. In this context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Komeito signed the 
“Three-Party Accord” on 4 October 1999 (Shoji, 2005). On 14 October, the Japanese 
government announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials from the 
Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, the Prime Minister’s Office, 
MOFA, and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to East Timor. The Japanese government 
hoped to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by plane through 150 staff 
of the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) (MOFA, 1999e). Based on the PKO Law, the 
government contributed assistance goods, such as 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping 
mats, 20,000 water containers, and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese 
(MOFA, 1999f). In response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government also 
decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as transport planes for the ASDF and a multi-
purpose assistance plane (U-4) with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and 
Kupang (West Timor) (MOFA, 1999g). In addition to the material assistance, the Japanese 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
159 
government contributed US$100 million to the UN Trust Fund, and the government, 
moreover, explored options to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in post-INTERFET operations. 
Stage 3: Peacekeeping: Japan’s Incremental Contribution to UNTAET 
In the third stage of the peace operation (peacekeeping), Japan’s contribution became 
gradually active, and finally, Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to UNTAET. The 
mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which 
includes “peace-enforcement”. Yet, the UNTAET operation can be categorized as an 
UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping 
rather than coercive action, Japan could not at first deploy the SDF to UNTAET due to 
constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West Timor to 
support UNHCR for the relief of East Timorese IDP during this period. On 20 October 1999, 
the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from East Timor and the UNSC set up 
UNTAET based on Resolution 1272, which was adopted on 25 October 1999 (United 
Nations, 1999c, 2001d). 
The word “Timorization” became a slogan to empower East Timor and the nation-
building process, and was also part of a process of “democratization” (Isezaki, 2004, p. 46). 
UNTAET was composed of three pillars: the military, Humanitarian Assistance and 
Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), and Governance and Public Administration. HAER was 
conducted under the leadership of Akira Takahashi, who later became Special Adviser on 
Development and Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. HAER was “instrumental in 
coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and working with the East 
Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities” (Smith & Dee, 2003, pp. 62-63). Unlike 
PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which Japanese peacekeepers could 
make a substantial contribution. Takahashi’s leadership in HAER assisted Japan’s 
contribution in the field of humanitarian aid.  
On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that Japan was 
willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 
1272, although he did not mention the possibility of the dispatch of the SDF to UNTAET 
(MOFA, 1999h). Akira Takahashi, Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency 
Rehabilitation of UNTAET (MOFA, 1999i). Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA official, was 
appointed as a senior civil affairs officer to take charge of the Environmental Protection Unit 
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of the Governance and Public Administration Component of UNTAET (MOFA, 2000). 
These appointments of Japanese officials to pivotal positions in UNTAET reflected MOFA’s 
diplomatic efforts to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.  
On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese 
government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang) 
to transport aid materials. The ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of 
material, and UNHCR appreciated Japan’s participation, which made it possible to provide 
aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees (JDA, 2000, pp. 175-176). Yoshio Mochizuki, a 
Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor on 11 April 2001 to meet the leaders 
of East Timor, including President Xanana Gusmao and Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. In 
these meetings, Mochizuki emphasized Japan’s contribution in the three fields of agriculture, 
human resources development, and infrastructure (MOFA, 2001a). The dispatch of ASDF 
personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki’s visit to East Timor show the non-
military and indirect nature of Japan’s contribution to the UNTAET operation.  
In response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government dispatched 
19 civilian election observers to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO 
Law (MOFA, 2001b). With regard to the election, the Japanese government decided to make 
an extra emergency contribution of US$1,191,000 through the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (MOFA, 2001c). On 30 August 2001, Constituent Assembly Elections 
were held with a voter turnout rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected as part of a 
peaceful democratic process (MOFA, 2001d). 
Significantly, the Koizumi government revised the 1992 PKO Law on 14 December 
2001 to make SDF’s participation in PKF possible (Cabinet Office Japan, 2001). In February 
2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from the United Nations and the leaders 
of East Timor, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 680 Ground Self Defense Force 
(GSDF) personnel in engineer units and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to peace operations 
conducted by UNTAET (MOFA, 2001e, 2002a; Cabinet Office Japan, 2002-2004). In 
response to a further request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to 
dispatch eight electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 in 
East Timor (MOFA, 2002b). In the same month (29 April), Prime Minister Jun’ichirō 
Koizumi visited East Timor to inspect an SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET (MOFA, 
2002c). For Japan, participation in UNTAET, the Constituent Assembly Elections, and the 
Presidential Election without casualties was a symbol of success. If SDF personnel had been 
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killed, the Japanese government would have had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF. 
Moreover, the UNTAET operation itself was generally successful (Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 132-
133). 
Stage 4: Peacebuilding: Japan’s Contribution to Post-independence Operations 
In the fourth stage of the peace operation (peacebuilding), Japan, on the basis of its 
“human security” policy, maximized its contribution to the peace operation in East Timor. 
UNMISET, under the leadership of SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from Japan, can be 
categorized as a post-conflict peacebuilding operation. Based on new diplomatic concepts 
such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, the Japanese government 
dispatched a total of 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor. In addition to UNMISET, Japan 
made a contribution to the subsequent UN peacebuilding operations in East Timor. East 
Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by 
UNMISET based on UNSC Resolution 1410 (United Nations, 2005a). The deployment of up 
to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers, and 1,250 civilian police 
officers, was authorized based on the UNSC resolution (United Nations, 2005b). 
The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a greater 
role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to reassign a Japan GSDF 
Engineer Unit of 680 members (including seven female personnel) and PKF headquarters 
personnel, all of whom had been dispatched to UNTAET, for the post- independence nation-
building operations of UNMISET (MOFA, 2002d). The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the 
GSDF, two fleets for transportation and escort for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), 
and seven C-130H transportation aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the 
ASDF. The SDF was stationed in main cities, such as Dili, Maliana, Suai, and Oecusse (Pante 
Macassar), to construct roads and bridges and to offer support with water and food supplies in 
collaboration with the Korean forces (JDA, 2002, pp. 214-218; JDA, 2003a, p. 215; JDA, 
2003b, p.12). 
Japan’s commitment to peacebuilding operations in East Timor gradually decreased 
as the UNMISET mission was carried out. The changeover of Japanese peacekeepers was 
conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, Parliamentary Secretary for the JDA, on 13 
March 2002. Responding to a request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was 
reduced from 680 personnel to 522 (MOFA, 2003a). On June 14 2002 in New York, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head of Mission (MOFA, 
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2002e). The United Nations decided to extend the mandate of UNMISET in accordance with 
UNSC Resolution 1480 until 20 May 2004, and the Japanese government also prolonged the 
term of the GSDF engineer group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor 
(MOFA, 2003b). In line with the gradual conclusion of UNMISET, the number of SDF 
troops was reduced from 522 to 405. Prime Minister Koizumi, in talks with East Timorese 
President Gusmao in Tokyo on 23 February 2004, promised to make a further contribution of 
approximately one million US dollars to East Timor (Prime Minister of Japan and His 
Cabinet, 2004a). 
After the mandate of UNMISET expired on 20 May 2004, the Koizumi government 
decided on the full withdrawal of the fourth SDF personnel. Even so, the mandate of 
UNMISET was extended from 20 May 2004 for a maximum of one year (MOFA, 2004a). 
The total number of SDF personnel dispatched to UNMISET amounted to approximately 
2,300 SDF troops, including 25 female personnel. The nation-building activities of the SDF 
consisted of 120 projects that included the maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and 
infrastructure, levelling land of the fields for elementary schools, and the construction of 
waste disposal facilities (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004b). Through the Trust 
Fund for human security, the Japanese government decided to support the “100 Schools 
Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East Timor” conducted by the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) (MOFA, 2004b). 
Following the expiration of the mandate of UNMISET on 20 May 2005, the United 
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political mission, was established 
with a one-year mandate. In April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army as a 
result of discrimination and the demonstrations. The East Timorese government intervened 
with the national army, and approximately 100,000 people became IDPs, around 60% of the 
entire population of Dili. In response, the Japanese government decided to provide 
emergency contribution of US$5 million for an emergency shelter, water, and health care 
(MOFA, 2006a, 2006b). 
After the UNOTIL operation expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorized the 
establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). 
Responding to a request from the United Nations, two Japanese civilian police officers were 
dispatched to UNMIT (Cabinet Office Japan, 2007). For presidential and parliamentary 
elections in East Timor, the Japanese government provided an emergency grant aid of 
US$723,855 though the UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral observers (MOFA, 2007a, 2007b, 
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2007c). In spite of all these peacebuilding activities, the security situation in East Timor was 
not stable and Australian Defense Forces remained until the security situation improved 
(MOFA, 2008). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UN peace operations failed in East 
Timor. Japan did not stop its contribution to the peace operations and dispatched two 
peacekeepers for cease-fire monitoring operations to UNMIT in 2010. In response to the 
extension of the UNMIT mandate to 31 December 2012, the Japanese government also 
extended the duration of its commitment until 28 February 2013 so that Japan could make an 
extra commitment in case of an emergency (MOFA, 2010, 2012; United Nations, 2012). 
Discussion: Examined Data in the Sequence Analysis 
As clarified by the sequence analysis of Japan’s commitments to the peace operations 
in East Timor, although Japan could not make a direct military commitment to “national 
security” of East Timor through INTERFET, it donated US$100 million to the INTERFET 
operation, and continuous and substantial contributions were made by the Japanese 
government for “human security” of the East Timorese people as shown in Table 2 below 
(“PKO”, here, means general PKO missions regardless of stages).  
Table 2: Sequence of Japan’s Peace Operations for Human Security of East Timor 
Start of 
Operations 
Name of 
Operations and Details 
PKO  Humanitarian 
Relief 
Election 
Observation 
Contributions  
in kind, etc. 
June 1999 
(Stage 1) 
Contribution in kind to  
UNAMET  
(US$10.11 million to the UN 
Trust Fund)  
(2,000 radios) 
   o 
July 1999 
(Stage 1) 
International  
Peace Cooperation  
Assignment in East  
Timor (A political affairs officer 
and three civilian police officers) 
o    
Sep. 1999 
(Stage 2) 
 
INTERFET (US$100  
million)  
Emergency  
Humanitarian Assistance  
for East Timor  
(US$2 million)  
(US$1 million to  
UNHCR and WFP) 
  
 
o 
 o 
Oct. 1999 
(Stage 3) 
Contribution in kind to  
UNHCR for the Relief  
of East Timorese  
Displaced Persons 
   o 
Nov. 1999 
(Stage 3) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
for East Timorese  
Displaced Persons (150  
ASDF) (500 tents, 9,000  
blankets, 11,140  
 o   
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sleeping mats,  
20,000 water containers,  
5,120 plastic sheets) 
Aug. 2001 
(Stage 3) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in East Timor 
(19 civilian election  
observers) 
(US$1,191,000 
through UNDP) 
  o  
Feb. 2002 
(Stage 4) 
 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in East Timor 
(680 GSDF and 10 PKF to 
UNAMET) 
(2,300 GSDF in total to 
UNMISET) 
o    
Apr. 2002 
(Stage 4) 
 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
for East Timorese  
Election Observation 
  o  
May. 2004 
(Stage 4) 
100 Schools Project  
(UNICEF) 
   o 
June 2006 
(Stage 4) 
 
Emergency  
Humanitarian 
Assistance for  
East Timor 
(US$2 million) 
 o   
July 2006 
(Stage 4) 
Emergency Grant Aid  
through International  
Organizations for IDPs  
from Unrest in  
Timor-Leste 
 o   
Jan. 2007 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in Timor-Leste 
o    
Mar. 2007 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment for 
Timor-Leste Election  
Observation  
(14 electoral observers  
and US$723,855  
through UNDP) 
  o  
Sep. 2010- 
Dec. 2012 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in Democratic Republic  
of Timor-Leste  
(2 peacekeepers  
for cease-fire monitoring to 
UNMIT) 
o    
 (Combined Data from Cabinet Office Japan, JDA, MOFA, and the United Nations) 
 
As the data displayed above demonstrate, Japan’s contribution to the peace 
operations, particularly dispatch of the peacekeepers to East Timor, became active after the 
Japanese government adopted the human security concept as a pillar of its diplomatic policy. 
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Simply, the sequence represents that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were consistent 
and comprehensive for human security (freedom from fear and want). Moreover, as 
represented in Table 3, Japan was the third largest donor for peacebuilding in East Timor 
following Australia and Portugal (2005 and 2006). This fact means that Japan made 
significant contributions to human security of East Timor especially in terms of “freedom 
from want”. 
Table 3: Percentage of Top 3 Donors for Peacebuilding in East Timor (2005 and 2006) 
Name  
of  
Country 
Number  
of  
Donors 
Number 
of Donors  
over  
90% CPA 
% of CPA  
by  
Top  
Donor 
% of CPA  
by  
Top 2  
Donors 
% of CPA  
by  
Top 3  
Donors 
Total % of  
CPA  
by Top  
3 Donors 
East Timor 21 10 Australia 
(22%) 
Portugal 
(20%) 
Japan 
(15%) 
Total 
(57%) 
(OECD/DAC, 2008. p. 46) 
 
As well as the financial contribution (freedom from want), Japan made significant 
contributions to human security of East Timor in terms of maintenance of stability (freedom 
from fear). Normally, the Japanese government has focused on financial contributio ns as its 
human security policy, but the case of East Timor reveals that Japan’s human security policy 
has become more active and contributory to freedom from fear. Indeed, Japan’s peace 
operations in East Timor were more comprehensive and large-scale than those in Cambodia 
(Akimoto, 2012; Walton & Akimoto, 2013). This fact can be visualised by comparing the 
case of Japan’s peace operations in East Timor with the other peace operations conducted by 
Japanese peacekeepers as shown in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Percentage of Japan’s Peace Operations for East Timor of Total Operations 
 
(Modified Data from Table 2 and Cabinet Office Japan) 
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As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of Japan’s commitment to peace operations in East 
Timor in comparison with the other operations is relatively high (31% in PKO, 50% in 
humanitarian relief, 33% in election observation, 19% in contributions in kind). Japan 
dispatched its peacekeepers to peace operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, El 
Salvador, the Golan Heights, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan, but the peace operations 
(PKO) in East Timor account for as many as 30% of the total. The figure, especially that of 
PKO, indicates that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were more consistent, large-scale 
and comprehensive than the other peace operations conducted by the Japanese government 
for human security (particularly “freedom from fear”). 
In short, not only did Japan make financial and material contributions to “freedom 
from want” of the East Timorese, but the Japanese peacekeepers contributed to “freedom 
from fear” of the people as well. Although Japan could not make a military commitment to 
national security during the INTERFET operation, its contributions to human security of East 
Timor were seamless and comprehensive, including peace operations, humanitarian relief, 
election observation, and contributions in kind. Japan’s military and constitutional limitations 
could be overcome by cooperating with other countries, which are experienced in peace 
operations including peace-enforcement. In sum, the analysed data indicate the fact that Japan 
made holistic and consistent commitments to the peace operations for human security of East 
Timor. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined Japan’s contributions to the four stages of peace operations 
in East Timor through the application of sequence analysis. By utilising the sequence analysis 
method, the complexity of the multi-dimensional peace operations and Japan’s contributions 
in East Timor has been clarified. As demonstrated by the data supplied in Table 2 and 3, as 
well as Figure 1, Japan has made long-term and large-scale contributions to the peace 
operations in East Timor. 
In the post-Cold War period, Japan explored making contributions to UN-authorized 
peace operations in East Timor. Japan’s first contribution was made to UNAMET as 
“preventive deployment”. Japan dispatched a political affairs officer and three civilian police 
officers and made a substantial material contribution to UNAMET. Nonetheless, as a result of 
the 1999 ballot, an armed conflict broke out and approximately one-fourth of the East 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
167 
Timorese population became refugees. This period represents a culmination of “conflict 
escalation” (Glasl, 1982). 
The armed conflict in East Timor necessitated military intervention by INTERFET, as 
“peace-enforcement” for the sake of “conflict containment” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2005). 
Australian-led multinational forces contributed to peace-enforcement as part of the 
peacemaking process. Although the multinational forces were not a formal UN force, their 
military operations were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1264. While Japan 
could not make a direct military contribution to “national security” of East Timor, owing to 
Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, it did make a financial contribution to INTERFET, 
UNHCR, and the WFP. 
The mandate of UNTAET as a peacekeeping operation included peace-enforcement 
based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Therefore, in 1999 Japan dispatched the SDF not to 
East Timor but to Indonesia and West Timor in order to support UNHCR. During the 
UNTAET operation, Japan made humanitarian and legal contributions. Indeed, HAER, one 
of the three pillars of UNTAET, was carried out under the leadership of Akira Takahashi. In 
addition, electoral observers were dispatched to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2001. 
Finally, in February 2002, 680 Japanese peacekeepers and 10 PKF headquarters personnel 
were deployed to UNTAET. The Japanese government revised the PKO Law in order to 
dispatch the SDF to peace operations during the “conflict termination” period (Lund, 1996). 
In consequence of UNTAET, the Koizumi government sent more peacekeepers to 
UNMISET as a peacebuilding operation led by SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa. On the basis of 
diplomatic concepts such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, Japan 
dispatched about a total of 2,300 peacekeepers to UNMISET, which was the largest number 
in the history of Japan’s PKO policy. Furthermore, Japan has continued supporting post-
independence peacebuilding operations, such as UNOTIL and UNMIT. Those UN peace 
operations literally involved “state-building” as a part of peacebuilding operations (Paris & 
Sisk, 2009). Thus, although it seems to be relatively simplistic, the sequence analysis method 
has contributed to clarifying the complicated Japan’s peace missions. In conclusion, the 
findings discovered by sequence analysis substantiate that Japan’s contributions to peace 
operations in East Timor were incremental, seamless, and comprehensive despite the 
technical limitations. 
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Achieving Democracy: Implementing the 1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords 
Raymond W. Cox III and Hugo Renderos 
Abstract 
The literature on negotiations and bargaining has been dominated by academics in business 
and public administration.  Given the interests and orientation of the academic disciplines, it 
is not surprising that the academic studies predominantly have examined the processes and 
dynamics at the level of collective bargaining and to a lesser extent organization leadership 
and management.  Dispute resolution has a distinctly intra–organizational character.  In 1991 
the warring factions in El Salvador came together to negotiate both an end to the fighting, but 
also to create a framework for the introduction of a democratic government for the country.  
Over a period of several months the two sides shaped an agreement.  Finally in late 
December of 1991 with a flurry of decisions an agreement was drafted and signed.  Twenty 
years later the country continues to implement the peace accord, but there is no consensus 
that the task is complete. 
Introduction 
The basic premise of alternative dispute resolution is that the parties to a disagreement 
can be brought together to resolve that disagreement (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  These processes 
are ubiquitous at every level of government and are central to much of international relations.  
From the relatively mundane — an employee grievance — to the momentous – ending wars– 
dispute resolution processes are used to end disagreements and presumably, once an 
agreement has been reached, to set the parties on a new path.  
The literature on negotiations and bargaining has been dominated by academics in 
business and public administration (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Lebow, 1996).  Given the interests 
and orientation of the academic disciplines, it is not surprising that the academic studies 
predominantly have examined the processes and dynamics at the level of collective 
bargaining and to a lesser extent organization leadership and management.  Dispute 
resolution has a distinctly intra-organizational character. 
The focus on intra-organizational and policy disputes has created a rich literature 
about the negotiations process leading to an agreement (i.e. the grievance is settled; the 
contract is signed).  Similarly, there is a large body of literature on the consequences for 
future negotiations based upon the way the prior negotiations unfold (Lewicki, Saunders, & 
Barry, 2009; Shell, 2006.  Less well developed is the literature on the aftermath of those 
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decisions. This gap in the literature is particularly critical when one examines negotiations 
that are essentially a one-off event, such as negotiating a peace treaty, or most international 
agreements, where there is a presumption that there will be no follow-on negotiations by the 
parties.  We know that the choices made during negotiations create future problems, but those 
problems are examined through the lens of future negotiations.  The dispute and problem-
solving mechanisms are built into the negotiations (Lewicki et al., 2009).  This is a somewhat 
self-referential process in which the parties return to clarify what was meant.  Importantly, 
those mechanisms assume that the process will be much like the original negotiation and may 
even involve the same actors.  In some instances, both sides to the dispute are eager to engage 
in dispute resolution because that ambiguity is a detriment to current practices and future 
negotiations.  International and national disputes do not have recourse to such problem 
solving mechanisms.  Perceptions of success or failure in such negotiations are judgments 
about the implementation of the agreement, not the process of reaching an agreement.  The 
failure of a treaty does not produce a renewed discussion about the treaty per se, but rather 
returns the negotiations to a pre-negotiation stage (Lewicki et al., 2009; Shell, 2006).  All 
bets are off and everyone is back to square one, but potentially under more trying 
circumstances. 
Thus, we posit that the consequences of failed implementation under such 
circumstances are far more critical and dangerous than under traditional (i.e. labor) 
negotiations.  Traditional dispute resolution follows the same rules as the original 
negotiations.  The process has structured rules, and those rules are understood by the parties 
to the dispute.  Original negotiations under such arrangements are aided by the safety net of 
the dispute resolution mechanisms.  International negotiations rarely have such a safety net 
(as will be noted later, even the introduction of third parties during or after negotiations may 
be viewed as a threat).  Implementation of such agreements is more complicated and more 
perilous.  
We understand that the negotiation and bargaining process requires compromise and 
even a certain level of ambiguity (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Shell, 2006).  These ambiguities are 
treated as necessary components of reaching an agreement, yet the consequences of those 
compromises, and especially the ambiguous language, for implementation are not explored.  
The problems in implementation are subordinate to the primary goal of an agreement.   
This examination of the Peace Accords implemented in El Salvador since 1992 reflect 
the perilous nature of negotiations without the safety net of structured dispute resolution.  
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There are many historic accounts of the move from war to peace negotiations and then the 
long-standing efforts to achieve democratic governance in El Salvador (e.g. Stanley, 1996; 
Wood, 2001; Wood, 2002).  To a large extent the Peace Accords are treated as little more 
than the transition from war to peace.  The war is analyzed and then the efforts to transform 
the government since are closely examined.  The Peace Accords are the starting point for 
those efforts toward democracy.  The analysis starts with the words in the document.  Much 
less is known about the process of negotiations as it unfolded.  As a result the potential 
influences of the negotiations process on implementation of the Accords are ignored.   
The incomplete implementation of the Peace Accords is a product of the negotiation 
process itself—especially in December 1991 when the imperative of reaching an agreement 
outweighed the ambiguities in the wording of the Accord.  Much was left for future elected 
officials to work out but with little more than an acknowledgement that the details had not 
been worked out as guidance.  Not only were future elected officials left to create a new 
democracy, they were left to address unresolved problems left over from the negotiations.  At 
a certain level it is a testament to the commitment of all Salvadorans to the ideal of 
democracy that they continue to work at completing the work of the Peace Accords.  
How did this intentionally and unintentionally ambiguous wording in the Peace 
Accords affect implementation of this momentous document?  To answer this question it is 
necessary to first examine the negotiations process through the template of academic 
negotiations and bargaining.  Fisher and Ury’s (1981) classic text on negotiations and 
bargaining offers that template.  Based upon interviews with participants in the Peace Accord 
negotiations, a sense of how the negotiations unfolded and in particular the tensions and 
concerns of the two sides will be explored.  With this information as background, a critique 
of the bargaining process can occur, highlighting the areas of ambiguity and compromise.  
The critique is not to look for fault but to understand the logical consequences of the 
decisions made (and not made) to reach an agreement. The intent here is to understand why 
this process, implementing the Peace Accords, after twenty years is still incomplete.  That is 
the task of this study. 
Negotiation and Bargaining Fundamentals 
Negotiations are a basic means of getting what one party wants from another.  It is a 
two way method of communication designed to reach an agreement when two parties share 
interests while opposing others (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  There are five key elements of 
negotiations that are pertinent in our study: 
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1. This is a bi- lateral process 
2. The desire to reach an agreement 
3. Styles and types of negotiations and how those styles intersect 
4. A means to break an impasse during negotiations 
5. A potential end-date for negotiations  
Bi-lateral Negotiations 
Because the point of reference for most of the academic literature on negotiations is 
contract negotiations in the private sector, these negotiations are general treated as simply 
two-way processes.  As public policy studies related to legislative behavior and 
environmental policy noted as early as the 1980s (Anderson, 2010), public policy 
negotiations generally involve three or more interested parties. This more complex 
arrangement does not change the dynamics discussed below, but it does greatly increase the 
precarious nature of the negotiations.  As the number of active stakeholders increases the 
likelihood that at least one party does not wish to resolve the problem increases (the current 
stalemate in the United States Congress in which both political parties are themselves divided 
is certainly one example). 
A Shared Definition of the Goal in Negotiations 
Critically, the negotiations process cannot begin until both sides agree to the simple 
premise that the outcome of the negotiations is a resolution of the questions in dispute.  While 
it may seem obvious that a positive outcome is a necessary starting point for negotiations, 
particularly in international relations the seemingly simple question of what outcome is 
sought, may be in dispute (Vietnam, Korea).  Unless the outcome envisioned by both sides is 
a mutually agreed upon vision, very little may get done.  In the case of El Salvador 
“meetings” over the years never evolved into formal “negotiations” because of the lack of 
agreement on the fundamental question— ending the civil war.  Until both sides came to the 
negotiations table with the intent of reaching agreement, the process of negotiations could not 
begin.  As will be noted in the discussion below, several attempts to negotiate occurred.  
Meetings were held, but follow-up was lacking.  There was for a long time little reason to 
negotiate.  It took longer to start negotiations (five years) than to conduct negotiations 
(eighteen months). 
Negotiation Approaches 
Fisher and Ury (1981) designed three approaches to negotiations. There is the soft, 
hard, and the principled methods for negotiating.  During any negotiation, all three 
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negotiating methods come into play (Fisher and Ury).  These methods are often seen as 
methods for “getting your way.” While there is that element to these methods, as presented 
by Fisher and Ury they are methods for moving the negotiations along.  The art in 
negotiation is in using these methods and knowing the right time to apply a method to 
facilitate negotiations. 
Soft negotiations. Soft approach negotiators try to avoid conflict in order to retain an 
amicable relationship.  They also avoid personal confrontations by readily conceding to reach 
an agreement.  The soft approach is more likely to occur at the beginning and ending stages 
of a negotiation.  At the beginning phase negotiators share the sense of the desire to reach a 
common outcome, promoting a soft or benign approach (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  At the end of 
negotiations, all parties involved have deadlines and timelines to meet.  In order to meet these 
deadlines and timelines, they are impelled to seek agreements with rapid acceptance of 
language that would otherwise have been debated.   
Hard negotiations. An important starting point in negotiations is for the separate 
parties define for themselves their “bottom line”—the outcomes that must be achieved (or 
exceeded for an agreement to be accepted).  The negotiations “game” requires that initial 
public proposals be far removed from the bottom line to mask the real goal/outcome. Thus 
occurs the common phenomenon in which all parties stubbornly cling to extreme positions 
and adamantly deny the possibility of budging.  This approach will recur as negotiations 
reach the still unacknowledged bottom line (Cox, 1987).  Hard negotiations are necessary, but 
also dangerous.  Fisher and Ury (1981) suggest that hard negotiations run the risk of 
alienating the opposition and thus ending the negotiations before an agreement is reached.  
Principled negotiations. The principled stance of a negotiator focuses on basic 
interests, fair standards culminating in an agreement whereby all parties involved feel the 
process and results of the negotiations are satisfying to all (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  This 
method consists of four basic principles:  
1. Separate the people from the problem: The ability to see each other’s issue from the 
point of view of the opposing party in a negotiation assists in appreciating the issue 
more realistically and allows all parties involved to focus on the issue not the parties 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981);   
2. Focus on interests, not the on the positions: Each party’s interests are the prime 
motivators that force all involved to decide upon an agreement (Fisher & Ury, 1981);  
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3. Invent options for mutual gain: In complex and difficult situations, it is important and 
necessary to be creative when inventing options for mutual gain (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  
By inventing different options for a mutually agreed solution to a negotiation, all 
interested parties uncover solutions in common.  Deciding on a mutually agreed 
accord becomes easy when shared interests dovetail (Raiffa, 1982); and  
4. Use objective criteria when arriving at an agreement: In contrast to using positional 
bargaining, negotiators accept proposals based upon the use of criteria independent of 
the preconceived or ideologically-driven views of either side (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 
11). 
Impasse Procedures 
Negotiations rarely run smoothly or at a consistent pace.  The negotiations may come 
to a halt because an agreement on an issue may seem impossible.  Finding a way out of such 
impasses is the key to coming to a final agreement.  The models for addressing such impasses 
come from collective bargaining where both mediation and arbitration are recommended as 
paths to settle disagreements during negotiation (Cox, 1987; Dresang, 2009).  Mediation is 
the process by which a third party enters the negotiations to help the two parties reach an 
agreement on items at impasse.  In contrast, arbitration is a more extreme measure whereby 
the third party imposes a solution.  In the first instance the two “sides” in the negotiation 
remain in control of the outcome.  In the later instance much of the control over the outcome 
shifts to the third party (Cox, 1987).   
Even though it brings the parties closer to a final agreement, the introduction of an 
arbitrator is rarely viewed by the parties as positive.  While the language of international 
relations implies that outside parties (the United Nations, for example) is a mediator, it is not 
unusual for the parties to the negotiations to see the entrance of a third party into the 
discussion as a loss of control—in other words, the third party is perceived as an arbitrator.  
While in collective bargaining the introduction of a mediator is generally seen as a neutral or 
positive occurrence, arbitration is not.  In international settings the introduction of a third 
party is inevitably viewed as a negative.  The mere threat of the introduction of a third party 
is often sufficient to restart movement toward a final agreement (Dresang, 2009; Lewicki et 
al., 2009; Shel006C, 2006).   
Timing 
There is an internal rhythm to negotiations (Cox, 1987; Fisher & Ury, 1981).  The 
pace of negotiations quickens near the end. In some settings the “end” represents a defined 
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date known by all at the start of the negotiations (the expiration of a contract for example).  In 
contrast most international negotiations have no future limit.  It is more like writing 
legislation or a constitution.  The future is limitless.  The sense that the “end” is approaching 
and, therefore, negotiations need to speed up, is not something that can be identified until it is 
happening.  This sense that a conclusion is imminent may be the product of conflicting views.  
The first is a sense that the “tough” issues have been addressed.  The second is the sense that 
unless the parties start settling the matter an (unwelcome) third party may intervene.  
The Chronology of the Salvadoran Negotiations 
Serious peace negotiations among the parties—the government and the FLMN 
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]—started in April 1990 (though that first 
meeting at which “progress” was made was preceded by a critical meeting in September 
1989, lasting until its consummation in January 16, 1992.  There were brief meetings prior to 
serious negotiating in 1984, 1986, and 1987 (El Salvador Chronology).  The negotiating 
parties could not establish a framework from which to proceed.  The parties could not yet 
agree on an agenda, timeline, or issues to discuss at the negotiations table. They were not 
ready to agree. 
The first meeting at which both parties were seriously engaged was in September 
1989. What had changed between 1984 and 1989?  International events were pushing both 
sides to the conflict toward serious negotiations.  Changes both symbolic—the tearing down 
of the Berlin Wall—and practical—the disintegration the USSR halting military support for 
the FLMN—would influence the prospects for success of the FLMN.  Similarly, US 
Congressional pressure on President Reagan to abolish military aid to the government, led the 
government to question its future prospects.  Both parties foresaw a military stalemate (El 
Salvador Chronology). 
Events that led up to the September meeting and then afterward, the UN expressed an 
interest in getting the negotiating parties to agree on an accord.  Therefore, a second 
important meeting took place in Geneva in April 1990; it was at this meeting that timelines 
and deadlines were discussed.  The UN pressed for a role as mediator.  The meetings began 
to gain momentum and were occurring at greater frequency as both parties sought to develop 
an internal solution without the UN.  In May 1990 a meeting took place in Caracas, 
Venezuela. During this meeting, the agenda and timeline were more clearly defined.  A July 
1990 meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica allowed the parties to negotiate on human rights issues.  
While it would be ten months before the parties would again meet to negotiate issues such as 
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transitional provisions, a truth commission, and political agreements elaborating on 
constitutional reforms, progress was being made. The San Jose meeting confirmed for the 
parties that they could negotiate with each other without a mediator.  The parties met in New 
York in December 1991 to refine what had already been negotiated and to produce the 
document that would be the peace accords.  This series of meetings culminated in both parties 
signing the Peace Accords in Mexico City, Mexico on January 16, 1992 (El Salvador 
Chronology). 
In part because of the scattered timing of the negotiations and in part because topics 
varied, the composition of the negotiators present at any location varied.  When the 
negotiating parties met in Geneva, each party consisted of four representatives: four members 
representing the government; three ambassadors; and one former Minister of Finance.  On the 
FMLN side, all four members were former rebel commanders (United States Institute of 
Peace, 1990).  The second time the negotiating parties met government representatives were 
six in number.  This group comprised academicians, armed forces personnel, and high 
ranking government diplomats.  Representatives for the FMLN were again military 
commanders, but now there were seven present (United States Institute of Peace).  When the 
parties met in San Jose, Costa Rica in July 1990, the same persons who had been in Caracas 
represented both the government and the FLMN (United States Institute of Peace).  The 
government representatives at the negotiations in San Jose would serve at both Mexico City 
and New York the following year.  In Mexico City only four members represented the 
FMLN, but a fifth joined the party in New York (United States Institute of Peace).  
Importantly there was a core of negotiators from both sides that attended virtually all 
meetings beginning in 1989. 
Data Collection 
The central question is how the 20+ year effort to create democracy in El Salvador 
was affected by the processes and practices of the actual negotiations.  Explanations of and 
critiques of the implementation of the peace accords suffer from a lack of information about 
how and why the accords came to be worded in the way they are.  The only way to examine 
the dynamics of the negotiations that led to the Peace Accords is to get information from the 
source –persons from the two “sides” to the negotiations.  Cr itically, some of those involved 
are no longer available.  Also, the number of persons, who were participants throughout the 
process, was never large.  Fewer than fifteen persons met these criteria.  Two persons, one 
from each side of the negotiations who were long term participants, were identified and 
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agreed to be interviewed about the negotiations dynamics.  Open-ended interviews of more 
than an hour each were conducted (in Spanish).  
The central purpose of these personal interviews was to provide insight into whether 
or not the negotiations that produced the Peace Accords unfolded in the way that the 
literature would suggest.  In answering that broad question we gain insight on the following 
questions: 
1. What made conditions in 1989 different than in prior years when negotiations did not 
continue? 
2. How did the choice of who would negotiate shape the outcome of the accords?  
3. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, create a “soft negotiations” environment in which 
horse-trading of previous positions occurred? 
4. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, lead to the choice to ”not decide,” leaving the 
implementation to the political process after the negotiations were finished? 
5. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, lead to implementation decisions to which neither 
side was comfortable? 
6. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, result in intentionally ambiguously worded 
language in the Accords? 
7. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, create a circumstance under which implementation 
was slowed, or even impossible? 
Critique of the Accords 
Applying the Fisher and Ury (1981) framework for negotiation to the actual events as 
described by participants affirms that the negotiations did play out much as would be 
expected.  The cycle of hard and soft, then principled and finally soft negotiations did to a 
large extent occur.  Also the commitment of both parties to continue to negotiate to a 
conclusion (especially in 1991) should be acknowledged.  Also, as anticipated by the Fisher 
and Ury framework, both intentionally and unintentionally ambiguous language appears in 
the accords.  Such language served to facilitate decisions.  In this case things went a step 
further; there are issues intentionally left out.  Both of the interviewees stated that some 
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themes were not negotiated.  The socio-economic issues that had been the core of political 
unrest since at least the 1930s were left unmentioned because there was no consensus 
between the negotiating parties on how to address them.  Getting an agreement and moving 
toward democracy was more important than the details of the economic character of that 
future government.  Yet, the issue was important enough in the public mind that it could not 
be ignored completely.  Ambiguous language that acknowledged the mandate to address 
socio-economic concerns without offering any hint of the direction or scope of such solutions 
found its way into the accords.  The following English language translation captures the 
convoluted passage on economic issues as a way to acknowledge the issue, but clearly shifts 
the entire burden of offering concrete solutions onto future governments: 
a sustained effort and shall be conducted in phases, bearing in mind that 
the aim is to reach some agreements that are to be implemented 
immediately to achieve stabilization, others that are designed to tackle the 
economic and social problems that will ensue from the end of the conflict 
and still others that are geared specifically to reconstruction. (United 
States Institute of Peace). 
Interestingly, there is some suggestion from the interviews that this ambiguous 
language was acceptable to both sides, though for quite different reasons.  On the one hand 
the FLMN saw socio-economic reform as a central tenant of their fight, but that did not 
require those reforms to be in the accords.  They were content to leave those decisions to 
future governments.  The government accepted the language because they did not see the 
wording as a specific mandate to act.  They anticipated social and economic issues would not 
be negotiated, discussed, or considered because these were issues that the government 
controlled.   
Summary of Findings  
A summary of the responses by the interviewees to the questions asked above is 
presented as follows:    
1. What made conditions in 1989 different than in prior years when negotiations did not 
continue?  The international situation was changing rapidly.  Both sides felt the 
pressure.  The demise of the USSR would mean that military support for the FLMN 
would inevitably end.  The US Congress was pressuring President Reagan to abolish 
military aid to the government.  Most critically, both parties foresaw a military 
stalemate.  
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2. How did the choice of who would negotiate shape the outcome of the accords?   The 
peace accord was negotiated by several groups of representatives from each party.  
During the two plus years of negotiating, both parties had different representatives 
sitting at the negotiating table whenever they met.  No one on either side was present 
at all negotiations, though a few were there for most of the talks.  Furthermore, ne ither 
side was fully united on every issue.  Participants on the same “side” held conflicting 
views.  As a consequence, those negotiators signing the final peace accord shaped the 
accord’s outcome.  As noted earlier this is a critical issue that is examined in more 
detail in another manuscript.  
3. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, before 
threatened UN intervention, create a “soft negotiations” environment in which horse-
trading of previous positions occurred?  The imperative of impending UN 
intervention created an atmosphere in which both sides traded off positions.  
Government representatives agreed to recognize and legitimize the legal existence of 
the opposition as a political party eligible to participate in popular elections.  FMLN 
representatives withdrew its demand for the demilitarization of the armed forces 
(effectively making it a nation police force).  
4. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations lead in December 1991, 
before threatened UN intervention, to the choice to ”not decide,” leaving the 
implementation to the political process after the negotiations were finished.  Many of 
the contentious socio-economic issues that had roots going back to the 1930s were not 
addressed and, according to both interviewees, remain incomplete tasks to this day. 
5. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, before 
threatened UN intervention, lead to implementation decisions to which neither side 
was comfortable.  According to both interviewees, both negotiating parties decided to 
finish the negotiations even though they had not agreed to specific time frames such 
as phases and time periods of disarmament, reducing the numbers (soldiers) of 
military power, and whether both parties would execute their part of the agreement as 
negotiated.   
6. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, before 
threatened UN intervention, result in intentionally ambiguously worded language in 
the Accords.  Chapters one (Armed Forces) and five (Socio-Economic) of the peace 
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accords were purposely drafted in order to obscure the goals and hinder 
implementation.   
7. To what extent did the mutual goal of finishing negotiations in December 1991, before 
threatened UN intervention, create a circumstance under which implementation was 
slowed or even impossible.  The events occurring prior, during, and after writing the 
peace accords, as detailed in the aforementioned six questions above, demonstrate 
how each negotiating party was intentionally agreeing to opaquely and ambiguously 
written peace accord provisions in order to later meet again to further negotiate other 
terms and conditions.  Both parties were consciously finishing the negotiations with 
an eye toward future deliberations and negotiations without regard for the political 
capacity to implement them. 
Discussion 
Implications for Implementation 
Agreeing on peace accords to reform an entire political system and drafting a political 
framework designed to change a country’s entire political history is a difficult (possibly 
impossible) task.  When two or more parties consist of more than one individual on each 
negotiating side, the stakes are high and agreeing on terms as a group becomes challenging 
for the entire entity.  Issues such as intra-group disagreements, conflicts, and divisions come 
into play.  Sometimes group divisions are so pronounced that it causes an entirely new entity, 
e.g., a new political party, movement, or group, to emerge out of negotiations, or during the 
implementation phase.  
When parties of peace agreements come together, it is inevitable for them to 
experience delays and misinterpretations.  Yet, ambiguity is necessary in order for the 
negotiating parties involved to settle on a final agreement.  The ambiguous wording found in 
the peace accords is based upon trust and mutual understanding, but also strategic 
assumptions about who would control implementation.  When both negotiating parties agree 
to an ambiguous wording, they are implicitly accepting that they will meet again and in good 
faith sign the peace accords.  Agreeing to and signing an ambiguous peace accord provides 
both negotiating parties a belief that, even after signing it, they can come back to it at a later 
time and work out whatever is left.  But both parties act on a second set of presumptions 
whereby each side believes (hopes? expects?) those future decisions will be based upon 
different political and socio-economic bases than those that existed in 1991.  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
185 
Lessons 
There are two different versions of whether the Salvadoran peace accords have been 
fully implemented.  One of the parties to the negotiations states that the peace accords have 
been fully implemented. The other party sees the accords as unfulfilled as long as issues are 
not addressed.  There is ample justification on both sides in the wording of the accords to 
affirm these conflicting assertions.   However, both sides assert that advances in the peace 
accords implementation have been made.  This analysis suggests that advances in the 
negotiations were made during the negotiating phase of the process, but as with all 
negotiations, the task of implementation is critical to a summative evaluation of the success 
of the negotiations. In this there is much left to dispute; the political landscape is quite 
different today than 20, 50 or 90 years ago.  The aspirations of democratic reformers that for 
so long were denied are tangible today.  Nevertheless, the implementation of the accords 
remains a work in progress.  The mandates of the accords still drive political decision-
making.  The expectations created by that document remain the touchstone for judging 
progress toward democracy. 
Yet another lesson learned from this study is the fact that language ambiguity can 
work to the advantage of those that seek peace.  The advantage it has is that it allows the 
negotiating parties to move forward while coming back to these ambiguous terms.  For 
example, when the negotiating parties could not reach an agreement, they decided to move on 
to another theme and come back to this theme later.  When the negotiators were able to get 
back to the topics, sometimes the negotiating parties may have had time to think of ways to 
word the themes at hand and manipulate them to fit their interests.  In some cases the 
negotiators never got back to the issue, leaving it to the political process.  
Next Steps 
There is a second element to the negotiations dynamic—the intra-group conflicts that 
Graham Allison analysed in his examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1971; 
Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  As suggested above, there were never merely two “sides” to the 
negotiations.   The participants in the peace accords represented organizations that were fairly 
diverse ideologically and in their expectations of the outcome of the negotiations themselves.  
A more complete appreciation of the negotiations process and its resulting influence on the 
implementation requires a separate analysis.  That is the next step.  
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Conclusion 
Reforming a political system via peace accords is a difficult task.  By every measure 
the peace accords accomplished its central goals; an end to civil conflict and a shift toward a 
democratic foundation for politics.  The accords are a success.  In choosing to ignore certain 
issues, the political process, not the negotiators inherited the task of policy making and policy 
resolution.  The future is one of democratically addressing political issues. That is as it should 
be and may well be all that can be expected of the accords.  The “incompleteness” of the 
implementation is now a matter of political decision-making and not one of the accords.  
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Counteracting Dynamics of Violent Communication in Bullying  
Jacques L. Koko 
 
Abstract 
This study examines fourteen conversations from observations conducted on bullying 
among 8th graders in 2002, in a Middle School in Virginia in the United States of 
America to: (1) identify power disparity in verbal bullying between bullies and targets, 
(2) examine how power disparity in verbal bullying empowers the perpetrator against 
silent targets, (3) explain how targets’ verbal responses neutralize bullies or stop 
bullying, and (4) design an approach to counteracting verbal bullying –the “agere contra” 
approach to bullying, which demonstrates how words could also be used, not only to 
counteract bullying, but also to heal both the perpetrator and the target of bullying with 
the intervention of third parties. It was hypothesized that targets’ response (silence or 
verbal reaction) to verbal bullying affects bullies’ attitudes or decision to perpetuate or 
stop bullying cycle. The study used a mixed-method approach to perform conversation 
analysis, and semiotic analysis on the data collected. The results show support for the 
hypothesis. In light of the  results, the study advocates for counteracting bullying by 
using the “agere contra” approach, which translates into a combination of the target’s 
verbal response and the intervention of third parties, open anti-bullying teams guided by 
a school conflict resolution specialist.   
Introduction 
Nowadays, the observer just needs to watch and read the news to admit that bullying 
is widespread in elementary, middle, and high schools in the United States. Media sources 
report abundant news on school bullying as recent and current events. Bullying represents an 
aggressive behavior pattern where a student (or a group of students in some cases) utilizes 
his/her physical, verbal, or material power to assault physically, verbally, or by gesture a 
weaker, smaller, or poorer student through the means of destructive enactments such 
intimidations, provocations, beating, undesirable touching or solicitations, insults, mocking, 
name-calling, or other behaviors of that kind (Olweus, 1993; Swearer, Espelage, & 
Napolitano, 2009; Winslade & Williams, 2012). As per this working definition, bullying can 
occur in the forms of physical or verbal violence. This article focuses mainly on verbal 
bullying because our observations show that it happens more frequently in our schools.  
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What are some indicators of violent communication in verbal bullying, and how do 
they create power disparity between bullies and targets? To what extent should targets 
respond, and how should bullying be addressed constructively and systemically? The present 
article answers those questions and suggests ways to counteract effectively and constructively 
the social problem bullying represents. The analyst could hypothesize that verbal response 
could contribute to ending the circle of verbal bullying. However, what if a verbal response 
does not work? What should be done to stop bullying? The article uses conversation analysis, 
and semiotic analysis to examine fourteen observations on bullying conducted in 2002 in a 
middle school in Virginia, and demonstrate how the combination of target’s verbal response 
and third-party intervention is required to counteract verbal bullying successfully.  
School Bullying as a Social Problem 
Studies by education services and scholars such as the Norwegian psychologist, Dan 
Olweus, have found that schools are plagued by the problem of bullying. Left unchecked, 
bullies are more likely than non-bullies to become offenders in the criminal justice system 
when they get older. Their victims are likely to suffer from severe problems of self-esteem 
and depression, impairing their ability to perform well in school and social life settings 
(Olweus, 1993; Swearer, Espelage, & Napolitano, 2009; Winslade & Williams, 2012). At the 
extreme, victims may commit suicide or develop violent strategies to rid themselves of those 
who bully them and to express their anger at those who ignored the bullying, as it apparently 
occurred with the young shooters of Columbine High School in 1999. 
Across the United States of America, bullying in schools remains a major issue of 
concern due to the danger it represents for individual safety and public health. Statistics 
reveal that 15 to 25% of U.S. students are frequently bullied. Fifteen to twenty percent of 
students confess they often bully their peers (Nansel et al., 2001). “The U.S. Department of 
Education Institute of Education Sciences (IES) (2007) found a higher figure among students 
in the 12 to 18 age group: 32% were victims of bullying in previous school year” (Winslade 
& Williams, 2012, p. 122). Studies find that bullying negatively affects both the perpetrator 
and the victim with emotional issues or behavioral deficiency. Findings suggest that 
perpetrators of bullying are inclined to poor academic performance or drop-out of school, and 
are more likely to engage in antisocial behaviors, including carrying weapons to school 
(Berthold & Hoover, 2000; Nansel, Overpeck, Haynie, Ruan, & Schiedt, 2003; Nansel, Craig, 
Overpeck, Saluja, & Ruan, 2004; Sourander, Helstela, Helenius, & Piha, 2000). Moreover, 
scholars indicate that victims of bullying have an inclination to issues of self-esteem, anxiety, 
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and depression, suicidal thoughts and attempts, in addition to poor school performance 
(Bond, Carlin, Thomas, Ruin, & Patton, 2001; Eisenberg, Neumark-Sztainer, & Perry, 2003; 
Gladstone, Parker, & Malhi, 2006; Hawker & Boulton, 2000; Klomeck, Marrocco, Kleinman, 
Schonfeld, & Gould, 2007; Nansel et al., 2004; Sourander, Helstela, Helenius, & Piha, 2000; 
Winslade & Williams, 2012). Such emotional and behavioral dysfunctions in perpetrators and 
victims of bullying may ultimately result in long-term destructive and criminal behaviors in 
their adulthood (Nansel et al., 2001; Gladstone et al., 2006; Hugh-Jones & Smith, 1999; 
Olweus, 1993). 
A number of scholars and practitioners have specifically associated bullying with 
suicidal thoughts or risks (for example, Kim, Koh, & Leventhal, 2005; Klomek et al., 2007; 
Klomek, Sourander, & Gould, 2010; Klomek, et al., 2011). In a cross-sectional study of 1718 
seventh and eighth-grade students in two middle schools, Kim, Koh, and Leventhal (2005) 
compared students involved in bullying with those who were not involved in it, and found 
that victim-perpetrators reported more suicidal behaviors. As a result, they concluded that 
students who experienced school bullying, particularly victim-perpetrators, had significantly 
higher risks for suicidal thoughts and behaviors when compared with students who did not 
experience bullying (Kim et al., 2005). Klomek et al. (2007; 2010; 2011) reviewed a series of 
studies on bullying to examine the association between suicide and bullying in children and 
adolescents. They found that bullying and peer victimization foster suicidal thoughts with 
some variations by gender. Their conclusion enhanced a correlation between bullying and 
suicidality (Klomek et al., 2007). Such results echo what observers witness in the news. 
According to CBS News’s Steve Hartman, “bullying that ends in suicide has become an all-
too-familiar theme on the news” (Hartman, 2011). Cases of teenage students who committed 
suicide over the past ten years due to school bullying include 13-year-old Ryan Halligan of 
Vermont in 2003, 14-year-old Megan Meier of Missouri in 2006, 15-year-old Phoebe Nora 
Mary Prince of Massachusetts in 2010, 18-year-old Tyler Clementi of New Jersey in 2010, 
14-year-old Jamey Rodemeyer of New York in 2011, 13-year-old Rachel Ehmke of 
Minnesota in 2012, and 17-year-old Jay Corey Jones of Minnesota in 2012, to mention a few 
names. 
Even though the literature seems to emphasize the impact of bullying mainly on 
perpetrators and victims, evidence suggests that bullying also affects the third party that 
witnesses its occurrence. Bystanders often feel disturbed and even guilty for not helping the 
victim by confronting the perpetrator of bullying (O’Connell, Pepler, & Craig, 1999). 
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Because bullying affects not only the target, but also the bully, and their community, this 
article examines how the bystander’s involvement in the form of a third-party intervention 
can be significant for power balance, and contribute to counteracting bullying effectively for 
the benefit of the school community.  
The analyst would observe that research on bullying drastically increased since the 
1990s, following Olweus’s (1993) groundbreaking work on bullying. Much of the literature 
defines bullying as repeated physical or verbal aggressions perpetrated by one or more actors 
on a subject whom they perceive to be weaker than them (Olweus, 1993; Rivers & Smith, 
1994; Bosworth, Espelage, & Simon, 1999; Baldry & Farrington, 2000; Nansel et al., 2001; 
Nansel et al., 2004; Winslade & Williams, 2012). Olweus’s definition of bullying excludes 
situations involving actors of similar physical and psychological strength (Olweus, 1993; 
1994), which implies that he observes some power imbalance in what he understands as 
bullying. Following Olweus’ work, researchers have more assertively examined power 
disparities between bullies and their victims (Vaillancourt, Hymel, & McDouga ll, 2003; 
Winslade & Williams, 2012). 
However, despite the surge in the literature on bullying, and the increase in scholars’ 
interest in studying power difference in bullying, the focus has not been so much on power 
imbalance of communication in bullying, though researchers seem to agree that bullying 
involves not only physical attacks, but also verbal ones. Some scholars even find that the 
occurrence of verbal aggression is higher among girls than with boys (for example, Baldry & 
Farrington, 2000; Bosworth et al., 1999; Nansel et al., 2001; Rivers & Smith, 1994). 
Observations of bullying experiences in our school systems allow the analyst to scrutinize 
bullying more carefully through the lenses of power imbalance in violent communication, 
and beyond the gender spectrum. This article sets that as a goal, which frames its relevance. 
Indeed, violent communication in bullying often takes the forms of verbal attacks such as 
insults or curses, name-calling, and mockeries (any words or phrases with some potential of 
destruction or destructive impact on the victim) recorded in a face-to-face communication, or 
in a phone conversation. Violent communication in bullying can also be virtual (cyber-
bullying), which occurs online through emails, text messages, on Facebook, using twitter, or 
other new technologies of communication. For its purposes, this study defines bullying as a 
violent conflict where a party A utilizes his or her physical, verbal, intellectual, or any other 
natural or personal power to oppress another party B perceived as weaker or disable. This 
definition of bullying falls in the perspective of conflict analysis and resolution, which 
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defines conflict as a manifestation of antagonism or contradiction between two parties 
(Wilmot & Hocker, 2001; Koko, 2008) or as an incompatibility of parties’ aspirations (Pruitt 
& Kim, 2004). Once bullying is defined as a conflict, it appears that violent communication 
represents a harmful weapon that bullies use to hurt their targets.  
Traditional approaches to addressing bullying include targets neglecting, minimizing, 
or ignoring the problem, targets fighting the bully back, or school officials taking punitive 
actions against the perpetrator of bullying, to mention a few approaches (Swearer et al., 2009; 
Winslade & Williams, 2012). In the perspective of conflict transformation, all such 
approaches present limitations which could be detrimental to the target, the bully, and their 
community. Winslade and Williams (2012) coherently highlight some of those limitations. It 
does not necessarily help when a target ignores bullying. “Perpetrators of bullying can easily 
see that their efforts are striking home, even on the person who tries to ignore it, and they are 
encouraged to keep on doing it” (Winslade & Williams, 2012, p. 126). A target that opts to 
fight back is either running the risk of embracing the logic of a bully, or increasing the chance 
of violence escalation (Winslade & Williams, 2012). Finally, punishment may not eventually 
address the roots of the problem; punishment falls in the win- lose logic of a power-based 
approach just like bullying, and fails to empower the victim and the bully for collaborative 
conflict transformation. 
Going beyond such approaches, Olweus’ groundbreaking work suggested that 
bullying should be handled more systemically through the means of class sessions and 
lessons, teacher awareness campaigns, playground supervision, and other school-wide 
programs to prevent, reduce or stop bullying (Olweus, 1993; 1994; Winslade & Williams, 
2012). However, due to their official nature, some of these programs can still be trapped in 
the win- lose logic of power-based approach to problem solving, which takes the authority for 
resolving issues out of students’ hands, and gives it to school officials. Winslade and 
Williams (2012) clearly understood this when they advocate for setting up undercover anti-
bullying teams to integrate and empower students by making them responsible for addressing 
bullying. To some extent, this article builds on their approach by suggesting that overt anti-
bullying teams capitalize on the target’s verbal response to bullying.  
By reading the observation sheets of field observations conducted on bullying in 2002 
in a middle school in Virginia, the author hypothesizes that targets’ response (silence or 
verbal reaction) to verbal bullying affects bullies’ attitudes or decision to perpetuate or stop 
the bullying cycle. The objective of this article is fourfold: (1) identify power disparity in 
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verbal bullying between bullies and targets in terms of the gap between the words used by the 
bullies, and the targets’ silent attitudes, (2) examine how power disparity in verbal bullying 
empowers the perpetrator against silent targets, by highlighting the hurtful power of words 
used in bullying, (3) explain how targets’ verbal responses neutralize bullies or stop the 
bullying cycle, and (4) design an approach to counteracting verbal bullying –the “agere 
contra” approach to bullying to demonstrate how words could also be used, not only to 
counteract bullying, but also to heal both the perpetrator and the target of bullying with the 
intervention of third parties, fellow students, parents, school officials, or conflict resolution 
specialists. The overall goal is to counteract bullying in schools adequately.  
Methodology 
This study mainly uses qualitative methods for data collection and analysis, building 
on data the author collected in 2002 with a colleague, Bonnie Lofton. Data collection 
procedures included participant observations. For data analysis this paper relies on techniques 
of conversation analysis, and semiotic analysis. The population targeted was the oldest 
children in a mid-sized middle school with a population of 750 students. The site was located 
in a small city of Virginia with a population of 23,000 people. Using purposeful sampling, 
and to keep the study manageable, the focus was limited to the top grade level (255 students 
in grade 8) of the three grades in the middle school. The school was the only public middle 
school in the city; therefore it embraces all the social-economic groups, races, and 
nationalities of the city. There were private schools available in the area, but they were 
smaller, drawing away only about one percent of the middle school population. Gaining entry 
to the school was relatively easy because my co-researcher, Bonnie Lofton, had contacts and 
vested interest in the quality of school environment, as a result of (1) having children in the 
school system, (2) being a substitute teacher in the school system, and (3) caring about the 
children in the community in which she lives. Lofton was known to school officials and 
trusted by them, making it possible to do research in the system with relative ease.  
The cooperation of school authorities was required to conduct this research. Parents 
and students received permission slips through the students' home-base teachers. Informed 
consent forms were given out to 8th graders in the Middle School, to teachers at the school, 
and to parents of 8th graders. Finally, the school needed to make physical arrangements for 
this study, providing permission for the researchers to ride school buses, and to participate in 
students’ activities in the classrooms, in the library, and in the cafeteria (during lunch). 
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Participant observations were conducted for two days in different school settings, including 
on the school bus, in the classroom, in the library, in the hallways, and in the cafeteria.  
The observations took place on Thursday, February 28th, 2002, and on Friday, March 
1st, 2002. Such observations were guided by the following research questions: How do 
students get picked on? How do they communicate with one another? What are students’ 
conversations like, in general? How do students handle bullying? Is it common that certain 
students hang together? If so, could these groups be described with names? How do members 
of the groups relate to one another? For example, how do the athletes get along with the artsy 
students? Do some students get picked on more often than others? Why is it important to 
reduce bullying here? What are things that teachers or other adults do that make students' 
relationships better or worse?  
For the purposes of this article, data collected through participant observations were 
chunked and coded with numbers and themes. In the context of this study, fourteen bullying 
situations were observed in the school over two days, on February 28, 2002, on and March 1, 
2002. From the observations, there were eleven bullies (coded as Bully 1, Bully 2, Bully 3, 
Bully 4, Bully 5, Bully 6, Bully 7, Bully 8, Bully 9, Bully 10, Bully 11), and fourteen targets 
(coded as Target 1, Target 2, Target 3, Target 4, Target 5, Target 6, Target 7, Target 8, Target 
9, Target 10, Target 11, Target 12, Target 13, and Target 14), with three targets (Target 1, 
Target 2, and Target 3) for Bully 1, and two targets (Target 5, and Target 6) for Bully 3. The 
study utilized techniques of conversation analysis, and semiotic analysis for data analysis, 
and the results were interpreted accordingly. Conversation analysis stands for “a meticulous 
analysis of the details of conversation, based on a complete transcript” (Babbie, 2004, p. 
375). Semiotic analysis looks for “meanings intentionally or unintentionally attached to 
signs” (Babbie, 2004, p. 373). The unit of analysis in the study was conversation. All fourteen 
conversations observed were between students at the middle school. Every conversation 
observed among the student population on the school bus, in the school cafeteria, hallways, 
and library, was recorded in the form of written notes as presented in Table 1 and Table 2.  
Eight out the fourteen bullying scenarios observed were verbal aggressions (they 
encompass the cases of Bully 1, Bully 2, Bully 3, Bully 6, Bully 7, and Bully 8), five were 
physical aggressions (which include Bully 3, Bully 4, Bully 5, Bully 9, and Bully 11), and only 
one was an imitation gesture for mocking a disable student (Bully 10). Though it takes into 
account the physical aggression scenarios observed, the conversation analysis here focuses 
specifically on verbal bullying, and the target’s verbal response. In other words, the analysis 
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capitalizes on the interactions between Bully 1 and Target 1, Bully 1 and Target 2, Bully 1 
and Target 3, Bully 2 and Target 4, Bully 3 and Target 6, Bully 6 and Target 9, Bully 7 and 
Target 10, and Bully 8 and Target 11. The study coded the manifest content (or concrete 
terms) of such conversations by identifying specific words that serve as indicators of violent 
communication on the part of the perpetrator (or bully in the context of this study) to 
determine how violent they are. Responses from the targets were organized into categories of 
counteractions (verbal or physical) and silence (absence of counteraction). Counteractions 
will be interpreted as filling the gap of power disparity by creating some power balance in 
conversations between bullies and targets (with positive incidence on discouraging bullying), 
whereas absence of counteractions will potentially equate with widening the gap of power 
imbalance with incidence on encouraging bullying, and with damaging implications in 
student conversations. 
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Table 1. Observing Bullying (Day 1 Observation Sheet)  
 
Table 1: Observing Bullying (Day 1 Observation Sheet) 
Observing Bullying (Day 1 Observation Sheet) On the school bus : 
‘Your name is moron’, says a tall boy (Bully 1) shouting at his short 
neighbor (Target 1) on the opposite seat. The victim looks at the 
perpetrator, then bends his head and remains silent; the bully goes 
on. 
‘You are stupid’, shouts the same schoolboy (Bully 1) at another 
student some minutes later. The victim (Target 2) remains silent, 
and the offender goes on. 
The same perpetrator (Bully 1) asks another student (Target 3): why 
is your head so big, big head guy? The target responds: my Dad 
says it is because I am smart. The harasser immediately refrains, 
opens his book, and starts reading quietly.  
Soon after, ‘what are you writing?’ a boy (Bully 2) asks a girl 
(Target 4). ‘I am writing my nickname’, she responds. –‘What is it?’ 
he continued. ‘Rubber’, she says. ‘That is a good nickname’, he 
adds. Then the girl starts beating him. ‘That is not abuse’, he reacts. 
‘That is abuse’, the girl replies. Then, the boy apologizes. 
In the school library: A boy (Bully 3) keeps touching a girl’s hair 
(Target 5). She reacts by beating him; he then stops. Later on, ‘get 
your bottom off my face’, says the same boy (Bully 3) to another girl 
(Target 6). The latter looks at him up and down, and hardly moves. 
The boy then moves away from the girl quickly. 
In the hallways: A tall guy (Bully 4) keeps beating his small 
neighbor (Target 7). The latter asks him sadly ‘why are you beating 
me?’ The persecutor responds, ‘because I can’. At this point, two 
other students notice the interaction, and ask the bully to stop, which 
he did and apologized to the target. 
Another boy (Bully 5) attempts to hug a girl (Target 8) from the 
back. She strictly resists by saying ‘no’. The boy suddenly backs up 
from his attempt, and run away. 
In the dining hall: A student (Bully 6) calls his neighbor (Target 9), 
‘smoker’. ‘Don’t laugh at me, I don’t tolerate that’, the victim 
responds. ‘I am teasing you, sorry’ the perpetrator says.   
FIELD RESEARCHER'S 
COMMENTS: 
 
The school bus, the school 
library and hallways, as 
well as the dining hall 
unfortunately become 
settings for bullying. Some 
students (apparently more 
powerful) use destructive 
words to offend others (less 
powerful).  
The bullies continue as 
long as they do not 
encounter resistance. Once 
there is verbal resistance 
they stop.  
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Table 2. Observing Bullying (Day 2 Observation Sheet) 
On the school bus : A girl (Target 10) is talking and 
laughing. Suddenly, a guy (Bully 7) behind her interrupts 
‘shut up’. She reacts ‘I don’t shut up! That is one thing you 
have to learn from me’. The boy looks down and moves 
away. Afterward, another girl (Bully 8) calls her neighbor 
(Target 11), ‘little man’. ‘You call me little!’ he exclaims, 
shaking his head in disagreement. As a result, another 
student witnessing the conversation tells the girl, “you 
should apologize”. She then apologizes. 
In the hallways : A boy (Bully 9) holds his neighbor’s hair 
(Target 12). ‘I don’t like that’, she declares. ‘I am just 
kidding’, he said. ‘You have to stop because I take it 
personal’, she reacts. The boy stops. 
Another boy (Bully 10) starts limping in imitation of a 
handicap student (Target 13) walking ahead of him. The 
victim notices it, and turns around. The boy laughs and 
stops for a while. As the victim silently continues his way 
forward, the bully keeps limping after him. 
In the dining hall: A group of students are sitting around 
a table. A boy (Bully 11) comes and starts pushing one 
(Target 14) of them. The victim asks ‘why are you pushing 
me?’ The bully responds ‘you need to be where you are 
now; are you worthy to be where I am?’ Then he laughs, 
clapping his hands. Other students witnessing the scene 
ask the victim to go complain. Then, the bully immediately 
starts walking away. 
FIELD RESEARCHER'S 
COMMENTS: 
 
The dining hall unfortunately 
becomes a place of group 
distinction and exclusion! 
The hallways sadly become a 
setting for mocking a disable 
student.  
 
Some Indicators of Violent Communication 
The observation sheets from the fourteen bullying scenarios show how bullies 
communicate to their targets in aggressive manners, often using offensive expressions or 
words that connote or denote violence. In the context of this study, such expressions include 
“your name is moron”, “you are stupid”, “Rubber . . . that a good nickname”, “get your 
bottom off my face”, “shut up”, “little man”, “why is your head so big, big head guy?” “Are 
you worthy to be where I am?” To some degree, these expressions are meant to insult, to 
intimidate, to mock, or to exclude their targets in a communication process. Indeed, the word 
“moron” literally indicates a mentally retarded individual, or a foolish person. The adjective 
“stupid” also has the same meaning. The bully uses them in an attempt to insult or denigrate 
his victims. In general, the word “rubber” is not commonly used as a name for individuals. 
Here, the bully intends to mock or laugh at the victim by implying that rubber is a good 
nickname. Such expressions as “get your bottom off my face” and “shut up” respectively 
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imply disdain and intimidation. The use of the expression “little man” reflects mockery or 
derision, which is also Bully 1’s intention when he asks Target 3 this question: “why is your 
head so big, big head guy?” A certain propensity to exclusion or discrimination is probably 
what triggers Bully 11 to challenge Target 14 with the following question: “are you worthy to 
be where I am?” Due to their violent connotations such expressions all bear the potential of 
having negative or destructive impacts on their targets.  
In every communication process, the words we use are powerful, and they affect both 
our internal and external environment significantly: they certainly affect the receiver of the 
message more so than the sender (Benveniste, 1973). Positive words or comments translating 
into messages of lauds or praises tend to affect their receivers positively by stimulating 
sentiments of satisfaction or happiness. However, negative words or comments echoed in 
insults, mockeries, intimidations, and discriminations tend to hurt or harm, or even kill their 
receivers by generating feelings of dissatisfaction and issues of self-esteem, depression, and 
possibly suicidal thoughts. Words not only stimulate positive or negative feelings, but they 
also enact or enable constructive or destructive behaviors or actions. Obviously, behaviors 
usually follow suit sentiments in any organic process of human interactions. In a process of 
verbal bullying, words can hurt or kill a target. Therefore, we ought to find systemic ways of 
counteracting bullying by unveiling how words can also heal. Words can certainly hurt and 
kill, but they can also heal and redeem human subjects.  
Categories of Targets’ Responses: Counteraction or Silence and Implications  
The observations conducted in the school reveal two categories of targets’ responses. 
Some targets actively respond to bullies by countering bullying verbally or physically. Other 
targets are passive and choose to oppose silence to the abuse. Out of the fourteen bullying 
situations observed over two days, eleven of the targets successfully counteracted bullying 
either verbally or physically, or both verbally and physically: eight targets confronted their 
bullies verbally (including Target 3 versus Bully 1, Target 7 versus Bully 4, Target 8 versus 
Bully 5, Target 9 versus Bully 6, Target 10 versus Bully 7, Target 11 versus Bully 8, Target 
12 versus Bully 9, and Target 14 versus Bully 11), one target defeated the bully both verbally 
and physically (Target 4 versus Bully 2), one target challenged the bully physically by 
beating him (Target 5 versus Bully 3), and one target stopped the bullying by using body 
language through disdainful eye contacts (Target 6 versus Bully 3). The other three targets 
remained silent in the face of attacks (Target 1 versus Bully 1, Target 2 versus Bully 1, and 
Target 13 versus Bully 10). 
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On one hand, all the targets who actively responded to their bullies ended up 
discouraging or stopping the bullying cycle, according to the observations sheets. Out of the 
eleven targets that confronted their bullies, seven (including Target 4, Target 5, Target 6, 
Target 8, Target 9, Target 10, and Target 12) were able to successfully discourage or stop the 
bullying ipso facto, without the assistance of a third-party intervention, and four (Target 3, 
Target 7, Target 11, and Target 14) succeeded in ending the aggression with some sort of 
assistance from a third-party. In an attempt to respond to Bully 1’s inquiry about why his 
head was so big, Target 3 replied: my Dad says it is because I am smart. This reaction 
implies that having a big head is nothing to be embarrassed about or ashamed of; instead it is 
an indication of being intelligent or bright. In other words, what the bully thought was a 
weakness for the target was turned into a powerful asset by the target’s response. Such a 
response empowered the target and disarmed the bully; it counteracted the perpetrator’s 
inclination to bullying with a sudden change in his attitude and behavior: he immediately 
refrained, opened his book, and started reading quietly. When Bully 3 summoned Target 6: 
‘get your bottom off my face’, Target 6 responded with an aggressive look at him up and 
down, and barely moved. As a result, Bully 3 quietly moved away from her. When Bully 6 
called Target 9, ‘smoker’, the latter reacted: ‘don’t laugh at me, I don’t tolerate that’, which 
triggered the aggressor to say: ‘sorry’. Moreover, as Bully 7 shouted at Target 10 to shut her 
up, the latter replied: ‘I don’t shut up! That is one thing you have to learn from me’. To such a 
response the attacker looked down and moved away. Finally, when Bully 8 referred to Target 
11 as a ‘little man’, the latter responded in disagreement, which made him get an apology 
from the perpetrator. 
On the other hand, with silent targets the bullies either renewed attacks on the same 
subjects, or made other victims according to participant observations at the middle school. 
Opposing silence to bullying seems to be interpreted by the tormentor either as an indicator 
of acceptance on the part of the target of the attacks, or as a sign of weakness on the part of 
the target, which gives the former a sense of having some superior power over the latter. 
Either way, the results show that the target’s silence to aggressions seems to encourage the 
aggressor to perpetrate further attacks. For instance, when Bully 1 called him ‘moron’, Target 
1 remained silent, which enabled the bullying cycle to continue, with Bully 1 treating Target 
2 as stupid. As Target 2 also remained silent to the insult, the oppressor perpetuated the 
bullying cycle to hit Target 3 with this mocking question: why is your head so big, big head 
guy? To which Target 3 stepped up to respond: My Dad says it is because I am smart. Target 
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3’s verbal reaction stopped the bullying cycle as Bully 1 immediately refrained from further 
bullying, opened up his book, and started reading silently. Additionally, Target 13’s silence 
in the face of Bully 10’s attack empowered the latter to keep the bullying cycle unfolding 
according the observations. 
Roles of Third-Party Bystanders 
Our observations confirmed that third-party interventions can play important roles in 
ending a bullying cycle. According to the observation sheets, third-party interventions 
contributed to stopping the bullying cycle in four cases out of the eight scenarios where 
targets confronted the bullying verbally. The four cases include Target 3 versus Bully 1, 
Target 7 versus Bully 4, Target 11 versus Bully 8, and Target 14 versus Bully 11. In the case 
of Target 3 versus Bully 1, Target 3’s father stepped in as a third-party whose intervention 
came in the form of an advice that ultimately empowered Target 3: your head is big because 
you are smart. Regarding the situation of Target 7 versus Bully 4, the third-party intervention 
was done by two bystanders who noticed the interaction after Target 7’s reaction, and asked 
the oppressor to stop, which he did and apologized to the target. As far as the scenario of 
Target 11 versus Bully 8 is concerned, the third-party intervention was that of another 
bystander who requested that Bully 8 should apologize to Target 11, which he did. Finally, in 
the case of Target 14 versus Bully 11, the third-party intervention occurred when a group of 
students witnessing the scene advised Target 14 to go complain to the school officials about 
the mistreatment. 
It is important to notice that in all four cases here, the third-party interventions follow 
the targets’ verbal reactions to bullying. In other words, the analyst could say that by verbally 
engaging their bullies, targets catch outsiders’ attention to witness what is happening in their 
immediate social environment, and to intervene as a result.  
Interpretation of Results  
The results of our analysis confirm the hypothesis that targets’ response (silence or 
verbal reaction) to verbal bullying affects bullies’ attitudes or decision to perpetuate or stop 
bullying cycle. Targets’ verbal response to attacks contributes to ending bullying cycle to 
some extent. According to our observations in this middle school, all eight targets that 
verbally counteracted their bullies were able to stop the bullying cycle either with or without 
a third-party assistance: four targets (including Target 8 versus Bully 5, Target 9 versus Bully 
6, Target 10 versus Bully 7, and Target 12 versus Bully 9) ended the bullying without the 
intervention of a third party, and four targets got some form of third-party assistance 
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(including Target 3 versus Bully 1, Target 7 versus Bully 4, Target 11 versus Bully 8, and 
Target 14 versus Bully 11). Such results call for some discussions. 
Some hermeneutics of the case of Target 3 versus Bully 1 would reveal that Target 3 
reported to his father how his schoolmates were mocking the size of his head, and how the 
father advised him to respond by constructively transforming his perception of the size of his 
head, and by ultimately empowering him over his bullies. As Target 3 followed his father’s 
advice, Bully 1 stopped calling him name, and he certainly felt empowered as a result. It is as 
if his father’s words exerted some healing power on Target 3. Words can certainly hurt when 
they are destructive as bullies’ words do, but they can also heal when they become 
constructive as they did in Target 3’s case. The lesson we learn from this scenario triggers a 
recommendation to parents and school officials to dedicate more time to listening to their 
children and students, and to find creative ways of preemptively or proactively empowering 
them against bullies. Based upon their responses, the analyst can conclude that such targets 
with a strong character from the participant observations include Target 9 and Target 10: 
remember that when Bully 6 called Target 9, ‘smoker’, the latter reacted sharply: ‘don’t laugh 
at me, I don’t tolerate that’, which triggered the aggressor to say: ‘sorry’. Likewise, as Bully 
7 shouted at Target 10 to shut her up, she replied: ‘I don’t shut up! That is one thing you have 
to learn from me’. Not everybody has such a strong personality; yet, what if it could be 
acquired through training or socialization processes in a society where bullying has 
unfortunately become a virus? 
It is of paramount importance that parents or educators assist in strengthening their 
students’ character or personality positively. Parents or educators can do so by providing 
students with empowering or positive auto-suggestions or advice that help them believe in 
their capacities and transform what could be seen as their weakness into their strength as in 
the case of Target 3. Suicide and the worst case scenario could be avoided if parents and 
educators assist students in taking serious actions against bullying. Fortunately, the media 
presented some success stories in that regard. On Tuesday, February 7th, 2011, CBS news 
reported a very moving case of a male victim of bullying at the American Heritage Academy 
outside Atlanta. The 11-year-old boy who suffered from juvenile arthritis was taunted by his 
classmates over medical ailment; they mocked his limp and called him “chicken legs and 
other funny names” because of the way he walked (Hartman, 2011). He was excluded and 
rejected by the popular kids in the school. He was inflicted much physical and emotional 
pain, and considered killing himself. After they became aware of the problem, his parents, 
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teachers, and a classmate took actions to help the young boy redeem his image, which 
prevented him from committing suicide: they took time to listen to him share his nightmare 
of experience; they moved on to seeking counseling for him; they worked to integrate him in 
a youth group at church; they made sure he became the manager of the school cross country 
team with the help of a classmate. Such strategic decisions and actions contributed to helping 
the teenage student survive bullying, and he was excited to share his story with CBS news at 
the age of 13 (Hartman, 2011). Achieving success in that process requires a climate of trust 
where students can open up to their parents and school officials, and the latter devote enough 
time to listen to their students’ concerns, or seek to inquire about their adventures at school.  
The results of our analysis show that in some cases targets’ verbal response alone is 
not sufficient to discourage the bully or end the bullying cycle. Some targets need the 
assistance of a third-party intervention to overcome the bully as in the cases of Target 3 
versus Bully 1, Target 7 versus Bully 4, Target 11 versus Bully 8, and Target 14 versus Bully 
11. Nonetheless, the reader ought to notice that such targets still took the initiative to attract 
the third-party’s attention to their situation by responding to the bully verbally or by exposing 
their situation to an outsider. This means that where the target’s words are still weak or 
ignored by the bully, the former should resort to the assistance of a third-party. Indeed, some 
bullies will reject or counteract their targets’ response to further victimize them; there should 
not be any doubt about that. Some victims’ “response to bullying can become the target of 
more teasing” (Winslade & Williams, 2012, p. 124). When such scenarios occur, the target 
ought to seek help from bystanders or an outside third party that could be a fellow student, a 
teacher, a school official, or a parent.  
Implications and Final Recommendations: The Agere Contra Approach to Bullying 
In its literal meaning, “agere contra” is the Latin expression for ‘act against’. This 
approach is inspired by the Jesuit Spirituality where the principle of agere contra requires 
that the subject finds creative ways to counteract or reject bad thoughts, or bad behaviors. 
The Jesuit principle of “agere contra” entails that “a soul that wishes to make progress in the 
spiritual life must always act in a manner contrary to that of the enemy” (Loyola, 2000, p. 
124). Such a principle is operationalized in two basic rules for the discernment of spirits 
according to St. Ignatius of Loyola (2000), rules 325.12 and 326.13. Rule 325.12 states that:  
The enemy becomes weak, loses courage, and turns to flight . . . as soon as one 
leading a spiritual life faces his temptations boldly, and does exactly the opposite of 
what he suggests. However, if one begins to be afraid and to lose courage in 
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temptations, no wild animal on earth can be fiercer than the enemy of our human 
nature. He will carry out his perverse intentions with consummate malice. (p. 118)  
Article 326.13 stipulates: 
When the enemy of our human nature tempts a just soul with his wiles . . . he 
earnestly desires that they be received secretly and kept secret. But if one manifests 
them to a confessor, or to some other spiritual person who understand his deceits 
and malicious designs, the evil one is very much vexed. For he knows that he cannot 
succeed in his evil undertaking, once his evident deceits have been revealed. (p. 118)  
These two rules present ways in which human nature ought to take actions to counter the evil 
spirit’s attacks in a spiritual process. Rule 325.12 suggests that the target of attacks fearlessly 
and harshly faces such attacks by opposing the enemy’s inclinations or traps. Doing so 
weakens and discourages the enemy, and ultimately causes him/her to flee. If the target fails 
to do so due to a lack of courage or due to fears of the enemy, the latter becomes more 
stubborn and more powerful in renewing his/her attacks. Apparently, this rule implies that the 
target takes action personally, without the intervention of a third party. However, rule 326.13 
requires that the target seeks the assistance of a third party by unveiling the attacks to a 
spiritual director. As a result, the two rules are complementary: if a target is not able to 
implement rule 325.12 (or if s/he fails to succeed in its implementation) for whatever reasons, 
s/he should resort to rule 326.13. The two rules are not mutually exclusive; a target can use 
them either alternatively or simultaneously. In other words, the target can select to take action 
personally and still unveil the situation to the attention of a third party for help.  
The present study uses such rules by analogy in an attempt to design a model for 
counteracting verbal bullying. Bullying is here compared to what St. Ignatius of Loyola 
(2000) called the “enemy”. Bullying–and not the bully—is the enemy because the bully is 
also a victim of the evil spirit that bullying reflects. It is essential to differentiate between 
bullying and the bully. Bullying is bad; it is the problem and not the bully (Winslade & 
Williams, 2012). Actually, Winslade and Williams (2012) further explain what we mean 
here: 
Every person involved in the bullying relationship is also capable of other styles of 
relationship. No one is a bully or a victim by nature. The bully, the victim, and the 
bystander are names, not so much of persons as of positions in a narrative. People 
enter these positions and perform their narrative function, but they can also set the 
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story aside, given an effective invitation to do so. The challenge is to create an 
opportunity for each of them to step out of the story of bullying and into another 
storyline that is incompatible with ongoing bullying. (p. 128) 
As a human being, the bully is a person who has the potential of transformation for good 
behaviors. To some degree, bullies’ bad behaviors could be attributed to bad upbringing or 
social exposures, negative peer pressures, or related issues of unsafe environments they have 
experienced. This perspective on bullying reflects the view of the French philosopher, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, (1964) on society when he suggests that human beings are good by nature; 
it is society that corrupts them. Thus, a good socialization or education process could help 
bullies overcome bullying behaviors. In other words, the bullies also need help to learn good 
behaviors, such as loving and respecting those who are different from them. The fact that the 
observation sheets show some bullies apologizing to their targets enhances the importance of 
distinguishing the bullying behavior from the person of the bully. Indeed, over the fourteen 
bullying cases covered in this study, four bullies ended up apologizing to their targets: these 
include Bully 2 to Target 4, Bully 4 to Target 7, Bully 6 to Target 9, and Bully 8 to Target 11. 
If they are able to apologize, it means they recognize their wrongdoing somehow, and they 
just need help to anticipate and avoid bullying and learn good behaviors. Ultimately, if it is a 
fact that bullies use their physical, verbal, intellectual, material, or psychological power to 
hurt those who are weaker or smaller than them, it is certainly possible to teach them to use 
such powers to serve, help, and love their social environment. Parents and educators should 
spend more time teaching students to show respect to one another, and to be acceptant of 
their differences. 
The agere contra approach to bullying encourages the target to first respond verbally 
to bullying, and then bring the issue to the attention of a third party for assistance (see Table 
3). The first response is likely to empower the target mentally, as s/he bravely confronts the 
attacks with the power of words or phrases such as “don’t laugh at me, I don’t tolerate that”, 
“I don’t shut up! That is one thing you have to learn from me”, all phrases used by Target 9 
and Target 10 as observed in this middle school. The list of catchwords for verbally 
counteracting bullying could include other catchphrases such as ‘I demand that you stop’, ‘I 
do not like it’, ‘you can behave better than that’, or any creative verbal motto such as the one 
by Target 3 in response to Bully 1’s injunction: “my Dad says it is because I am smart”. The 
target’s verbal response and subsequent empowerment may contribute to discouraging, 
disarming, slowing, or stopping the bullying cycle as in the case of Target 9 versus Bully 6, 
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and Target 10 versus Bully 7. However, regardless of the outcome of the target’s verbal 
response, the agere contra approach would require that the target takes one additional step by 
bringing the situation to the attention of a third party that is able to assist in addressing the 
issue more broadly and effectively. Because of the danger bullying presents to individual and 
public health, it is therapeutic and safe for both the target and the bully, as well as for their 
school community that a third party comes in to address the bullying situation thoroughly in a 
bigger picture. A third-party intervention would certainly assist in transforming their 
relationship constructively and help the subjects grow. This second action is in reference to 
the rule 326.13 (Loyola, 2000) mentioned previously, which requires the target to unveil the 
attacks to a spiritual director that should be a conflict resolution specialist. 
 
Table 3. Agere Contra Approach to Bullying  
Bullying Attacks Target’s Response: Agere Contra Approach to Bullying 
Verbal Attacks (1) Verbal Reaction 
[followed by(2)] 
(2) Bring Issue to Attention of Third-Party 
(a conflict resolution specialist intervenes 
with open anti-bullying teams made up of 
students) 
 
Specifics of a third-party intervention in school bullying presuppose the services of a 
conflict resolution specialist working for or within the school. It is critical to emphasize here 
the importance for each school to have a conflict resolution specialist because their education 
and training in conflict resolution predispose them to efficiently assist students in handling 
bullying which is here perceived a destructive conflict pattern within the school system. Their 
skills in intervention allow them to isolate the issues from the persons in order to tackle the 
destructive issues and help the persons constructively. As a result, they will be able to help 
targets, bullies, and their communities by tackling bullying accordingly. If each school can 
afford a school nurse or counselor, they should also bring on board a conflict resolution 
specialist in order to successful address the virus of bullying within school communities. 
Considering the negative impacts of bullying on our school communities, having a conflict 
resolution specialist working in the school compound is now as vital as having a school 
nurse. 
To counteract verbal bullying, using the agere contra approach, the school conflict 
resolution specialist ought to reflectively and respectively listen to bullying targets, and 
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subsequently set-up peer anti-bullying teams to carefully and methodically counteract 
bullying within the school community. To some extent, this perspective relies on the 
“undercover anti-bullying teams” approach suggested by Winslade and Williams (2012, p. 
127). According to Winslade and Williams: 
Establishing undercover anti-bullying teams is an example of a practice that breaks 
new ground for counselors and employs their professional skills in a way that 
addresses behavior problems and transforms relationships, without resorting to an 
authoritarian approach. It can reduce bullying in a school to the benefit of students’ 
learning, teachers’ classroom management, and administrators’ workloads. (pp. 127-
128) 
Unlike scholars that advocate for undercover anti-bullying teams (Winslade & 
Williams, 2012), the present study suggests that such anti-bullying teams should not be 
undercover, but open. Indeed, open anti-bullying teams within schools are more likely to 
exert a positive peer pressure that generates a more systemic movement for counteracting 
bullying on a larger scope than the environment of a single school. Open anti-bullying teams 
could follow the pattern or trend of a regular student association or movement that publicly 
and instrumentally stands against bullying. Such teams should be exclusively made up of 
students to emphasize their orientation to peer- intervention, and to avoid the punitive 
message that the presence of a school authority might insinuate. Inspired by Winslade and 
Williams’s (2012) perspective on undercover anti-bullying teams, the open anti-bullying 
teams should also include a couple of students who perpetrate bullying; however such 
students should be outnumbered by students who do not bully. By integrating students who 
do bullying in the anti-bullying teams, the agere contra approach intends to embrace a 
transformative approach to bullying, which distinguishes the problem from the person 
creating the problem, herein, the bullying from the person committing bullying. Their 
integration into the teams also grants the bullies an opportunity to be exposed to, and learn 
good behaviors from their other teammates, by understanding bullying as a bad behavior, and 
ultimately fight against it. To be more specific, an open anti-bullying team should be made of 
eight members, including four females and four males for a gender balance. The eight 
members will include six students who are good role-models, and two students who do 
bullying. The set-up of the peer anti-bullying team should be designed by the school conflict 
resolution specialist in collaboration with the bullying target in order to allow the target to 
take responsibility for resolution and experience empowerment and healing. The conflict 
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resolution specialist does not act as an authority that decides what to do on behalf of the 
teams, but he or she plays the facilitative role of a transformative mediator who empowers the 
parties to recognize one another and to dynamically take control of the process and outcome 
of problem-solving. 
The open anti-bullying team will take on the mission to monitor bullying activities 
around the identified target in the school environment, and to decisively stand to protect, 
defend, and empower the target verbally and morally in every situation where verbal bullying 
occurs. In addition, the anti-bullying team members should be trained to intervene as peer 
mediators between the bully and the target. Peer mediation is a process of mediation in which 
students serve as mediators to help their fellows in conflict solve their problem 
collaboratively by exploring issues systematically (Burrel, Zirbel, & Allen, 2003; Schrumpf, 
Crawford, & Bodine, 1997). Peer mediation sessions will be used for the parties to 
experience the healing power of words. In such sessions, the victim should be allowed to 
express their frustrations to the perpetrator of bullying. The latter should be given the 
opportunity to listen to the victim, to express remorse, and apologize to the victim with 
healing phrases such as “I am sorry”, “I regret I did this to you”, I feel bad I hurt you”. Peer 
mediation can ultimately help empower the victim and inject a culture of healing in the 
school environment. Furthermore, the anti-bullying team should organize weekly anti-
bullying events or forums that are open to the entire school community. Such events will 
serve as the venue to send clear messages against bullying through the means of student 
presentations, flyers, or posters. They will also be the place to recognize the anti-bullying 
team members by presenting them with incentives and rewards for hardworking. Such 
activities should creatively aim at providing bullies, victims, and their communities with an 
opportunity for change, growth, and healing. Success will be measured by the target’s report 
on the reduction or end of bullying assaults s/he experiences, along with his/her expression of 
satisfaction with the involvement of his/her anti-bullying team. This implies that the conflict 
resolution specialist consults daily or weekly (depending on the criticality of the case and on 
the workload) with the team and the target on their achievements and progress. Such 
moments of consultations could serve as a forum for providing advice and guidance for 
success. In other words, the consultative forum in the process provides an opportunity for a 
formative evaluation. 
Upon the target’s request, and following his/her expression of satisfaction with the 
anti-bullying team’ s performance, there will be a summative evaluation of the team’s 
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involvement in relation to the target’s satisfaction. The summative evaluation will ask the 
target a mixture of quantitative and qualitative questions such as the following: Did you like 
the process? What did you like most in the team’s involvement? How do you feel now? Do 
you feel better? Do you think the team has helped stop the bullying circle? Do you like the 
team’s involvement? What would you recommend for improvement in how the team 
operates? Would you recommend the team to any other target? Members of the team will also 
be asked more or less similar questions such as: What do you think of the team’s 
performance? Were you happy to be a part of the team? Do you like working with the team? 
Do you want to continue being part of this team? How do you see the team’s involvement? 
What would recommend for improvement? 
Conclusion 
This study examined fourteen conversations from observations conducted on bullying 
in 2002, in a Middle School in Virginia to: (1) identify power disparity in verbal bullying 
between bullies and targets in terms of the gap between the words used by bullies and the 
targets’ silent attitudes, (2) examine how power disparity in verbal bullying empowers the 
perpetrator against silent targets, by highlighting the hurtful power of words in bullying, (3) 
explain how targets’ verbal responses neutralize bullies or stop bullying, and (4) design the 
“agere contra” approach to counteracting bullying, which demonstrates how words could 
also be used to heal both the perpetrator and the target of bullying with the intervention of 
third parties. 
Conversation analysis and semiotic analysis of the data translated into results that 
show that the target’s verbal response as we ll as a third-party intervention is required to 
counteract verbal bullying successfully. The study designs and highly recommends the use of 
the agere contra approach to bullying, which integrates both target’s response and third-party 
intervention to counteract verbal bullying. The agere contra approach will recommend every 
school to have a conflict resolution specialist whose role will be to (1) coach or teach victims 
of bullying to find creative ways to respond verbally to the perpetrators, and (2) create open 
peer anti-bullying teams made of bullies and non-bullies for intervening against bullying, and 
performing peer mediation activities. The notion of peer anti-bullying teams is inspired by 
Winslade and Williams’s (2012) practice of undercover anti-bullying teams. However, this 
study recommends that such teams are not undercover because they may have a greater 
impact if they are overt. 
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The implication of this study for policymaking is straightforward. Policymakers and 
school officials could find useful tools in the open anti-bullying teams to successfully 
counteract bullying on a large scale in their school environment. The study also has 
interesting implications for research in the way it uses conversation analysis, and semiotic 
analysis to examine a phenomenon such as school bullying. More research ought to be done 
on bullying by using methods that analyze what is said and done by individual bullies.  
This study presents some limitations. Its first limitation emerges from the fact that all 
fourteen observations were limited to the environment of only one school. Spreading 
observations on a larger scope, beyond the perimeter of a single school, to encompass many 
more schools would provide more meaningful results for policymaking. Implicit to this 
limitation is the small number of observations conducted in this study: analysts could 
reasonably argue that fourteen observations are not sufficient to make a strong case against 
bullying. The second limitation of this study is in the time period of the observations which 
covered only two days, with cross-sectional data collection. The dynamic of data collection 
and analysis would be different with more reliable results if data collection was longitudinal 
over a longer time-period. The third limitation is reflected by the single method used for data 
collection: using additional techniques such as open-ended interviews and surveys would 
have contributed to enrich the data, and ultimately increased the quality of the results. 
Another limitation comes from the possibility that the target’s verbal response would even 
further the bullying cycle as some bullies may challenge the target’s response with increased 
or additional attacks, and escalation of violence. Finally, the use of more rigorous methods 
that go beyond conversation analysis and semiotic analysis would foster broader results that 
can be used for policymaking on a wider scale.  
 
References 
Babbie, E. (2004). The practice of social research. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson 
Learning. 
Baldry, A. C., & Farrington, D. P. (2000). Bullies and delinquents: Personal characteristics 
and parental styles. Journal of Community Applied Sociology 10, 17-31. 
Benveniste, E. (1973). Problems in general linguistics. Miami: University of Miami Press.  
Berthold, K. A., & Hoover, J. H. (2000). Correlates of bullying and victimization among 
intermediate students in the Midwestern USA. School Psychology International 21, 
65-78. 
Bond, L., Carlin, J. B., Thomas, L., Ruin, K., & Patton, G. (2001). Does bullying cause 
emotional problems? A Prospective Study of Young Teenagers. British Journal of 
Medicine 323, 480-484.  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
209 
Bosworth, K., Espelage, D. L., & Simon, T. R. (1999). Factors associated with bullying 
behavior in middle school students. Journal of Early Adolescence 19, 341-362. 
Burrel, N. A., Zirbel, C. S., & Allen, M. (2003). Evaluating peer mediation outcomes in 
educational settings: A meta-analytic review. Conflict Resolution Quarterly 21(1), 7-
26. 
Eisenberg, M. E., Neumark-Sztainer, D., & Perry, C. L. (2003). Peer harassment, school 
connectedness, and academic achievement. Journal of School Health 73, 311-316. 
Gladstone, G. L., Parker, G. B., & Malhi, G. S. (2006). Do bullied children become anxious 
and depressed adults? A cross-sectional investigation of the correlates of bullying and 
anxious depression. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 194, 201-208.   
Hartman, S. (2011). Bullied boy saved from hurricane raging inside: Teen tortured by 
classmates over medical ailment tells survival story after considering suicide. 
CBSNews.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/08/assignment_america/main7327274.shtml 
Hawker, D. S. J., & Boulton, M. J. (2000). Twenty years’ research on peer victimization and 
psychosocial maladjustment: A meta-analytic review of cross-sectional studies. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 41, 441-455. 
Hugh-Jones, S., & Smith, K. (1999). Self-Reports of short and long term effects of bullying 
on children who stammer. British Journal of Educational Psychology 69, 141-158. 
Kim, Y. S., Koh, Y., & Leventhal, B. (2005). School bullying and suicidal risk in Korean 
middle school students. Pediatrics 115(2), 357-363.  
Koko, J. L. (2008). National conference as a strategy for conflict transformation and 
peacemaking: The legacy of the Republic of Benin model. London: Adonis & Abbey. 
Klomek, A. B., Marrocco, F., Kleinman, M., Schonfeld, I. S., & Gould, M. S. (2007). 
Bullying, depression, and suicidality in adolescents. Journal of the American 
Academy of Child Psychology 46, 40-49. 
Klomek, A. B., Sourander, A., & Gould, M. (2010). The association of suicide and bullying 
in childhood to young adulthood: A review of cross-sectional and longitudinal 
research findings. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 55(5), 282-288. 
Klomek, A. B., Kleinman, M., Altschuler, E., Marrocco, F., Amakawa, L., & Gould M. S. 
(2011). High school bullying as a risk for later depression and suicidality. Suicide & 
Life-Threatening Behavior 41(5), 501-516.  
Loyola, I. (of). (2000). The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. Trans. Louis Puhl. New York: 
Random House. 
Nansel, T. R., Craig, W., Overpeck, M. D., Saluja, G., & Ruan, W. J. (2004). Cross-National 
consistency in the relationship between bullying behaviors and psychosocial 
adjustment. Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 158, 730-736. 
Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M. D., Haynie, D. L., Ruan, J., & Scheidt, P. C. (2003). 
Relationships between bullying and violence among US youth. Archives of Pediatric 
and Adolescent Medicine 157, 348-353. 
Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R. S. Ruan, W. J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. 
(2001). Bullying behaviors among US Youth: Prevalence and association with 
psychosocial adjustment. Journal of the American Medical Association 285, 2094-
2100.  
O’Connell, P., Pepler, D., & Craig, W. (1999). Peer involvement in bullying: Insights and 
challenges for intervention. Journal of Adolescence 22, 437-452. 
Olweus, D. (1993). Bullying at school: What we know and what we can do. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell. 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
210 
Olweus, D. (1994). Bullying at school: Long-Term outcomes for the victims and an effective 
school-based intervention program. In L. R. Huesmann (Ed.), Aggressive behavior: 
Current perspectives (pp. 97-130). New York: Plenum Press.    
Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (2004). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Rivers, I., & Smith, P. K. (1994). Types of bullying behavior and their correlates. Aggressive 
Behavior 20, 359-368. 
Rousseau, J-J. (1964). Discourse on the origin of inequality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
Schrumpf, F., Crawford D. K., & Bodine R. J. (1997). Peer mediation: Conflict resolution in 
schools. Illinois: Research Press. 
Sourander, A., Helstela, L., Helenius, H., & Piha, J. (2000). Persistence of bullying from 
childhood to adolescence: A longitudinal 8-year follow-up study. Child Abuse and 
Neglect 24, 873-881. 
Swearer, S. M., Espelage, D. L., & Napolitano, S. A. (2009). Bullying prevention and 
intervention: Realistic strategies for schools. New York: The Guilford Press.  
Vaillancourt, T., Hymel, S., & McDougall, P. (2003). Bullying is power: Implications for 
school-based intervention strategies. Journal of Applied School Psychology 19, 157-
176. 
Wilmot, W. W., & Hocker J. L. (2001). Interpersonal conflict. Dubuque. Iowa: William C. 
Brown. 
Winslade, J., & Williams, M. (2012). Safe and peaceful schools: Addressing conflict and 
eliminating violence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin. 
 
  
 
 
  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
211 
Symbolic and Concrete Demands in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Rotem Nagar and Jacob Shamir  
Abstract 
Researchers have recently leveled criticism at the realist approach to conflict resolution by 
pointing out the importance of symbolic aspects of this issue.  Few studies, however, have hitherto 
focused on symbolic demands in conflicts.  The present study examines the role of symbolic as 
well as concrete demands in conflict resolution, and is therefore innovative in this regard.  A 
demand is categorized as “concrete” if it is based on an interest that is viable and applicable, 
in that it involves tangible resources that may change hands or be divided.  A “symbolic” 
demand, on the other hand, pivots on either refraining from or tak ing action rather than on a 
tangible result.  With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this research suggests that the 
relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve as a tool for achieving 
conflict resolution – not only by compensating for symbolic demands with concrete demands 
and vice versa but also by balancing between the symbolic and the concrete aspects within the 
same demand.  These findings may have valuable implications for the use of symbolic discourse 
as an instrument to transform conflicts. 
Introduction 
According to the classical realist approach to conflict resolution, the parties’ actions 
are motivated by the desire to advance their interests and maximize their gains, and therefore 
symbolic aspects of the issue are deemed irrelevant.  During the last two decades, however, 
realist researchers have conceded that, within the boundaries of the realist research of 
negotiations, symbolic aspects should not be dismissed altogether – albeit recognizing them 
only as part of a game whose object is to maximize gains (Zartman, 1983).  This approach 
has, in turn, incurred criticism, on the grounds that conflicts can be better understood through 
the prism of symbolism rather than realism (Faure, 1999; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002).  Thus, 
in investigations of conflict resolution, the importance of symbolic issues in conflicts has 
recently come to the forefront.  
To the extent that symbols are at the heart of conflicts, matters of honor and guilt may 
be more important than even the central resource of the village life – the land (Nader & Todd, 
1978).  Issues that accumulate throughout a conflict have symbolic value that may "defy 
simple, rational understanding" (Faure, 1999, p. 20) and pertain to human suffering and 
honor, rather than to land and houses that have been lost forever (Kaufman & Bisharat, 
2002).  
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Conflicts are based on key rights and/or demands that arise from basic identity 
metaphors and narratives (Zartman, 1983; Ross, 2001).  Accordingly, human rights have 
become an integral part of conflict resolution (Gaer, 1997; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002).  
Conflicts have also come to involve sacred values (such as justice), which are perceived as 
absolute and uncompromisable (Atran et al., 2007; Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Wade-Benzoni et 
al., 2002).  It is not surprising, therefore, that barriers in fundamental political conflicts often 
include differences in the sacred values and narratives of the sides (Susskind et al., 2005; 
Bazerman et al., 2008).  Conversely, a symbolic gesture recognizing the values of the “other” 
may facilitate the negotiation and even resolution of a charged conflict.  Moreover, symbolic 
meanings may have a powerful effect on the actions of the negotiating parties (Faure, 1999).  
Indeed, in international politics, nations’ behavior is not based solely on considerations of 
power and sheer interests, but often involves aspirations for justice as well (Welch, 1993). 
In conflicts accompanied by turbulent emotions and disagreements over prestige, the 
solution to the crisis may lie in a symbolic remedy (Cohen, 1997).  However, to secure just 
and legitimate peace, the symbolic sacrifice may not be enough: more matters must be 
settled, including recognition of the “other” as an entity with an identity, history and culture 
(the so-called “thin recognition”) and understanding the basic characteristics of the “other” 
(“wide recognition”) (Allan & Keller, 2006).  Recognizing the rights of the “other,” even on 
the declarative level, may provide the basis for a constructive negotiation and demonstrate a 
symbolic willingness to settle the conflict (Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002). Yet, in spite of the 
findings that point to the importance of symbolic aspects in conflict resolution, few 
researchers have examined the effect of symbolic demands on international political 
processes.  The present study seeks to fill this void by developing an approach in conflict 
research that acknowledges the limitations of the realist models and examines the role of 
symbolic demands, as well as their relation to concrete demands, in conflict resolution 
processes.  In addition to offering a new theoretical perspective on this issue, we focus on the 
practical implications of the analysis of conflict resolution processes, and especially the use 
of symbolic discourse as an instrument to transform conflicts.  
Concrete and Symbolic Demands 
The concepts of concrete and symbolic demands are based on Fraser's (1995) 
theoretical work.  Fraser described a conceptual continuum between two types of demands 
for social justice: recognition and redistribution.  Demands for distributive justice stem from 
socio-economic injustice linked to the economic structure.  Demands for identity recognition 
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arise out of cultural injustice rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and 
communication. Unlike the paradigm of redistribution, cultural injustice aligns better with 
Webber’s status groups than with Marx’s classes.  While, according to the redistribution 
paradigm, the solution is a new economic structure, the remedy suggested by the recognition 
paradigm is a symbolic change (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).  
Fraser’s model has sparked disagreement among scholars.  Young (1997) contends 
that it represents a false dichotomy, and that redistribution and recognition are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather both stem from a demand for justice.  Honneth (2001) censures Fraser’s 
work, imputing to it Marxist economic reductionism, and arguing that redistribution is 
essential for justice but should be subsumed under the category of recognition.  Economic 
injustice, on Honneth’s view, is experienced as injustice stemming from disrespect, for 
example the violation of a complex order of recognition in society.  
While conceding that recognition and redistribution are not “clear-cut” categories, we 
will argue – contrary to Honneth’s (2001) approach – that the distinction between them is 
meaningful, and that therefore this dualism deserves a place in the study of political demands 
in negotiation.  In line with Fraser (1995, 1998), we will attempt to demonstrate that an 
analytic distinction can be drawn between demands that are primarily symbolic, such as 
recognition, justice and apology, on the one hand, and demands that are inherently concrete, 
such as distribution of territory, water etc., on the other.  Our working hypothesis to this 
effect is that demands set forth in negotiations can be located on a bi-polar continuum 
ranging from “symbolic” to “concrete.”  The mapping of the various demands, and the 
analysis of the relations between them, should be performed bearing in mind the uncertainties 
involved in delimiting the two categories and the possibility that any specific demand may be 
linked to both ends of the spectrum. 
We categorize a demand as concrete if it is based on an interest that is viable and 
applicable, in that it includes tangible resources that may change hands or be divided.  For a 
demand to be symbolic, its meaning must lie in the action of making it and not in a tangible 
result.  While any specific demand might carry both a symbolic and a concrete connotation, 
we classify it as either symbolic or concrete depending on the phrasing.  Thus “water” is 
arguably an emotionally charged term, but at the same time it is an important physical 
resource. Consequently, a specific suggestion regarding the use of water is considered a 
concrete demand. Similarly, while recognition is usually perceived as a purely symbolic act, a 
demand to accept the end of demands is, in itself, a legal political demand which has the 
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concrete significance of assuring the other side that no additional demands, concrete or 
symbolic, can be made.  In this case, even though no material property has changed hands, 
the right to make demands has been forfeited, and this has strong concrete implications.  
Methodology 
In this study, the role of symbolic and concrete demands in conflict resolution is 
examined in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The situation investigated is rife 
with political symbolism due to the sides’ strong emotional attitudes regarding questions of 
land, nation, security and survival.  It has been argued that the failure of Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders to reach a solution is attributable to symbolic factors (Hermann & 
Newman, 2000).  
Negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict epitomize a contrast between 
symbolic discourse regarding recognition and justice, on the one hand, and concrete discourse 
regarding resources in a framework of costs and benefits, on the other.  Most researchers 
concur that the Palestinian side tends to perceive the conflict in terms of rights and frame its 
demands in terms of justice, focusing on key values (Albin, 2001; Allan & Keller, 2006; 
Peled & Rouhana, 2007).  By contrast, the Israeli side purportedly frames the negotiation in 
terms of rational cost-benefit analysis centered on considerations of security and territory 
(Albin, 2001; Shamir & Shikaki, 2010; Sabet, 1998).  It goes without saying that this 
difference in perception is reflected in the public and the political arenas; it determines the 
framing of the conflict management in public discourse and influences the assessment of 
possibilities for various solutions.  
In this study, the symbolic and concrete aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
were examined using two methodological tools: (1) interviews with politicians and experts on 
both sides who had been involved in the peace process over the years, and (2) surveys to 
gauge the Israeli and Palestinian public opinion.  
Politicians and Experts Involved In the Peace Process  
Our choice of the sample was motivated by two considerations.  First, the politicians 
and public figures we interviewed were familiar with the entire negotiation process and with 
the demands set forth by both parties over the years.  Moreover, these were the key figures in 
the peace process: the ones who had led the negotiations and suggested wordings to resolve 
the disputed issues.  
The respondents’ preferences for concrete versus symbolic demands were assessed 
based on semi-structured in-depth interviews.  The attitudes of the Israeli and the Palestinian 
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experts were examined with regard to each of the demands that had been subject to 
negotiation over the years: the right of return; recognizing the pain and suffering of the 
refugees; recognizing Israel’s part in creating the refugee problem; water rights; territory;  
security; end of the conflict; end of demands; mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as 
the national homes of their respective peoples; recognition of the State of Israel as a state of 
the Jewish people.  For each demand, we determine whether the interviewers treated it as 
symbolic or concrete, according to the analytic distinction elaborated above.  
The interviews with the Israeli experts were conducted in Hebrew and took place in 
Israel. The Palestinian experts were interviewed in Arabic, mostly in the West Bank, by a 
Palestinian Israeli and the interviews were subsequently translated into Hebrew.   
All in all, eleven interviews were conducted with Israeli Jewish experts and politicians. 
All Israeli interviewees studied in depth the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and had participated in 
formal and informal negotiations, as negotiators or as political consulates, among them the 
Oslo negotiations, the Taba Summit and the Camp David summit in 2000 and so on. 
Moreover, three of the Israeli interviewees participated in drafting the Geneva Accord, the 
only final status peace accord drafted jointly by Israelis and Palestinians  . 
Five interviews were conducted with Palestinian experts and politicians All 
Palestinian interviewees are senior public leaders, most of them in senior positions in the 
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and/or the Palestinian National Authority. Most of 
the Palestinian interviewees had participated in formal and informal negotiations, among 
them the Oslo negotiations, the Wye River discussions, the Taba Summit and the Camp 
David summit in 2000. Some of them participated in drafting the Geneva Accord.  All 
interviewees were assured that they will not be quoted directly, and to protect their identities, 
throughout the paper they will be referred to by random letters of the alphabet.  
Public Opinion among Israelis and Palestinians 
As stated before, in addition to the interviews, we conducted opinion polls among the 
Palestinian and Israeli publics.  The decision to study public opinion was prompted by the 
important role it plays in the two- level negotiation game (Putnam, 1988; Shamir & Shikaki, 
2010) and in foreign policy decisions (Holsti, 1992).  Indeed, it is public opinion that 
underlies collective wisdom and lends legitimacy to leaders and policies alike (Shamir & 
Shamir, 2000). Moreover, given the reciprocal relation between state leadership and public 
opinion (Shamir, 2005), an analysis of each cannot be complete without the understanding of 
the other.  Public opinion is known to be sensitive to symbolic gestures and lend support to a 
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negotiator who comes up with an appropriate wording to frame a demand – this may be 
especially the case in conflicts over symbolic values (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).  It is 
therefore necessary to examine the views of both publics investigated, on both symbolic and 
material issues, particularly in light of their sensitivity to the symbolic aspects of this specific 
debate.  
The data are based on the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll (JIPP), which has 
simultaneously tracked Israeli and Palestinian public opinion since 2000.  The polls were 
planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute 
for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the 
Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research (PSR).  In addition to using data from the polls conducted since the year 
of 2000, we developed several questions regarding demands related to redistribution and 
recognition and included them in the December 2008 and March 2010 polls (Israeli poll: 
N=600; Palestinian poll: N=1270).  In all the surveys the Palestinian data are based on face-
to-face interviews conducted among representative samples in Gaza, the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.  The Israeli data comprise of interviews with representative samples of adult 
Israelis conducted over the phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian.  The Israeli sample is 
weighted based on the proportion of Arab and Jewish citizens in the general population, as 
well as on the results of the general elections preceding the poll.  
Respondents were presented with pairs of issues, one symbolic and the other concrete, 
and asked which among the two they deemed the more important.  In all the pairs, symbolic 
gains were centered around recognition, due to the importance of this issue in the day-to-day 
political discourse, while concrete issues focused on territorial compromises.  Israeli 
respondents were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people versus sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  In addition, 
they were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state versus 
sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria.  Palestinian respondents were asked 
to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return, accompanied by the return of 
refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel), versus a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.  In 
addition, they were asked to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return, 
accompanied by the return of refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel) versus Palestinian 
sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  
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In addition, each participant was asked to rank two symbolic and two concrete 
demands in terms of their importance.  The demands that were presented to the Israeli sample 
and those that were presented to the Palestinian sample had nearly identical social and 
cultural significance for the sides.  The following demands were presented randomly to the 
Israeli sample: Creating early warning facilities within the Palestinian state to prevent a 
surprise attack; Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; securing 
Israel’s water rights; Palestinian recognition of Israeli pain and suffering throughout the 
conflict (2008), or alternatively, Palestinian declaration of the “end of the conflict” (2010).  
The demands that were randomly presented to the Palestinian sample were as follows: safe 
passage between the West Bank and Gaza; Israeli recognition of Palestine as the home of the 
Palestinian people; securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement; Israeli 
recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians throughout the conflict.  In 
order to compare the issues in terms of their importance to the respondents, each of the issues 
presented to both the Israeli and the Palestinian participants was assigned an index of 
importance based on the following formula:  
Index of Importance (only for the questions that involved ranking in terms of 
importance):   
(1) 
(Frequency as first priority)*4 + (frequency of as second priority)*3 + 
(frequency as third priority)*2 + (frequency as last priority)*1.  
Findings: Examining the Symbolic-Concrete Continuum for Each Side  
Experts’ Assessment of Each Negotiated Demand as Symbolic and/or Concrete 
The right of return. 
Most Israeli interviewees distinguished between a declarative symbolic recognition of 
the right of return and its concrete implementation.  The prevailing feeling among the Israeli 
participants was that, throughout peace negotiations, Palestinians have emp hasized the 
symbolic demand in this regard but have been willing to compromise on its concrete 
implementation. Israeli interviewee A, for example, stated that “the declaration is more 
important to them... than the actual implementation. It is important to their leadership... [it is] 
important to their people, it’s important to the refugees.”  The interviewees based their 
opinions on both formal and informal negotiations.  Thus, Israeli interviewee E mentioned 
the Geneva Accord, in which, as he put it, the Palestinians “gave up the right of return in 
exchange for a symbolic right of return.” Israeli interviewee F brought up the negotiations 
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with Yasser Arafat, contending that Arafat's historic “trade-off,” as he called it, “was to 
exchange Palestinian sovereignty over Temple Mount for the right to return,” a concession 
that is both material and symbolic.  In the same light the Israeli interviewees saw the Arab 
Initiative for Peace.  Thus, participant F believed that the Arab League's March 2009 decision 
clearly indicates that the Palestinian side is willing to forgo any actual return of refugees.  
The Palestinian interviewees emphasized that recognition is essential but not 
sufficient, and that concrete implementation is needed.  They noted, however, that they are 
well aware that the extent of the right of return must be regulated based on an agreement with 
Israel, or in other words, that not all refugees would return to the State of Israel.  Their 
responses distinguished between the recognition of each refugee's right to return and a limited 
implementation of this right.  Palestinian interviewee N asserted that the Palestinians 
“understand that, at the end of the process [peace negotiations], not all refugees can or would 
want to return.”  He went on to say that, while “for Palestinians, recognition of the right of 
return is very important... they know that there is a difference between having a right and 
realizing it.”  Palestinian interviewee M stated that “Israel must recognize this right in 
principle... We need to… separate between… the issue of recognizing the right and the 
responsibility for the great crime… and the issue of implementation.” 
Recognizing the pain and suffering of the refugees and recognizing Israel’s part 
in creating the refugee problem. 
Most Israeli interviewees saw recognition of the pain and suffering of the Palestinian 
refugees as an important part of the negotiation, which may serve as a compensation for more 
concrete concessions.  However, no consensus emerged regarding Israel’s obligation to 
accept responsibility for creating the refugee problem. Indeed, some of the respondents 
expressed the belief that the pain and suffering of the Palestinian people ought to be 
recognized, albeit without taking blame for it.  Israeli interviewee I felt that hundreds of 
Palestinians “want the feeling that Israel says that it admits… responsibility for what 
happened with the refugees.”  However, in the Geneva Accord “we did go that far 
recognizing the suffering caused to the Palestinian people [without taking responsibility].”  In 
his opinion, recognition of the Palestinian suffering is important, and if the Palestinian 
representatives in the Geneva negotiation had been satisfied in this regard, this would have 
had “a good effect on the Palestinian public opinion.”  Israeli interviewee J, who suggested 
that Israel should recognize the pain and suffering, saw the Palestinian demand that 
recognition of pain and suffering should be combined with acceptance of responsibility as 
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“an impossible combination” – and as he put it, “a zero-sum game.”  On the other hand, 
Israeli interviewee C believed that accepting responsibility is important for the negotiation. 
He stated that the third and fourth generations of refugees: 
“…want two things... one is related to the  concrete dimension and the other to 
the symbolic dimension. Regarding the concrete dimension, they want a 
solution… in terms of compensation and rehabilitation in exchange for their 
terrible loss... Regarding the symbolic dimension... it’s [for Israel] to stand up 
and apologize.” 
The Palestinian side also attached great importance to recognizing the pain and 
suffering of refugees, but pointed out that Israel must accept responsibility for the emergence 
of the refugee problem.  Moreover, they emphasized that this recognition must be 
accompanied by concrete actions.  Palestinian interviewee M stated that the solution to the 
refugee problem requires “first and foremost” Israeli recognition of the Nakba and of Israel's 
responsibility for it, and underscored the practical implications of such responsibility: “I 
don’t care about the apology if it is not accompanied by a practical procedure...”  Palestinian 
interviewee A held a similar position, stating: “Recognizing the pain and suffering is 
important but it's not everything. To achieve peace, we want to see… things happening in the 
Palestinian people's reality.” 
Water rights. 
All but one of the Israeli interviewees expressed a pragmatic view of this issue, 
seeking alternative technical solutions to dividing the Mountain Aquifer, such as desalination.  
Palestinian interviewees likewise focused on the concrete aspect of the situa tion, namely, the 
need for an equal share of the water.  Unlike the Israelis, however, Palestinian interviewees 
offered fewer specific solutions to the problem.  Palestinian Interviewee N stated that, to the 
best of his knowledge as a member of the committee that negotiated water rights, “there is 
nothing symbolic, it’s a practical thing.”  Palestinian Interviewee O was one of two 
respondents who spoke in terms of justice: “We want a fair and just solution to the division of 
resources and water.”  Palestinian Interviewee M highlighted the Palestinians rights under 
international law, but also called for an equitable division of the water.  
Territory (including the Jerusalem question).  
It has been widely acknowledged that any debate over territory includes both 
symbolic and concrete aspects, and this is especially so when the point of contention is 
Jerusalem and its sacred sites.  Nevertheless, both the Israeli and the Palestinian interviewees 
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revealed for the most part a pragmatic attitude in this matter, and their approach to the issue 
pivoted on practical solutions for the division of territories.  Indeed, most saw Jerusalem as a 
divisible resource – in fact, in their view, it was already divided, for all intents and purposes.  
Israeli interviewees E, C, and J offered solutions involving an exchange of territory. 
Interviewee J even quantified the problem, asserting that a “serious” disagreement was 
confined to 5% of the West Bank, while the debate over the rest of the territory had been 
resolved by prior negotiations.  Israeli Interviewee A suggested that a concession in terms of 
territorial exchange can help achieve compromises on the right of return.  Israeli interviewee 
B supported a pragmatic approach to territorial issues, criticizing the shift in the attitude of 
the Israeli public from pragmatic to symbolic, expressed in the discourse focusing on 
“historical rights to the land of Israel.”  He rejected the “united Jerusalem” approach, stating 
that the issue is not pragmatic (“no one looks at the map”) and that “the unity of Jerusalem” 
has become “a slogan.” 
The Palestinian interviewees’ discussion of territory likewise centered on practical 
solutions.  Palestinian interviewees L, N, P and O spoke of recognizing the 1967 borders and 
allocating land based on territorial exchange.  L stated that territory is a pragmatic rather than 
a symbolic issue: “From a pragmatic perspective, I know that to get Hebron I need to give up 
Haifa.  I can’t get both Haifa and Hebron.  I expect the same of the Israeli side.” 
Security. 
As is the case with territory, it has been widely acknowledged that security is an issue 
that incorporates symbolic as well as concrete aspects.  Here, too, the interviews revealed a 
pragmatic approach on the part of the Israeli respondents, most of whom addressed the issue 
by offering practical solutions.  Israeli interviewee I, for example, explained why any 
solution in this regard must involve demilitarization in exchange for “strategic depth” 
(strategic presence of Israeli forces outside of the Green Line). Israeli interviewee H 
described the security problem as a complex set of “technical issues” that are already being 
solved on a daily basis.  As in the discussions of territory, a number of Israeli interviewees 
criticized what they saw as symbolic intransigence on security issues among Israeli public.  
Israeli interviewee G, for example, criticized the insistence of the Israeli side on reserving the 
right to fly over the West Bank, and contended that it was a symbolic demand with no 
substance to it: “What's the area of the West Bank for an F15 or F16?... It’s a joke.” 
On the Palestinian side, interviewees N, M and L offered specific suggestions in 
connection with security issues.  Thus, interviewee N spoke about an international presence 
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in the Jordan Rift Valley, and the possibility of using radar and satellite dishes in the West 
Bank. Similarly, interviewee M suggested that an international force be present, “for the short 
or long term as determined by both sides.”  Interviewee L chose to discuss a security model 
proposed as part of the Geneva Accord.  Palestinian interviewees M and P, on the other hand, 
saw security as a tool used by Israel to seize land.  
End of the conflict and end of demands. 
“End of the conflict” is a political demand that the accord mark the formal end of the 
conflict. “End of demands” is a political- legal demand that both parties' demands be set down 
in the accord, such that, once the accord has been signed, parties can only claim its 
implementation.  
While some of the Israeli interviewees saw both these demands as concrete and 
essential, others saw the end of demands as a concrete claim, while the end of the conflict as 
symbolic. From the responses of Israeli interviewees, it was clear that those who viewed end 
of the conflict as a concrete demand believed it to be important. Interviewees who saw this 
demand as symbolic, on the other hand, were divided as to its importance for the peace 
process.  Thus, for Israeli interviewee K, both demands were essential:  
 If you leave things open, then we haven’t ended the conflict… It’s very 
important for Israel that the peace agreement should stipulate the end of the 
conflict… Regarding demands, that’s a legal issue. This means all the 
demands… have been settled.  
 In contrast, in the opinion of Israeli interviewee B, the end of demands is a legal 
contract, while the end of the conflict symbolizes the shift from a pragmatic public discussion 
to a symbolic public discussion, the latter characteristic of Israeli public opinion in recent 
years. Similarly, Interviewee C regarded the end of the conflict as “something that we… I 
don’t want to say we made it up, but maybe we did.”  In his view, the end of the conflict 
demand has no concrete significance; yet, in the Geneva Accord, he had pushed for its 
inclusion on account of its symbolic value, which – he believed – could serve as “a tool that 
would help sell the agreement to the Israeli public.” 
On the Palestinian side, all the interviewees attached importance to both demands in 
equal measure.  Unlike the Israelis, the Palestinians saw both the end of the conflict and the 
end of demands claim as endowed with concrete significance.  For example, Palestinian 
interviewee N stated that both demands were important “from the perspective that both sides 
can be sure that they have solved all the problems.”  Similarly, Palestinian interviewee P 
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believed both these demands to be important and pointed to the section of the Arab Peace 
Initiative referring to them. 
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their 
respective peoples and recognition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their respective 
peoples and recognition of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people are inherently 
symbolic demands, which according to our definition above are not accompanied by tangible 
concessions.  During the interviews, we examined how important the demands for 
recognition are to each of the sides. 
While some of the Israeli interviewees supported the demand of mutual recognition, 
all had reservations about demanding recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 
Israeli interviewee C, for example, proposed an alternative wording, namely, that both sides 
acknowledge the right to mutual self-determination:  
The way we did it in the Geneva Accord was much more clever, since in the 
Geneva Accord, or even in other places... we said that each of the States can 
determine its own identity, or we said Israel defining itself as the home of the 
Jewish people, say, signs an agreement with the Palestinian State defining 
itself as the national home of the Palestinian people.  So that way you don’t 
demand that the other side recognize your self-determination, but you demand 
that the other side acknowledge that you have the right to self-determination... 
Israeli interviewee B believed that it is impossible to reach an agreement without 
dealing with the issue of mutual recognition, and offered what he described as a “simple 
solution”:  “For example, repeat the wording of the UN Partition Plan... and that’s the end of 
it... It’s a pragmatic solution to a supposedly symbolic question.”  However, he went on to 
say, this solution “is never going to materialize if Israel insists on the ‘symbolic issue’ of 
recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while pragmatically, we don’t need 
Palestinians to recognize that: we decide what kind of a country it is.”  He sees this demand 
as a part of the above-mentioned process whereby Israeli discourse has shifted from 
pragmatic to symbolic issues.  Israeli interviewees I and E were exceptions, in that they 
disagreed with the notion of mutual recognition as well as with the demand to recognize 
Israel as the state of the Jewish people.  They asserted that there is no need to demand mutual 
recognition.  E, for example, stated that a clause addressing mutual recognition should not be 
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included in any peace agreement, since such recognition has already been given in the past 
and, additionally, no such clause appears in any other peace agreement in the Middle East.  
In contrast to the Israelis, Palestinian interviewees were not in agreement regarding 
the significance of mutual recognition of national homes, and some opposed this notion.  
However, all the Palestinian interviewees concurred with their Israeli counterparts in that 
each state may define itself however it sees fit, and claimed that political recognition would 
only complicate the issue.  For example, Palestinian interviewee M opposed mutual 
recognition stating, “because what’s important to the agreement are two things: mutual 
political recognition of sovereignty of each state, and then ending the conflict, such that there 
will be no demands in the future...”  He stated that Israel can define itself in any way it 
chooses but the Palestinians should recognize it as it is recognized by international law.  On 
the other hand, Palestinian interviewee L declared mutual recognition to be “definitely” 
important.  As for recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, he leaves it to the State 
of Israel to decide: “I believe it is up to the Israelis to declare the nature of their state...” 
The Importance of Concrete and Symbolic Demands in Public Opinion 
Israeli public opinion. 
In the opinion of the Israeli public as of December 2008 and March 2010, the most 
important demand was the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people – in marked 
contrast to the Israeli interviewees, who tended to minimize the importance of this demand.  
In the December 2008 survey, this symbolic demand was ranked first, and two concrete 
demands – securing water rights and setting up early warning facilities – as second and third.  
Palestinian recognition of Israeli suffering was ranked as the least important.  In March 2010, 
the demand for the end of the conflict was ranked second, but it was not clear whether it was 
regarded as concrete or symbolic.  The demands ranked third and fourth were securing water 
rights and setting up early warning facilities, in that order.  
In addition to ranking their preferences in the negotiations, the respondents were 
asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
and territorial compromises.  The results showed a clear preference for the former over the 
latter. In December 2008, 50% of respondents preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people to sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem 
(35%; 6% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know).  In the 
March 2010 poll, 55% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people, while 25% preferred Israeli sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusa lem; 
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11% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know.  Of the 
respondents who preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
(N=273), 50% said that they find this much more important than securing sovereignty over 
East Jerusalem; 34% said they find it somewhat more important, and 12% said they find it 
slightly important (5% did not respond or did not know).  
In the December 2008 poll, 46% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state 
of the Jewish people, while 41% preferred sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and 
Samaria; 5% did not prefer either option, and 9% did not respond or did not know.  In March 
2010, 38% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while 
31% preferred Israeli sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria; 11% did not 
prefer either option, and 20% did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents who 
indicated a preference for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
(N=273), 50% said that they see this as much more important than Israeli sovereignty over 
the settlements in Judea and Samaria; 35% said it was somewhat more important, and 12% 
said it was slightly more important (3% did not respond or did not know). 
Thus it appears that, contrary to the belief commonly held among scholars that the 
Israeli approach is predominantly concrete, the reality is more complex: Israelis tend to uphold 
concrete as well as symbolic demands. 
Palestinian public opinion. 
Like the Israelis, the Palestinian respondents ranked Israeli recognition of Palestine as 
the state of the Palestinian people as their first priority.  The second preference was the 
concrete issue of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and the third was the 
symbolic demand for Israeli recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians 
throughout the conflict. Last came securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement.  
These findings hold true for both 2008 and 2010. 
In a poll conducted in 2003, most Palestinian refugees insisted that any agreement 
with Israel must ensure their right to return to their homes and property within Israel.  The 
majority of the respondents, however, expressed a wish to live within the Palestinian state 
(31% in Gaza and the West Bank and 23% in Israeli territories that they envisioned as being 
made part the Palestinian state) or in a different host country (17%), rather than in Israel 
(10%).  This indicates that, at that time, the right of return was seen primarily as a symbolic 
right, which most respondents did not intend to realize. 
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The December 2008 poll indicates that, at that time, 50% of Palestinian respondents 
preferred a state based on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return 
accompanied by a return of refugees to Palestine but not to Israel.  Only 24% preferred Israeli 
recognition of the right of return, even at the cost of a smaller state.  Nineteen percent did not 
prefer either option, and 4% did not respond or did not know. 
In March 2010, 56% of the Palestinian respondents preferred a Palestinian state based 
on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return.  Twenty-five percent 
preferred Israeli recognition and 18% did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents 
who preferred a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders (N=716), 52% said that this is 
much more important to them than Israeli recognition; 39% said it was somewhat more 
important, and 8% said it was slightly more important (0.7% did not respond or did not 
know). 
We also asked the respondents to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of 
return, with a limited number of Palestinians returning to greater Jerusalem, versus 
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  In December 2008, 38% 
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 33% chose Israeli recognition; 23% 
did not prefer either option, and 7% did not respond or did not know. In March 2010, 43% 
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 35% chose Israeli recognition; 22% 
did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents who preferred Palestinian sovereignty 
over East Jerusalem (N=543), 50% said that this was much more important to them than 
Israeli recognition; 34% said that it was somewhat more important; and 11% said that it was 
slightly more important (1% did not respond or did not know).  
The Sides’ Perception of Each Other’s Preferences in Terms of the Symbolic-Concrete 
Continuum 
The Israeli interviewees’ perceptions of Palestinian attitudes diverged: some saw them 
as primarily pragmatic, while others as symbolic.  Israeli interviewee A, for example, 
described the Palestinians as completely pragmatic:  
The Palestinians, I think they care less about dramatic declarations, they want 
pragmatic results.  What they really want is… give me my freedom… give me 
the territory, I want the symbolism less now… Israel unfortunately sets a great 
store by such favors and such patronization, like I give you a flag, give you a 
national anthem, give you a song and screw you over – excuse me – in simple 
Hebrew, when it comes to territory, refugees, Jerusalem and the like...  
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 Israeli interviewee J felt that, initially, the Palestinians had emphasized more 
symbolic matters, but this had changed over the years:  
When we started the negotiations with the Palestinians, I was there pretty 
much from the very beginning, honor was the most important component for 
them and substance was almost meaningless.  They also didn’t quite 
understand, they didn’t prepare enough, they didn’t know the facts well... no 
one cared about the substance... That's not [the case] any more.  They have 
really changed, they’re organized, know their facts etc. Actually today the one 
who cares more about appearances is the Israeli side.  
In contrast, Israeli interviewees D, I, B, and H expressed the belief that symbolism is 
more important to the Palestinians than concrete demands.  Interviewee D described Israel’s 
attitude towards territory, water and refugee rights as a fundamentally technical platform, as 
opposed to the Palestinians' justice based approach. In his opinion, the conflict between these 
two attitudes presented an obstacle in previous negotiations, preventing the sides from eve n 
beginning to discuss solutions.  Interviewee B also believed that the Palestinians’ attitudes are 
mainly symbolic, but he felt that a change had recently occurred in the Israeli approach: today 
the Israeli side also concentrates on symbolism, rather than on practicality: 
 When I started dealing with this issue… 15 years ago… in the beginning, I 
thought a major part of the issue was the cultural differences between the two 
sides, mainly that we were the pragmatic ones… while they came with an 
attitude that cared more about symbols… I’m not so sure this is true [today].  
That is, when I look at the importance that is assigned by our side to issues 
like the unity of Jerusalem… when I know that anyone who knows anything 
about the subject and has examined it knows that the whole thing is pretty 
much a bluff. 
Israeli interviewees C, E, and G emphasized the importance of an approach that 
combines the symbolic and the pragmatic, realizing that symbols are of great importance to 
the Palestinians but also that symbolism cannot stand on its own.  Interviewee G actually 
criticized Israel for being too concrete in its approach, which he dubbed “the thrift-shop 
mentality.” 
While most of Israeli interviewees had formed an opinion regarding the location of 
Palestinian preferences on the concrete-symbolic continuum, the responses of the Palestinians 
were much more vague in this respect.  For example, Palestinian Interviewee N said that the 
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Israelis simply “want to get it all.”  In the same vein but in less categorical terms, Interviewee 
L stated: 
I can’t tell. What we see now are two issues: the issue of security and the 
recognition of the state of the Jewish people… The security issue is something 
we consider as physical. The recognition in the state of the Jewish people… is 
a bit confusing. It just gets in the way...  
The position of Palestinian interviewee M was somewhat more complex: he believed 
that the Israelis use symbols to justify their political demands.  
Discussion 
According to a commonly held view, which is also manifested in the academic 
literature, one of the main obstacles to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from a 
disparity between a concrete Israeli orientation and a symbolic Palestinian approach.  The 
findings here reveal a far more complex reality, with both sides making symbolic and 
concrete claims simultaneously.  It appears, therefore, that the widespread assumption 
regarding the different nature of the demands made by each of the sides is unfounded.  
Furthermore, this study shows that this mistaken premise may, in itself, constitute an obstacle 
to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  More generally, in light of the finding 
obtained in this research, the hypothesis that there is a clear-cut distinction between symbolic 
and concrete cultures seems untenable.  Crucially, this idea is clearly counterproductive, as 
the data suggest that balancing between symbolic and concrete demands in a negotiation can 
serve as a tool for achieving conflict resolution.  
The Israeli Side 
Israeli interviewees were largely in agreement about the degree of importance of 
mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective peoples, 
and some also supported the political demand that Palestine recognize Israel as the state of 
the Jewish people.  The literature on political recognition deals for the most part with the 
struggle of different groups within a joint social sphere, rather than with conflicts between 
states or nations. The interviews conducted for the purpose of this study show that, much as 
with individuals and groups, recognition is also sought and demanded by states.  Thus, our 
research contributes to the scholarly effort in this regard by extending the academic study of 
demands for recognition from the national-social to the international context.  
On issues of water rights, security and territory, Israeli interviewees appeared to favor 
the pragmatic approach.  Furthermore, the responses show that all the interviewees who saw 
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the demand for the end of the conflict as concrete believed it to be important, while those 
who saw it as symbolic were divided as to its importance in the peace process.  
In the surveys, Israeli respondents unambiguously placed recognition of Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people as their top priority, preferring it over territorial demands.  The 
second and third preferences, however, were concrete.   
The Palestinian Side 
The interviews demonstrate that, although the Palestinians interviewees assigned great 
importance to symbolic demands, they did not discount concrete interests either.  The 
recognition of the right of return and of the pain and suffering of refugees was mentioned 
over and over again, as well as the demand to accept responsibility.  The literature is divided 
on the question of whether or not a political apology must involve accepting responsibility 
(Auerbach, 2004; Barkan, 2000; Cunningham, 1999; Rotberg, 2006; Rouhana, 2004; 
Weyeneth, 2001).  In our case, the Palestinians focused on the Israelis’ acknowledgment of 
responsibility as a symbolic gesture, which would necessarily entail an apology.  
According to the academic literature, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of 
a case in which the demand for justice has become a key issue.  Thus, the goal of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has frequently been defined as achieving a “just and stable peace” 
(Rouhana, 2004, p. 37), thereby rendering justice as a primary condition to forging peace.  
The present study has not supported the above theoretical premise.  The concepts of rights 
and justice rarely figured in the Palestinian conceptualizations of demands – in fact, these 
terms were mentioned only three times, in two interviews.  Instead of calling for justice, the 
Palestinian interviewees tended to frame specific, concrete demands designed to solve the 
problems of security, water, territory and more – although their solutions were less defined or 
detailed as compared to those advanced by the Israeli side.  And while putting emphasis on 
Israeli recognition of the right of return and on the refugees' pain and suffering, as well as on 
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem, the Palestinian interviewees clearly 
stipulated that these symbolic gestures must be translated into practical measures.  Thus, on 
the Palestinian side, the discussion of the refugee problem was by no means amorphous or 
wrapped in vague terminology such as justice or equity, but appeared to be firmly anchored 
in pragmatism and realism.  
As for Palestinian public opinion, the rankings given to symbolic and concrete 
demands show preference for both.  The first priority for most Palestinian respondents was a 
symbolic demand: Israeli recognition of Palestine.  Their next highest preference, however, 
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was concrete: safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza.  Recognition of pain and 
suffering was clearly more important than water rights, a finding which points to the 
importance of the former issue for the Palestinian public.  The emphasis Palestinian public 
opinion places on concrete aspects was also evident from their preference for a state based on 
the 1967 borders or for sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem over 
recognition of the right of return.  
It is noteworthy that, while both sides weighed symbolic and concrete demands as 
equally important, neither side was aware of that tendency on the part of the other.  Israeli 
interviewees were divided on their perception of the Palestinians' place on the symbolic-
concrete continuum, but some of them clearly still saw the Palestinians' attitude as anchored 
primarily in symbolic values.  As mentioned previously, the prevailing assumption among 
scholars is that differences in symbolic versus concrete preferences serve as an obstacle to 
conflict resolution. Ironically, the results of this study indicate that it is the assumption itself 
that might constitute an obstacle in a quest for peace.  
From a different perspective, the Israeli interviewees' awareness of the symbolic 
needs of the Palestinians may be helpful in respond ing to the Palestinians’ demands.  The 
Israeli interviewees acknowledged the importance attached by Palestinians to Israel 
recognizing the right of return and the pain and suffering of the refugees, as well as to Israel 
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem.  As a result of this awareness, the Israeli 
interviewees were willing to acquiesce to the former two demands in order to advance the 
negotiations.  The Palestinian interviewees, on the other hand, had no clear perception of the 
Israelis' place on the symbolic-concrete continuum.  In so far as symbolic demands carry 
great weight in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, this lack of awareness on the part of the 
Palestinians may prove an obstacle to constructive negotiation.  
As concerns symbolic versus concrete distinction, the present study has shown that 
the common assumption regarding a gap between the Israeli and the Palestinian preferences 
is unfounded.  On the other hand, a disparity emerged between groups within the Israeli 
society concerning the value of symbolic aspirations.   In the polls, Israeli respondents ranked 
the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people as their top 
priority. In contrast, most of the Israeli interviewees believed that this demand for recognition 
is unnecessary, and may even be perceived by the other side as a provocation.   Public 
opinion is an important player in conflict resolution and, moreover, there is a reciprocal, 
inter-dependency relationship between public opinion and leaders.  Thus, the disparity found 
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between the opinions of the public and the persons interviewed should not be disregarded, 
since it constitutes an obstacle that may impede the negotiation and conflict resolution.  
Political processes of negotiation, conflict management and conflict resolution require 
common ground and shared understanding.  One of the central challenges in resolving 
international conflicts is the possible failure of talks or accords due to inter-group differences 
which hinder communication and prevent sides from agreeing upon shared rules of play 
(Wittes, 2005).  By the same token, the success of any political dialogue depends on 
understanding the goals and the discourse of the 'self' as well as learning about the 'other' 
(Gurevich, 2002; Sagi, 1999).  Our research demonstrates that, in a conflict, examining the 
needs and aspirations of sides through the lens of symbolic and concrete distinction is 
essential for promoting mutual understanding and toppling stereotypes.  
Thus, awareness of the symbolic and the concrete dimensions in one’s own as well as 
the other side’s aspirations is essential for dealing with conflicts. The Joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Polls (JIPP) conducted between 2003 and 2006 indicate that an overall package can receive 
greater support than its component parts.  People’s rationale is largely based on trade-offs, so 
one component may be seen as a compensation for another (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).  This 
research has shown that the relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve 
as a tool for achieving a compensatory balance.  Israeli interviewees proposed varied ideas 
for symbolic acts as a compensation for concrete concessions.  The findings suggest, 
therefore, that understanding which core issues are seen mostly as concrete (for example 
land, in our case) and which as symbolic (for example, recognition) improves the chances 
that the sides will agree upon the overall package in a negotiation.  Put differently, in 
international conflict management and conflict negotiation, it is essential to understand and 
analyze the sides’ attitudes towards symbolic demands, as this may facilitate conflict 
resolution as well as reconciliation.  
As we maintained earlier, a demand can be seen as both symbolic and concrete.  The 
right of return issue, for example, has two dimensions: a concrete demand for physical return 
and a symbolic demand for recognition of the right to return.  We have found that a trade-off 
between the two dimensions can be used to achieve conflict resolution.  In the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, both sides agree that the right of return cannot possibly be realized by 
having all refugees return to Israeli territory within the Green Line.  This is evident from the 
results of the December 2011 JIPP poll: 45% among Palestinians support a solution based on 
permanent residency of the refugees in Palestinian and the Israeli areas transferred to 
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Palestinian  (residency in host countries, third countries, or Israel would be subject to the 
decision of these states).  While the refugee problem is generally seen as an intractable issue, 
in our study the interviewees on both sides asserted that recognizing the right of return can be 
exchanged for Palestinians waiving the actual return and thereby conceding that this right 
would ultimately remain unrealized.  This result suggests that openness to symbolic demands 
and the trade-off between the symbolic and the concrete dimensions within the same demand 
may serve as a means to promote conflict resolution.  Further studies may examine how this 
strategy can be applied to other international conflicts, based on an understanding of the 
importance of symbolic demands for recognition in conflicts.  
The above discussion does not imply that symbolic-concrete compensation is possible 
for all demands in a conflict.  The Palestinian interviewees were reluctant to agree to mutual 
recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective people, despite 
the importance attached to these demands by the Israeli side.  Furthermore, they spoke 
against recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, in spite of this issue’s importance 
for the Israeli public opinion.  And while the Palestinian side set a great store by the Israeli 
acceptance of responsibility for the refugee problem, the Israeli interviewees were divided on 
whether this demand should be met.  It seems, therefore, that the study of conflict resolution 
can benefit from a better understanding of the ways in which recognition can serve as an 
obstacle to resolving conflicts, on the one hand, and as a tool to aid it, on the other.  
An assumption underlying the few studies dealing with the symbolic-concrete 
distinction regarding conflict resolution is that cultures can be classified into two clear-cut 
categories: symbolic versus concrete (Abu-Nimar, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Inbar & Yuchtman-
Yaar, 1985).  Yet, as we have seen in the Israeli case, within the same culture, public opinion 
and leadership can attach different importance to symbolic demands.  Thus, further research 
on symbolic aspects in conflict resolution would do well to cast such inter-culture 
assumptions aside.  The perception of a culture in academia must take into account its 
complex nature, and seemingly irrational phenomena should be examined based on the 
analysis of the symbolic discourse in various public arenas where conflicts are presented and 
framed. 
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